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Summary 
 
 
 
The main concern of my study is to understand the contemporary conflicts 
regarding Islam in the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Today a revival of Islam can be observed, which 
began in the last years of the Soviet Union. Since the late 1990s Central 
Asian governments have feared Islamic terrorism and have taken diverse 
measures against its spread. Despite this, as I show, apart from fundamenta-
list movements, modernist groups and folk Islam are also gaining ground in 
Central Asia. By way of an explanation, my vicious-circle hypothesis de-
monstrates how state repression against such movements might be having a 
counter-intended effect on the radicalization of Muslims in the region.  
The revival of Islam in Central Asia cannot be analyzed without under-
standing the local forms of Islam prevalent in the region. Part I of the study 
highlights the most important aspects of Central Asian Islam such as the 
prevalence of the Sunni Hanafi School of law and the adaptation of local 
customs; the combination with pre-Islamic rituals, and the influence of Su-
fism. Following this I present an overview of the different definitions of po-
litical Islam and the history of Salafism before introducing the most in-
fluential Salafi groups in the region. Not only do I focus on radical political 
groups in my analysis but also on apolitical groups and religious move-
ments aiming at the mere social transformation of the society. Indeed I also 
regard these as an essential part of my analysis since they often have more 
members than political groups and are similarly prone to state repression. 
This part concludes with a typology of actors contributing to the revival of 
Isalm. 
In part II I focus on the relationship between politics and religion 
during the last centuries. Knowledge of tsarist and communist religious po-
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licies is important for an understanding of the politics of the contemporary 
Central Asian states in the domains of religion, security and jurisprudence. 
I start my comparative study by addressing the issue of how Central Asian 
states are currently dealing with Islam: I analyze the status of religion in 
their respective constitutions, the content of religious laws, the institutions 
which are involved with religion and some important state-controlled pro-
cedures concerning religion such as hajj and the registration-process for re-
ligious communities. I furthermore compare these countries’ security stra-
tegies and counter-terrorism laws, the capacities of their secret police 
(GKNB), of their internal forces (MVD) and their military and give an 
overview of their international security cooperation. Against this back-
ground, I finally elaborate an actor-typology of the Central Asian states’ 
restrictions towards Islamic groups.  
In part III securitization theory provides us with a useful theoretical 
framework to analyze my hypothesis with an agent-based computer simula-
tion. As I reveal, many observers of Central Asian government policies 
suggest that state repression towards Islamic groups leads to the radicaliza-
tion of individuals but they do not explain how this mechanism has come 
about. I here use a computer simulation model to test my hypothesis and the 
assumed mechanisms. Finally, I present my simulation model of the con-
flict in Central Asia and draw some conclusions from the simulation out-
comes. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
1.1. RESEARCH INTEREST 
 
Today western countries fear international terrorism and Islamic fundamen-
talism. As Richard Clarke made clear after 9/11, the international terror 
network of jihadists will be the biggest danger to the US national security 
in the near future and will probably also need to be combated in the follo-
wing generation (Clarke 2005: 11). In addition to western nation-states, the 
United Nations Security Council also declared terrorism a major threat to 
international security. After 9/11 the following Security Council Resolution 
was penned on September 28 2001: “[…] the Security Council [is] deeply 
concerned by the increase, in various regions of the world, of acts of terro-
rism motivated by intolerance or extremism” (UNO 2001: 1). Whereas 
western governments have subsequently used the (legitimate) grounds of 
state security to justify their ‘War on Terror’, they have at the same time, 
“persuaded their citizens to accept less progressive and rigorous norms, ea-
sing the job of law enforcement at the cost of individual human rights” 
(Kamalova 2007: 1). This is even truer for Central Asian governments who 
are used to governing in an environment where respect for human rights 
does not yet have such a long political tradition as in Europe and the US. I 
concentrate here on the comparison of the former Soviet Republics of Kaz-
akhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. (As Turkmenistan is a too 
special case because the repression and state-control are very extreme and 
the country is totally closed to any international observers and scientific re-
search, this case is excluded from the study.) Despite criticism from human 
rights organizations, western powers like the US, France and Germany as 
well as western collective treaty organizations such as NATO collaborate – 
along with Russia and SCO – with these authoritarian Central Asian re-
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gimes to ‘fight terrorism’. These human rights organizations state that the 
international discourse on Islamic terrorism justifies human rights violati-
ons and the suppression of the already very weak opposition in the Central 
Asian countries. Indeed, Khalid explains that by taking part in the ‘War on 
Terror’ Central Asian countries can expand their power “by tying all dome-
stic opposition to ‘international terrorism’, even when no links actually 
exist” (Khalid 2007: 169). Kamalova exemplifies this with the case of Uz-
bekistan which went furthest in this regard (Kamalova 2007).  
The Central Asian countries differ in terms of the strength of their poli-
tical regimes; the extent to which their security forces use repressive means, 
and also in terms of their respective cultures and level of religiosity. How-
ever, despite these differences, my case study shows that at least with re-
gards to the development of the religious reality and the handling of religi-
ous groups all Central Asian states share some common features. 
 
Social developments: 
 
• A ‘revival of Islam’ is underway in Central Asia. This ‘revival of Islam’ 
is ideologically multi-faceted: not only are neo-fundamentalist move-
ments becoming more popular but modernist Islamic groups are also 
gaining more members. In addition, folk Islam is being practiced on a 
more regular basis.  
• On the one hand there are devout religious Muslims without any social 
or political agenda while on the other there are armed Islamic groups 
aiming to establish an Islamic state. 
• Among those who are working towards an Islamic society are groups 
which proselytize peacefully and others who execute terrorist acts 
which lead to deaths and casualties. 
 
Government response: 
 
• The Central Asian governments have established their own interpretati-
on of ‘traditional Islam’ as the legal, ‘official’ Islam. 
• Central Asian governments lump together all foreign Islamic move-
ments as ‘extremist’ and ‘terrorist’. 
• The Central Asian governments restrict the freedom of religion of their 
citizens by counter-terrorism measures. 
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1.1.1. Research Question 
 
Comparing the extreme examples concerning the threat of Islamist terro-
rism I can observe the following differences between the Central Asian sta-
tes: 
 
• Since the early 2000s seven suicide attacks have taken place in Uzbe-
kistan (see Figure 1). Furthermore, this country has the highest numbers 
of detainees on religious grounds: the total figure is estimated to be se-
veral thousands (see Table 21). According to the Human Rights Defen-
ders of Uzbekistan in 2012 alone 250 Muslims were detained on religi-
ous grounds (see US State Department 2013). 
• In Kyrgyzstan no terrorist attacks have occurred so far although it is the 
country with the highest percentage of Muslims (10% of the population) 
that regard attacks against civilians as at least sometimes justified (see 
Figure 7) in order to defend Islam (Uzbekistan is the country with the 
lowest percentage of 0%). Furthermore, an astonishingly high percenta-
ge of over 30% of Kyrgyzstanis would welcome the introduction of 
Sharia as the law of the land (see Figure 7 as well; there is no data 
available on this question for Uzbekistan). Despite these facts, it is the 
Central Asian country with the smallest numbers of detainees on religi-
ous grounds (approximately 50 people). 
 
Another difference between the two countries is that Uzbekistan has the 
largest proportion of Muslims that do not feel free to practice religion while 
Kyrgyzstan is the Central Asian country where Muslims feel most free to 
practice their religion (see Figure 12). 
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Source: GTD (2013) 
 
It is furthermore interesting to note that in each country where suicide atta-
cks occurred this invariably happened after the introduction of a restrictive 
religious law: such a law was introduced in Uzbekistan in 1998, in Tajikis-
tan in 2009 and in Kazakhstan in 2011. (In Kyrgyzstan a new religious law 
was introduced in 2009 and amended in 2012.) 
 
Against this background I pose the following research questions: 
 
• Why does the revival of Islam lead to different degrees of radicaliza-
tion of Muslims in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbeki-
stan? 
• Does a vicious circle between counter-terrorism measures and radi-
calization of Muslims exist in Central Asia? Why could this be the 
case? 
 
I will now introduce some important terms and then elaborate on the con-
cepts of repression and radicalization before turning to the broader theoreti-
cal background of radical Islam and security issues. 
Figure 1: Numbers of Suicide Attacks in Central Asia 
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1.1.2. Definitions 
 
Before I start to theorize about this topic I must clarify some terms. 
 
• State actors: if I speak of a state actor I have the Central Asian govern-
ments as well as their ministries, institutions and security forces in 
mind. The term state actor refers to the collective of individuals work-
ing in these state institutions. 
• Non-state actors: if I speak of non-state actors I am referring to Muslim 
groups which either have or do not have a political agenda but share the 
same goals or sentiments of Islam. The term non-state actor refers to the 
collective group and not to an individual member of the group.  
• State violence/ Repression: the terms state violence and repression are 
used interchangeably and refer to “the action [of a state actor] of subdu-
ing someone or something by force” (Oxford dictionary ). When I speak 
of state-violence of repression without further specification I refer to 
violence aimed at members of Islamic groups. Repressive means used 
by a state can be legitimate or illegitimate as well as legal or illegal. 
Whereas the legality of repressive means depends on the state’s laws, 
the legitimacy of repressive means is not only a question of laws and 
rules but also of the “ability to be defended with logic or justification; 
validity” (Oxford dictionary ) (see definition of legitimacy). 
• Radicalization: I distinguish between ideological and methodological 
radicalization. A person who is ideologically radicalized becomes an 
advocate of “thorough or complete political or social reform; a member 
of a political party or part of a party pursuing such aims” (Oxford dic-
tionary ). A person who is methodologically radicalized becomes mili-
tant, which means that he favours “confrontational or violent methods 
in support of a political or social cause” (Oxford dictionary ). 
• Non-state violence/ Militancy: the terms non-state violence and mili-
tancy are used interchangeably and refer to violent means used by non-
state actors. When I speak of non-state violence or militancy I mean 
property damage or harm caused to people by citizens belonging to an 
Islamic group. Non-state violence can have a terrorist character if it is 
directed against civilians or a guerrilla-like character if it is directed 
against security forces, police or the government. It is always illegal but 
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can be regarded as legitimate or illegitimate (see definition of legi-
timacy). 
• Legitimacy: legitimacy is important in my study in two different ways. 
First, there is the question of whether state and non-state violence is le-
gitimate in a normative way. The use of repressive means by a state or 
militant means by a non-state actor is legitimate if it is morally or reli-
giously justifiable. (The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy calls this 
a narrow normative definition of legitimacy. )   
The second issue concerns the fundamental question of the legitimacy 
of the Central Asian states and governments. In this regard Weber’s dis-
tinction of three different sources of legitimacy for rule is important for 
what the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy calls the “descriptive de-
finition of legitimacy”. Crucial in this respect is the citizen’s belief in 
the legitimacy of a political regime: “the basis of every system of autho-
rity, and correspondingly of every kind of willingness to obey, is a be-
lief, a belief by virtue of which persons exercising authority are lent 
prestige” (Weber 1964: 382). In the Central Asian context Weber’s dif-
ferent (rational-legal, traditional and charismatic) sources of legitimacy 
for a government or ruler can be understood as: the ability to maintain 
political stability, provide economic development or mere habituation 
to clan politics or Soviet style of rule (I will go into further details of 
such consideration in section 6.3.1). 
• Security: traditional concepts of security refer to national security, 
which means the absence of military threats from inside and outside of 
a country. Whereas this puts the sovereign nation state at the heart of 
security policies, the term human security refers to the security of the 
individual. This definition is relevant as “far more people have been kil-
led by their own governments than by foreign armies during the last 100 
years” (HSRP). At any rate, there is a degree of correlation between 
issues of national and human security. The Human Security Report Pro-
ject (HSRP) defines human security as “the combination of threats 
associated with war, genocide, and the displacement of populations” 
which means “at a minimum, […] freedom from violence and from the 
fear of violence” (HSRP). In a broader sense, “hunger, disease, polluti-
on, affronts to human dignity, threats to livelihoods, and other harms” 
are also regarded as human security issues (HSRP). Under this broad 
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definition the protection and provision of social and economic human 
rights is essential. 
 
I will come back to these concepts of security when discussing the results 
of the simulation. I will now analyze in detail the arguments of those who 
criticize the collaboration of western powers with authoritarian Central 
Asian regimes because of the latters’ response to the ‘revival of Islam’ and 
thereby elaborate my hypothesis. 
 
1.1.3. Repression-Radicalization Hypothesis 
 
When arguing that western powers should not collaborate with authoritari-
an regimes who spurn basic human rights, human rights defenders and also 
scientists often refer to what I will call here the repression-radicalization 
hypothesis. This hypothesis implies that individuals who experience the 
suppression of their human right to freedom of religion are radicalized. Not 
only practitioners and field workers but also independent observers mention 
this hypothesis and I therefore scrutinize its implications in more detail in 
this study. 
 
Repression-radicalization hypothesis: 
 
In the long run, strong state repression against Islamic groups leads to 
the radicalization of Muslims in Central Asia. 
 
Figure 2: Repression-radicalization Hypothesis 
 
 
 
Expert interviews in the region revealed that it is more realistic to act on the 
assumption of the radicalization of individuals rather than on the assump-
tion of the radicalization of entire groups (interview with member of Politi-
co-Military Unit OSCE in Bishkek). Let us elaborate on the aforementioned 
mechanism with some examples of statements. First of all, the presentation 
of religious or political issues as a security problem by governments indi-
Repression Radicalization 
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cates that the state fears devout Muslims because of their social influence. 
As I can see from the following examples, many observers concentrate on 
the case of Hizb ut-Tharir. This group is discussed especially controversly 
as it is a political party that aims at establishing a caliphate across the con-
temporary nation-states but despite using only non-violent means it is ille-
gal in all Central Asian countries (see also Karagiannis 2010: 72). 
Indiscriminate repression of devout Muslims begs the question: how 
many alleged extremists are merely devout peaceful Muslims rather than 
terrorists? How many of them feel aggrieved because of the human rights 
violations they experience and subsequently become extremists only after 
being arbitrarily detained? The following statement by Halbach exemplifies 
this view with reference to Uzbekistan: 
 
“For a long time now, the undifferentiated approach taken towards alleged or actual 
religious extremists in Uzbekistan has led us to question whether power, with its 
violent actions, actually fosters radicalization tendencies instead of preventing them” 
(Halbach 2010a: 95, translated by the author). 
 
Halbach’s comments are echoed by Karagiannis, who observes that repres-
sive means against fundamentalist movements can have a counter-intended 
effect. He gives the example of the non-violent group Hizb ut-Tahrir, which 
has only attracted greater publicity as a result of its criminalization:1 
 
“[…] the adoption of repressive and punitive measures to combat a radical, but non-
violent, Islamic group has only increased the appeal of Hizb ut-Tahrir among Cent-
ral Asian populations” (Karagiannis 2010: 72). 
 
By detaining members of banned groups, the government tries to suppress 
the group, but this does not always have the desired effect. Kamuluddin’s 
argument is in a similar vein. He explains the counter-intended effect of 
developing martyrs‘ stories by means of detentions: 
 
                                                   
1  Criminalize means: “turn (an activity) into a criminal offence by making it ille-
gal: turn (someone) into a criminal by making their activities illegal” (Oxford 
dictionary: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/criminalize). 
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“by imprisoning and persecuting the members of the party, the authorities are, in ef-
fect, providing substantial assistance to the Hizb ut-Tahrir, which, as a result, enjoys 
the aura of martyrdom” (Kamuluddin 2005).  
 
My case studies show that the registration of religious groups is one of the 
main instruments for controlling the religious landscape in the Central 
Asian countries. This allows for the criminalization of groups which do not 
pass the registration process and therefore are per se illegal. Members do 
not even have to be accused of making any attempt to topple or attack the 
regime. Persons therefore can be arrested and detained only on grounds of 
their mental attitude (as members of an illegal group) instead of their be-
haviour (interview with Sultangaliyeva, former Director of the Kazakhstan 
Institute for Strategic Studies). As Vitaly Ponomarev, Head of the Central 
Asia department of the Russian Memorial Human Rights Center makes 
clear, until 1998 the penal code was hardly ever applied to religious ex-
tremists except for convictions regarding possession of illegal drugs and 
weapons (which were planted during their arrest) (interview with 
Ponomarev). From 1998 to 2001, however, the majority of Islamists were 
convicted of acting against the constitution while more recently articles 
against the distribution of material threatening public security (Art. 244-1) 
and membership of a banned group (244-2) have been applied (interview 
with Ponomarev). 
If I focus on the banned groups and what has happened to their mem-
bers, one important point has to be considered: detained persons are likely 
to become radicalized in prison. Several studies analyze this phenomenon 
such as Fighel’s paper entitled ‘The Radicalization Process in Prisons’ 
(Fighel 2007). Although this mainly concentrated on the US and Europe, 
the following is true globally: 
 
“The prison’s isolated environment, ability to create a ‘captive audience’ atmosphe-
re, its absence of day-to-day distractions, and its large population of disaffected y-
oung men, makes it an excellent breeding ground for radicalization” (Fighel 
2007: 1). 
 
The International Crisis Group briefing ‘Central Asia: Islamists in Prison’ 
concentrates on Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan specifically (ICG 2009). Here 
the authors come to the conclusion that the number and political importance 
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of Islamists in Kyrgyz and Kazakh prisons is growing (ICG 2009: 1). Fur-
thermore, poor living conditions, prevailing corruption and abuse of office 
in the prisons are severe grounds for concern (ICG 2009: 13). Although I 
will not go into further details of how the radicalization in prisons takes 
place I will use it as the main indicator to simulate radicalization through 
repression. The fact that I have estimated numbers of detainees on religious 
grounds for all four countries also speaks for this approach. 
When discussing the counter-intended effects of repression we should 
first of all keep in mind, though, that repression itself is considered to be 
the solution to the existence of radical and terrorist groups. The very fact 
that more radicalization leads to more repression is also understandable be-
cause the state can more easily gain legitimacy for the repression of Islamic 
groups when these groups become more prominent in society. 
 
1.1.4. Vicious-Circle Hypothesis 
 
It is important to note that the state suppression of Islamists results in more 
than just a counter-intended effect. First of all, repression prevents groups 
from acting overtly, diminishes their proselytizing efforts, reduces their re-
sources and awes their members. For these reasons I will not dwell upon 
the repression-radicalization hypothesis but develop it further and talk of a 
vicious circle of repression and radicalization. 
 
Vicious-circle hypothesis: 
 
State repression against Islamic groups and radical political Islam mutu-
ally reinforce each other in Central Asia 
 
Figure 3: Vicious-circle Hypothesis 
 
 
 
I now give an overview of theories used to understand the revival of Islam 
in Central Asia and then introduce the methods and data applied in this stu-
dy for analysing and testing the vicious-circle hypothesis. 
Repression Radicalization 
INTRODUCTION | 27 
1.2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
In order to explain the development of political Islam as an opposition 
power, authors refer to theories such as functionalism, resource-
mobilization theory, political process theory or frame theory. However, 
most of the experts on Central Asian political Islam refer to these theories 
only in a delimiting way (see for example Karagiannis 2010). Furthermore, 
in Naumkin’s view these theories, as well as theories of political depriva-
tion and economic or psychological explanations, are not useful for an 
analysis of radical Islam in general and radical Islam in Central Asia specif-
ically. He therefore suggests refraining from using all theoretical approach-
es to the subject. Hafez also criticizes socio-economic and psychological 
approaches as well as political process theory; however, he does turn to so-
cial movement theory for an explanation of violent Islamism.  
I am not interested in the general reasons for why radical Islamism has 
come about and therefore do not want to judge the usefulness of theories 
for an analysis of political Islam. Instead I am interested very specifically in 
the above mentioned interplay of governmental politics and radicalizing 
tendencies in political Islam. I therefore now provide an overview of theo-
retical approaches dealing with legitimacy and security politics as well as 
with constructivism in general. Only in chapter 10 will I elaborate on secu-
ritization theory in more detail. 
Mainstream approaches in International Relations such as Realism or 
Liberalism explain insecurity and security politics in terms of objective 
threats (see Balzacq 2011: xii) which are therefore not useful for analysing 
the vicious circle of repression and radicalization: They refer to material in-
centives for explaining participation in armed groups. Therefore, rational 
explanations disregard legitimacy, which is a very important factor for 
maintaining or escalating a conflict. Its importance as a precondition for 
collective action is without controversy in sociology but underestimated in 
International Relations. Whereas the ‘just war’ theory investigates under 
which circumstances war is justifiable, it is more concerned with morality 
than with its impact on collective behaviour. What I do, however, is not to 
conduct a normative analysis but to analyze the impact ‘described’ legiti-
macy has on the further participation of state and non-state actors in the 
conflict. 
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Sociological approaches are useful in this regard: non-material incentives 
such as a leader’s charisma, group ideology or the satisfaction of pursuing 
justice or vengeance are issues of sociological conflict research (Blattman 
and Miguel 2010: 15). Schlichte (2009) acts on the assumption of a politi-
cal sociological viewpoint and identifies legitimacy as a key variable in ex-
plaining the success and failure of non-state armed groups. He states that 
“violence can legitimate power, but it can also have de-legitimizing effects” 
(Schlichte 2009: 20). Conflict parties must overcome what he calls the 
‘shadow of violence’ (Schlichte 2009: 14) to be collectively capable of act-
ing. “It is the de-legitimizing and legitimizing effects of violence that are at 
the core of the dynamics which decide about an armed group’s fate” 
(Schlichte 2009: 17). Without legitimacy the mobilization for collective vi-
olent action is not feasible. 
Furthermore, practitioners acknowledge the importance of ‘winning the 
hearts and minds’ of the population in a conflict. NATO for example em-
phasized the importance of legitimacy as a tool to attain strategic goals in 
the tactical directive for ISAF soldiers in Afghanistan: 
 
“We will not win based on the number of Taliban we kill, but instead on our ability 
to separate insurgents from the center of gravity – the people. That means we must 
[…] operate in a manner which will win their support” (McCrystal 2009: 1). 
 
This was scrutinized in studies on terrorism and counter-terrorism policies. 
Empirical research on the impact of legitimacy on conflict development has 
been carried out by Wenger and Zimmermann (2007), who examine the 
connection between legitimacy and efficiency in the counter-terrorism poli-
cies of western states. They find that “combating terrorism is no short-term 
endeavour. Thus, in the long term, legitimacy matters, both in terms of our 
self-perception and in terms of the political perceptions of the people af-
fected by global terrorist forces” (Wenger & Zimmermann 2007: 13).  
With this I come back to the intended and counter-intended effects of 
repression and to the vicious circle of violence. If we are looking for a theo-
retical framework for further developing the vicious-circle hypothesis, we 
should look no further than constructivism for gaining an understanding of 
the role of legitimacy, as well as of the counter-intended and mutually rein-
forcing effects. 
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The constructivist idea implies that social relations and structures consist of 
three elements: 
 
• Shared knowledge 
• Material resources 
• Practices 
 
Shared knowledge is decisive when actors cooperate or conflict (Wendt 
1995: 73). In a security dilemma, actors mistrust each other and therefore 
are prone to use violent means in order to enforce their claims. In a security 
community, on the other hand, actors share the same knowledge and con-
flicts can be reconciled. Wendt explains that material resources per se do 
not promote or prevent conflicts. Instead: “[…] Amity or enmity is a func-
tion of shared understandings” (Wendt 1995: 73). The US, for example, is 
far more concerned by North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons than 
by Israel’s. Furthermore, a conflict exists only as long as corresponding 
practice is executed:  
 
“Social structure exists only in process. The Cold War was a structure of shared 
knowledge that governed great power relations for forty years, but once they stopped 
acting on this basis, it was ‘over’ ” (Wendt 1995: 73).  
 
Contrary to rational choice approaches, the constructivist approach assumes 
that interactions between actors have an influence on their interests and 
identities. Therefore it is useful to analyze conflicts in general and the vi-
cious circle of repression and radicalization specifically using this ap-
proach. It is important to my study that the actors’ perceptions are not mere 
inventions but are galvanised by real occurrences. However, these occur-
rences are interpreted and remembered by the actors involved in different 
ways. In a viable conflict system, the actions of one actor legitimize the ac-
tions of his opponent because the actions of both are mutually dependent.2 
                                                   
2 “Viability means that knowledge or other constructions have to prove them-
selves to be useful and viable in a certain context of use – they have to be ap-
propriate and enable an individual to act and survive in a particular context. This 
does not mean that constructions have to be true or have to contain accurate de-
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In our case, this means that if a suicide attack takes place in a market place, 
killing civilians, this reinforces their opponents’ perception of Islamists as 
inhuman, irrational lunatics. Similarly, if the US justify the loss of civilians 
in their ‘War on Terror’ as ‘collateral damage’, this reinforces their oppo-
nents’ perception that the United States’ interest in democracy and human 
rights is duplicitous. This is even easier to prove in case of the Central 
Asian states which are governed by former Communist party officials who 
lack any democratic legitimacy. 
 
 
1.3. METHODS 
 
In addition to a computer simulation, which I use as an analytical method in 
my study, qualitative research methods such as content analysis and inter-
views are used. In this chapter I will provide details regarding my qualita-
tive research followed by an overview of agent-based modelling in the so-
cial sciences.  
 
1.3.1. Qualitative Research 
 
Laws on religion and terrorism published by the Central Asian governments 
as well as interviews and publications of religious groups constitute im-
portant primary sources for the analysis. The official documents and web-
sites used for analysing the Central Asian governments’ position towards 
religion are listed in Appendix A. 
Furthermore, it was regarded as essential to include contemporary 
events in the study and therefore online-news portals reporting in Russian 
(for example Centerasia www.centrasia.ru and Radio Azattyk http:// 
rus.azattyk.org) were reviewed on a regular basis (these provide not only 
more diverse information about the region than English online-news portals 
such as Tengri News or EurasiaNet but also a greater amount). 
I reviewed secondary analyses on Islam in Central Asia in recent centu-
ries and more specifically in the last few decades in order to gain an over-
view of the history of its relation to politics. In addition, I reviewed litera-
                                                   
pictions of reality – neither of these can be proven because they cannot be di-
rectly compared to the original” (Flick 2008: 163f). 
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ture on Islamic terrorism in general and radical groups active in the region 
in particular. Studies on ‘everyday Islam’ completed this stage of my analy-
sis and raised questions concerning the acceptance of groups adhering to a 
scriptural interpretation of Islam in the broader Central Asian population. 
I directly observed the prevailing mood concerning the relationship of 
religion and politics in the Central Asian countries during a research trip to 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan from February to March 2013. In 
addition to formal interviews with experts and devout Muslims in the field 
(listed in Appendix B), several informal talks with ordinary people and ob-
servations took place in Almaty, Bishkek and Dushanbe as well as in near-
by places of these capitals. In Bishkek I was able to visit a madrasa and a 
mosque of the Gülen movement as well as a private primary school of the 
same movement. Outside of the city I conducted observatory research at the 
Mazar of Baityk Baatyr and the worshipping that took place there. I fur-
thermore could participate in a religious meeting of an unofficial religious 
class of women in Bishkek that lastet for several hours. In Almaty, I paid a 
visit to the official city mosque and talked to women working there. In Du-
shanbe I took a trip to the Ismaili Centre, Haji Yakoub mosque and two 
small neighbourhood-mosques. Unfortunately I could not realize a planned 
research excursion to Uzbekistan because of difficulties obtaining a visa. 
Finally, I applied the information from the primary sources, secondary 
analyses and fieldwork in the case studies of the Islamic groups and gov-
ernments and elaborated a computer simulation model to further develop 
and scrutinize my assumptions. Because the analytical method of agent-
based simulations is not yet well known in social sciences, I will presently 
give a short overview of simulation methods. Following this, one of the 
best known agent-based conflict models will be presented. Only in chapter 
11 I will expose how I deal with the main elements of agent-based simula-
tion for analysing the religious conflict of state and non-state actors in Cen-
tral Asia. 
 
1.3.2. Simulation as an Analytical Method in 
Social Sciences 
 
Computer simulations are still not very commonly used in social sciences 
even though they are very useful for analyzing dynamic, non-linear and 
emergent processes: the scientist builds a model of a real-world phenome-
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non as a computer-program and runs it to find out if the assumed mecha-
nisms work in the expected way. Although it is possible to conduct statisti-
cal analysis to test, for example, exponential growth with nonlinear regres-
sion analysis, “the only generally effective way of exploring non-linear be-
haviour is to simulate it by building a model and then running the simula-
tion” (Gilbert and Troitzsch 2005: 10). A computer simulation model is not 
very different from other models used in social sciences: “Computational 
models are formulated as computer programs in which there are some in-
puts (somewhat similar to independent variables) and some outputs (similar 
to dependent variables)” (Gilbert 2009: 2). However, there is one big ad-
vantage – its usefulness for analysing dynamic and nonlinear developments. 
Other advantages (for my study) of simulations in general and agent-based 
models (ABM) in particular are: 
 
• Bounded rationality: information is local – agents make up their mind 
based on their own experiences and on the messages they receive from 
other agents. Therefore, they do not have all the necessary information 
to be able to make a rational decision. Secondly, their decisions are in-
fluenced by their subjective condition (i.e. socio-demographic precondi-
tion), personal memories and experiences, and group propaganda.3 
• Heterogeneity of agents: individuals support one or the other side in the 
conflict. Even if they support the same group, they are heterogeneous 
with regard to their propensity for violence, their experience and to the 
legitimacy they ascribe to the groups. 
• Interactions between agents: agents can react to each other and to their 
environment.  
• Linking of individual behaviour with macro-outcome: the collective en-
gagement in a conflict can be best explained if one understands the mo-
tivation of the individuals taking part in it. The macro-situation can 
have an effect on the individual behaviour of the conflict. 
• Abduction, the ‘third way of doing science’ (Axelrod 2005): conflict 
assumptions are deduced from my case studies and securitization theory 
but can be adjusted during the research process. 
                                                   
3  See Epstein: “Individual rationality is ‚local’ also, in the sense that the agent’s 
expected utility calculation excludes any estimate of how his isolated act of re-
bellion may affect the social order” (Epstein 2006: 250). 
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I think it is especially fruitful to analyze the expected vicious circle with an 
agent-based model because my constructivist assumptions underline the 
importance of interaction for the emergence of a social phenomenon. Fur-
thermore, security analysis in general should include interactions because, 
as Clausewitz has made clear, war is never an isolated act but a succession 
of decisions and acts (Clausewitz 1952: 94f). According to Clausewitz, 
each conflict-party determines his own actions by assessing those of his 
opponent based on their “character, constitution, condition and circum-
stances” (Clausewitz 1952: 97f). What Clausewitz is describing is a “mutu-
al reinforcement”, which is relatively easy to demonstrate using agent-
based models (see Gilbert 2009: 2).  
In military sciences and military education, simulation methods have a 
long tradition. Computer simulations are used for the training of military 
personnel, as well as for the development of doctrines on different levels 
(Stahel 1999: 187). One example of this is Albert Stahel’s and Pierre Al-
lan’s analysis of the Soviet War in Afghanistan using a dynamic model. 
This took into account the macro-combat interactions between the Afghan 
guerrilla forces and the Soviet and Afghan regular armies as well as the 
support for the guerrillas by the population (Allan and Stahel 1983). 
The latter mentioned simulation was a system dynamic model. The 
main difference between the agent-based and the system-dynamic approach 
is that the former diverges from a ‘methodological individualism’. This en-
tails explaining macro-phenomena by means of the behaviour and actions 
of individuals. Although ‘micro dynamics’ are a subgroup of system dy-
namics which simulate individual behaviour, it has become more common 
to simulate individual behaviour with agent-based modelling techniques. 
Agents Based Models (ABMs) allow us to simulate the interaction of indi-
viduals and the diffusion of information as well as the analysis of network-
effects. The agent-based approach also enables us to analyze a macro-
phenomenon originating from the individually heterogeneous behaviour of 
agents. I attempt to answer my research question with an agent-based simu-
lation and therefore situate my study in the realm of Analytical Sociology.4 
I am interested in how macro-patterns of social behaviour are caused by in-
dividual behaviour and vice-versa. Since in an agent-based simulation each 
agent behaves according to his decision-rules within a defined environment, 
                                                   
4  See for example http://analyticalsociology.com/about/. 
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I am able to reconstruct the macro-outcome from the definition of the mi-
cro-behaviour. Indeed, agent-based simulation “permits one to study how 
rules of individual behaviour give rise – or ‘map up’ – to macroscopic regu-
larities and organisations” (Epstein 2006: 4). Studies applying agent-based 
models should be interested in regularity at the macro-level, which can be 
explained by a theory relying on micro-behaviour of agents.  
In contrast to the agent-based approach, system dynamics are based on 
differential and difference equations. Such mathematical or equation-based 
models usually specify relationships between variables at the macro-level 
and are often displayed as stock and flow diagrams: 
 
“System dynamics, as its name implies, models systems of interacting variables and 
is able to handle direct causal links, such as a growth in population leading to in-
creased depletion of resources, and feedback loops, as when population growth de-
pend on the food supply, but food supply depend on the level of the population” 
(Gilbert 2009: 18). 
 
In a system dynamic model, the values for the dependent variables are cal-
culated at each time step with the values of the variables at the previous 
time step, according to the differential or difference equations which make 
up the model. The relevant variables in the model can be borrowed from a 
theory, but the forms of the equations which define the system-behaviour 
are usually derived from statistical evidence, and not from theory (Gilbert 
2009: 5).  
None of the model-types presented above is generally better or worse 
for simulating social phenomena. Whichever type is more suitable in a spe-
cific project depends on the research question: 
 
“The choice of agents versus equations always hinges on the objectives of the analy-
sis. Given some perfectly legitimate objectives, differential equations are the tool of 
choice; given others, they’re not. If we are explicit as to our objective, or explanato-
ry criteria, no confusion need arise” (Epstein 2006: 29). 
 
System-dynamic models are very useful when large populations of homog-
enous agents are studied because they deal with aggregates (Gilbert 2009: 
20). Therefore, a system dynamics model is appropriate if I base my study 
on a theory which explains macro-mechanisms. On the other hand, an ex-
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planation on the micro-level is easier to formulate with an agent-based 
model, where the behaviour of individuals leads to the macro-phenomenon. 
If one needs to simulate heterogeneity among the agents or if the agents’ 
behaviour depends on their past experience or memory, it is also useful to 
design an agent-based model (Gilbert 2009: 20). I consider here radicaliza-
tion to be the process of ideological (re-)orientation that an individual un-
dergoes. In my view, it is for this reason that the agent-based modelling 
technique is appropriate for modelling the securitization of Islam in Central 
Asia. 
 
1.3.3. Epstein’s Conflict Model 
 
In order to embed my study in the current literature and in order to provide 
an outline of a well-known agent-based conflict model, I will briefly intro-
duce Epstein’s ‘Modelling Civil Violence’. Epstein’s study is of special in-
terest to me because it analyzes, among other things, the impact of legiti-
macy on the dynamics of a civil rebellion. In his book ‘Generative Social 
Science’ Epstein presents two models: one in which a decentralized rebel-
lion rises up against a central authority, and one where two different intra-
state groups fight each other and the central authority tries to separate them. 
In this review I will only present the first model (Epstein 2006: 245ff). 
Epstein develops an entirely theoretical model without testing his hy-
pothesis with reference to a real case. His aim is to elaborate on the main 
dynamics of civil violence. There are two agent-types; the so called 
‘agents’, representing citizens, and ‘cops’, who stand for the central author-
ity. The agents can take part in the uprising (they are ‘active’) or they do 
not participate (they are ‘quiescent’). They become active if they are ag-
grieved, which depends on their perceived hardship (uniform distribution 
among the agents) and on the legitimacy of the regime they are living in 
(exogenously given).5 A further factor is the risk aversion of the agents, 
which is heterogeneously distributed among the agents, but fixed for each 
individual’s lifetime. The risk aversion factor influences whether the agents 
become active or not. The agents calculate at each time-step the perceived 
probability of being arrested, which also depends on the active agents and 
                                                   
5  G = H* (1- L) (G = grievance, H = perceived hardship, L = legitimacy). 
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on the cops within their vision.6 During these calculations, the agents are 
rational, but because their calculation depends on their subjective vision 
and their decision (to become active or not), which is influenced by their 
specific risk-aversion, they are boundedly rational. 
The following three rules comprise the micro-specification, which de-
fines the agents’ and cops’ behaviour in Epstein’s model.7 
 
• Agent rule A: If G – N > T be active; otherwise, be quiet. (whereas G = 
individual Grievance; N = Netrisk, R * P; T = Threshold)8 
• Cops rule C: Inspect all sites within v* and arrest a random active 
agent.(whereas v* = cops’ vision) 
• Movement rule M: Move to a random site within your vision. (holds 
good for agents as well as for cops, whereas v = agents vision and v* = 
cops vision) 
 
I will not elaborate more on the details of this micro-specification, which 
can better be understood if one reads the original text of Epstein (2006: 
245–270). The presentation of his model here only serves to display how 
the very simple agent rules presented above can lead to the following find-
ings, which are interesting for my research purpose: 
 
• Under an illegitimate regime, rebellion is more likely than under a legit-
imate regime. If the legitimacy of a regime steadily declines from a 
high state to 0 (no legitimacy at all), the probability for an uprising is 
much smaller than in a scenario where the legitimacy is reduced only a 
little but at once. 
• As we see, a reduction of legitimacy can trigger rebellion. On the other 
hand, a reduction of repression can also lead to a rebellion 
                                                   
6  P = 1- exp [-k(C/A)v] (P = perceived probability to be arrested; C = number of 
cops; A = number of agents; k = parameter). 
7  See for the implementation of Epstein’s model into a NetLogo Model (Wilensky 
2004). 
8  G H (1-L) (whereas H = exogeneously given perceived hardship, heterogeneous 
among agents; L = legitimacy of the regime, exogeneous and equal among 
agents). 
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• The society’s ripeness for revolution can be measured by the average 
grievance, number of inactive agents and average risk aversion.9  
 
These findings are especially relevant as many defenders of authoritarian 
regimes state that a reduction of repressive means in their countries would 
jeopardize political stability. On the other hand, human rights defenders 
would argue that the strong repression of Islamist groups, for example, 
against Hizb ut-Tahrir, only drives them to violence. 
In contrast to Epstein I am primarily interested in the link between legit-
imacy and repression, or in what Schlichte (2009) calls the ‘shadow of vio-
lence’. Securitization theory states that extraordinary means can only be 
implemented if the audience accepts the securitization. To answer my re-
search questions, it is crucial to ascertain how authoritarian regimes estab-
lish legitimacy for their security policies and what impact this has on their 
opposing non-state actors. According to securitization theory, I assume that 
the violent (or extraordinary) means of a group are linked to the legitimacy 
the audience has ascribed to this group. 
Unfortunately, social scientists using computer simulations as a method 
all too often pay little attention to the deduction of the assumptions used in 
the models and to the empirical survey of their outcomes. Instead, they de-
velop very sophisticated and complex systems. But even the most sophisti-
cated and complex computer model does not help us to understand social 
processes if it is not based on correctly deduced assumptions which are 
tested afterwards. For this reason, it is important to keep in mind the rules 
of social science research when computer simulations are used. Therefore, I 
pay as much attention to high-quality qualitative research as to an innova-
tive computer model and describe my model with a standardized ODD pro-
tocol.  
At no point in time should it be forgotten that a simulation is only a 
simplified model of reality and that it is not reality itself. Neither, therefore, 
should too much importance be attributed to the interpretation of the simu-
lation itself despite the many advantages of the method. Instead, the simula-
tion outcome can only be understood if it is thoroughly embedded in a case 
study. 
                                                   
9  G B /R , whereas G  = average grievance, B  = frequency inactive agents, R  = 
average risk aversion. 
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1.4. DATABASES, COUNTRY REPORTS AND 
COUNTRY PROFILES 
 
Apart from the qualitative research of primary and secondary literature, I 
used different databases, country reports and annually updated country pro-
files for my study. 
Data used for the comparison of the countries and as input for the simu-
lation stem from: 
 
• CIA World Factbook (2012)   
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ 
• EIU, The Economist Intelligence Unit (2013): Democracy index 2012. 
Democracy at a standstill. A report from The Economist Intelligence 
Unit. The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited: https://portoncv. 
gov.cv/dhub/porton.por_global.open_file?p_doc_id=1034  
• Freedom House: country reports http://www.freedomhouse.org/  
• Gibney, M., Cornett, L., Wood, R., and Haschke, P.: Political Terror 
Scale (2013): http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/  
• Human Security Report (2012): http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-
security-reports/2012/overview.aspx  
• International Institute for Strategic Studies: Military Balance (2012)  
http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/military-s-balance 
• Reporter ohne Grenzen, country ranking (2013)  
https://www.reporter-ohne-grenzen.de/pressearchiv/ranglisten-
pressefreiheit/ 
• Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index (2012)   
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results 
• US State Department Country Reports on Terrorism (2013)  
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2012/209983.htm 
 
The CIA World Factbook provides country information for many issues 
such as society, economy and infrastructure. It is a reliable source of statis-
tical data. The Military Balance provides annual information about global 
military capabilities and defence economics and is widely accepted as a re-
liable source for security studies. It is compiled by the International Insti-
tute for Strategic Studies which is located in the United Kingdom. The Po-
litical Terror Scale measures human rights violations committed by state 
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actors. It relies on the same sources as the better known Cingranelli and 
Richards Human Rights Data Project (CIRI) but has improved its coding 
system (for further information about this difference see the project’s web-
site). Reporter ohne Grenzen (‘Reporters without borders’) annually pub-
lish an international ranking of the freedom of press. Transparency Interna-
tional does the same for perceptions on corruption around the world. As 
these organizations are impartial the rankings are judged as objective. The 
US State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism are used as an addi-
tional source of information concerning terrorist incidents in the Central 
Asian countries. All information provided by state actors is handled care-
fully in my study as these actors are prone to political bias (in this case for 
example with regards to the classification of groups as either ‘extremist’ or 
‘terrorist’). 
In order to validate my simulation results I use the following databases: 
 
• Global Terrorism Database (GTD)   
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ 
• Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA)   
http://www.thearda.com/internationalData/ 
 
Both databases are from the US. GTD is a project of the University of Mar-
yland and of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Re-
sponses to Terrorism (START) which is a Center of Excellence of the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security. GTD is available online “in an effort to 
increase understanding of terrorist violence so that it can be more readily 
studied and defeated” (GTD). The data provided by GTD are collected 
from news articles. I regard the database as very valuable because it allows 
us to search for many different variables, such as the perpetrators of an at-
tack, the weapons used and the targets of the attack. Furthermore, every in-
cident is briefly described which provides the user of the database with ad-
ditional information such as the sequence of events.  
ARDA is an interesting database to survey and compare the religious 
landscapes of different countries. It is part of the Religion and State project 
(RAS) of Bar Ilan University in Ramat Gan, Israel. ARDA gives an over-
view of the countries’ histories and religious demographics and provides 
statistical data on religious adherents. Furthermore, it provides religious 
freedom indices on government regulation, social regulation and govern-
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mental bias towards certain religions, and lists the constitutional articles re-
garding religion. 
In order to visualize the contemporary diffusion of religious preferences 
and attitudes among Muslims in Central Asia I referred to the following da-
tabases and reports of the US Pew Research Center (PEW): 
 
• Global Religious Futures Project  
http://www.globalreligiousfutures.org/countries 
• The World’s Muslims: Unity and Diversity (2012):   
http://www.pewforum.org/files/2012/08/the-worlds-muslims-full-
report.pdf 
• The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society (2013)   
http://www.pewforum.org/files/2013/04/worlds-muslims-religion-
politics-society-full-report.pdf 
 
PEW provides representative survey data on different topics and religious 
issues and is extremely useful for my purpose because it enables us to con-
trast official data with information from face-to-face interviews with ordi-
nary Muslims. PEW data for Uzbekistan is judged most problematic. Here, 
some questions are missing, as they were not asked in order “to avoid of-
fending respondents and/or risking the security of the interviewers” (PEW 
2012: 117). Furthermore, “large scale labor migration patterns may have 
contributed to fewer interviews with male respondents” in Uzbekistan 
(PEW 2012: 119). 
For discussing the state regulation of religion and of religious groups I 
additionally rely on: 
 
• Amnesty International: country reports   
http://www.amnesty.ch/de/laender 
• United States Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human 
Rights and Labor: International Religious Freedom Reports  
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/  
 
It is important to mention that it is difficult to verify information concern-
ing religious freedom as western interest in this issue is generally restricted 
to the promotion of human rights. Many reports therefore refer to each oth-
er. ARDA, for example, refers to the CIA World Factbook, United Nations 
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Human Development Reports and the US State Department’s International 
Religious Freedom Reports. PTS refers to Amnesty International and Unit-
ed States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF). The 
PEW survey data therefore provides an interesting addition to these data. 
Furthermore, the inclusion of some publications and articles in Russian 
should help to avoid an excessively western- (and specifically US-) orient-
ed perspective on the topic.  

 
 
PART I  
REVIVAL OF ISLAM:   
CASE STUDIES OF ISLAMIC GROUPS 
 

 
 
2. Features of Central Asian Folk Islam 
 
 
 
The revival of Islam in Central Asia cannot be analyzed without under-
standing the local forms of Islam prevalent in the region. Therefore, I first 
of all highlight the most important aspects of Central Asian Islam. One im-
portant feature is the prevalence of the Sunni Hanafi School of law and 
their adaptation of local customs; how this combines with pre-Islamic ritu-
als, and the influence of Sufism.  
 
 
2.1. GENERAL REMARKS ON ISLAM 
 
2.1.1. A Heterogeneous Religion 
 
A special feature of Islam is that it has developed heterogeneous character-
istics in different parts of the world. Moreover, these many local forms of 
Islam are themselves not homogenous but internally diverse, a fact which 
all too often goes unnoticed, as Khalid makes clear: 
 
“Totalizing statements about Islam […] grossly misrepresent this reality. Char-
acterizations that present Islam simply as wicked or tolerant are equally incor-
rect. Muslims can draw any number of lessons from Islam. The tradition is 
much too rich and diverse to be reduced to a single evaluative adjective” (Kha-
lid 2007: 24). 
 
Alongside the development of different cultural understandings of Islam 
over time has been a concomitant evolution of diverse theological debates 
about the proper way to practice religion (Schubel 2009: 279). The catch-
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words jihad and sharia, whose true meaning will be clarified in these pag-
es, are used by Islamists as well as by those countering the ‘Islamic threat’, 
with both sides perceiving Islam in an essentialist way as a unified and ho-
mogenous religion (which is either totally right or totally wrong, depending 
on the point of view). 
First of all, however, a clear distinction has to be made between ‘every-
day’ Islam versus ‘scriptural’ Islam – a distinction that has gained ground 
in the current academic discourse on Islam in Central Asia (Epkenhans 
2011: 81). As Khalid explains: 
 
“ ‘Customary’ or ‘local’ understandings of Islam are countered by more ‘nor-
mative’ versions of Islam that draw their authority from greater adherence to in-
junctions or strictures elaborated by scholars who specialize in fiqh or other as-
pects of Islam’s normative tradition. This tension between different ways of un-
derstanding Islam creates the most characteristic inner dynamic in Muslim soci-
ety” (Khalid 2007: 24). 
 
As we will see below, in the contemporary ‘revival of Islam’ in Central 
Asia, different understandings of the religion are gaining influence and are 
partially competing against each other. Nevertheless, it should not be con-
cluded that either the scriptural or the local interpretations of Islam them-
selves are homogenous or have reached the end of their development.  
Contemporary research on Central Asian Islam is restricted to two main 
fields: anthropological research on the private practice of religion on the 
one hand and a securitized research discourse on Islam on the other. In the 
latter field (where my study is situated as well), the tendency to regard Is-
lamists as the main threat to the existing regimes has endured from Soviet 
times up until the present day: “The difference is mainly that the ‘Islamic 
threat’ was formerly seen as an antidote to Soviet ascendancy, while now it 
is viewed as a danger for stability and a potential vector for international 
‘Islamic terrorism’ ” (Schoeberlein 2009: 102). In order to distance our-
selves from this overly simplistic view, I consider it important to embed the 
discussion of radical Islamist groups in the region’s religious landscape. As 
such, although this is a security study, I will first of all analyze Central 
Asian mainstream religious practices before focusing on extremist and vio-
lent groups. In this way, I first introduce the inner-Islamic debate and only 
then turn to the official religious policies. As I show, since Soviet times it 
FEATURES OF CENTRAL ASIAN FOLK ISLAM | 47 
has been common to speak of categories such as radical versus moderate 
and parallel versus official Islam (Epkenhans 2011: 82). However, it is im-
portant not to oversimplify or restrict ourselves to only those theoretical 
terms which are problematic for understanding the facts because they imply 
distinctions where there are grey zones and evoke contradictions where 
there may be none. For example, the official Islam changed its nature over 
decades of Soviet rule. Representatives of both official and underground Is-
lam often came from the same background and maintained contact with 
each other. Yet today terms such as ‘traditional’ or ‘foreign’ Islam prevail 
in Central Asian countries: it would be very simplistic to limit descriptions 
of Islam to only these two categories, though. As we shall see, Salafism, for 
example, not only came to the region by contemporary Arab influences but 
has its local roots in Central Asia as well.  
 
2.1.2. Islam and Politics 
 
The Prophet Muhammad was not only the religious but also the political 
leader of the first Muslims. Subsequently, it is often mentioned that politics 
and religion are necessarily closely intertwined in Islam, however I agree 
with Khalid, who opposes this view:  
 
“The earliest caliphs claimed both political and religious authority, but already 
by the beginning of the third Islamic century, the ulama [the learned of Islam] 
had supplanted the caliphs as guardians of the faith. The political might of the 
caliphate, in contrast, disappeared with the rise of numerous independent dynas-
ties, whose legitimacy came primarily from military conquest” (Khalid 2007: 
27).  
 
This makes clear that throughout history, religious and political authorities 
were for the most part separated – a division which is also supported by ap-
propriate theories. For this reason, I do not want to imprudently mix the 
history of politics and religion. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that many 
dynasties and emperors in Central Asia did try to legitimize their rule by re-
ligious means, as Naumkin makes clear: 
 
“The Hanafi clergy and scholars played an important role in the administrative 
and political life of medieval Central Asia. The head of the Hanafites in Bukha-
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ra (ra’is) even acquired hereditary power in Bukhara in the eleventh century, 
which his family wielded until the Mongol conquest in the thirteenth century” 
(Naumkin 2005: 8). 
 
Such a bond between Islam and politics can be observed today in the organ-
izational structure of the mahalla – the Central Asian neighbourhood soli-
darity network. Even un-Islamic regimes took advantage of the mahalla’s 
organizational structure. The mahalla was a “partly self-governed unit 
which had a mosque and a maktab (an Islamic primary school)” (Salmor-
bekova and Yemelianova 2010: 214). It was genuinely Muslim and re-
served an important role for the imam. More recently, the authorities of the 
USSR and the newly independent states have made use of these networks to 
exert control over Islam. 
I am especially interested in the role of religion in contemporary Cen-
tral Asia and in the legitimizing effect the reference to religion has. I there-
fore summarize the ancient history of Central Asia by emphasizing how the 
regimes legitimized their rule with reference to religion and heredity (either 
by tracing back their ancestry to the Prophet Muhammad or employing Su-
fis as counsellors, as we will see in this chapter). As we can see, Islam 
played a role in Central Asian politics in the past to the extent that political 
regimes profited from the existence of religious authorities. This, however, 
does not mean that politics and religion have always necessarily been inter-
twined. On the contrary, this only serves to demonstrate that in some eras 
religious and political leaders were closer to each other than in other times.  
Who is promoting the revival of Islam in the post-communist coun-
tries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan? I will show in the next 
chapters that the ‘revival of Islam’ in Central Asia is not a one-
dimensional development and introduce the various actors involved in 
this process. I first of all present general features of Central Asian Islam 
before I explain how folk Islam has been undergoing a revival since inde-
pendence. After this I turn to political Islam and to groups which aim at 
transforming society. 
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2.2. SUNNI HANAFI MADHAB 
 
The contemporary disputes among state and non-state actors in Central 
Asia have a lot to do with ‘traditional Islam’ and ‘foreign influences’ on Is-
lam. The conflicts take place between folk Islam and Sufis, conservative 
Hanafites, fundamentalist Salafis (also called Wahhabites, but this term is 
not correct in this context, as I show), and other reformist movements. In 
order to understand the different perceptions, for example, on the role of lo-
cal customary law, or of worshipping at shrines or attitudes to clothing, I 
will here give first of all an overview of Sunnis and Shiites as well as of the 
different schools of Islam. 
 
2.2.1. Sunnis and Shiites 
 
Muslims are divided into two different branches: Sunnis and Shiites. In the 
beginning of Islam, Muhammad, the most important Prophet, not only con-
fessed this new religion but was also the political and military leader and 
Imam (the person who leads the Muslim prayer) of the Muslim community. 
After his death, the four caliphs who were elected as his successors were 
called the ‘righteous’ caliphs, because the time span of their rule was re-
garded as the ideal Muslim period (Elger 2002: 29). 
After the death of the fourth caliph, the Sunnis accepted the leadership 
of the Umayyads (661 to 750, centred in Damascus) and the Abbasids (750 
to 1258, centred in Baghdad), who wielded a great influence on the culture 
and political order of Muslim society (Elger 2002: 29). From the 9th centu-
ry, however, the Muslims were no longer united as one political entity 
(Elger 2002: 30). From this point on, the Abbasid caliphate was ruled by 
several dynasties of local authorities (Sultans). At the same time, the Sunnis 
began to elaborate political theories which strengthened the authority of the 
caliphs and Sultans: 
 
“For the early Sunni jurists, the only legitimate form of government was the Ca-
liphate; only the descendent of the Prophet was considered as the religious and 
political leader of the umma. The caliphs were not regarded as theocrats with 
unconfined power, but as upholders of the divine commandments (shari’a) and 
defenders of the Muslim community” (Elger 2002: 33). 
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The succession of the Prophet Muhammad led to one of the most relevant 
divergences in the Muslim community – the one between the Shiites and 
the Sunnites. The Shiites regarded only Ali (the last of the four ‘righteous’ 
caliphs, who died in 661) as legitimate and argued that Muhammad had 
preferred him as his successor because of his piety and his intellectual qual-
ities (Elger 2002: 34). The Shiites therefore declared only the descendants 
of Ali and his wife Fatima as legitimate caliphs and imams (Elger 2002: 
34). When the first Son of Ali, Hasan, ceded from power in 661 in favour 
of the Umayyad caliph, and his younger brother Husain opposed the 
Umayyads (and was later killed), Shiites and Sunnis split. I will not go into 
the details of this division nor explain further distinctions among the differ-
ent groups of Shiites because the great majority of Central Asians are Sunni 
Muslims and the current conflicts in Central Asia are only among Sunnis. 
Table 1 shows the percentages of Muslims in the population of the Cen-
tral Asian states as well as the percentages of Sunnis and Shiites in these 
countries. The biggest Shiite minority lives in Tajikistan; they are Ismailites 
and comprise eastern Iranian peoples and the inhabitants of Badakhshan re-
gion (Atkin 2009: 307). 
 
Table 1: Muslim Population in Central Asia: Sunnis and Shiites 
 Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
Sunnis  70.1 % 75.0% 94.0% 92.9% 
Shiites 0.1% < 1% 4.0% 0.1% 
Source: ARDA 2013 
 
2.2.2. Hanafi School of Law 
 
Islamic Jurists were to look for the answers to judicial subjects first of all in 
the Quran or in the reported deeds and sayings of the Prophet Mohammad 
(hadith) (Elger 2002: 54). Since the 9th century, jurists in Sunni Islam were 
commonly not supposed to interpret the written sources in their own way 
but rather had to refer to older authorities for seeking answers to juridical 
questions (Elger 2002: 55). In this way, local juristic traditions emerged 
and distinct dogmatic schools (madhab) evolved (Elger 2002: 55): 
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“The beginnings of the schools of law in Islam go back to the late Umayyad period, 
or about the beginning of the second Islamic century, when Islamic legal thought 
started to develop out of the administrative and popular practice as shaped by the re-
ligious and ethnical precepts of the Qur’an and the hadith” (Ziadeh 2009: 389). 
 
From a total of seven, four madhabs have continued to this day and are 
generally regarded as legitimate (Ziadeh 2009: 290). They bear the name of 
their founders (Elger 2002: 55): 
 
• Abu Hanifa (died in 767): Hanafi school 
• Malik ibn Anas (died in 795): Maliki school 
• Ash-Shafi’i (died in 820): Shafi’i school 
• Ahmad ibn Hanbal (died in 855): Hanbali school 
 
Each dogmatic school has its own principles and methods for finding jus-
tice. The concept of ‘imitation’ is called taqlid. It leads to different interpre-
tations of what is permitted by the different schools of law. Elger explains 
such differences using the example of the right of women to divorce: 
Hanafites say that women are only permitted to divorce from their husband 
if he is impotent and therefore cannot consummate the marriage. Malikites, 
on the other hand, accept other grounds such as physical and mental defi-
cits, shortcomings in maintenance obligation, bad treatment or abandon-
ment (Elger 2002: 55). 
In Central Asia, as in the Islamic world more widely,1 most people fol-
low the Hanafi dogmatic school (Schoeberlein 2009: 98). In the context of 
the contemporary conflicts between ‘folk’ or ‘popular’ Islam and a more 
‘scriptural’ interpretation of the Quran, it is important to stress the special 
position of traditions and customary law in the Hanafi madhab. It is often 
mentioned that compared to other schools, the Hanafis are “tolerant of pre-
Islamic popular customs and rites” and legitimized some of the tribal and 
customary norms (Salmorbekova and Yemelianova 2010: 213). Pre-Islamic 
traditions were incorporated into their version of Islamic law and “Hanafi 
jurists often referred to custom in their ruling” (Gerholm and Mubarak 
2009: 492f). In rural areas both Muslim clergy and clan councils adminis-
                                                   
1  It is estimated that around one third of the Muslims worldwide follow the Hana-
fi madhab (Ziadeh 2009: 392). 
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tered justice, and under Hanafi madhab, they could incorporate their local 
unwritten customary law (‘adat or ‘urf) into Muslim jurisdiction (Elger 
2002: 58). An example of Islamized traditions is the (genuinely zoroastrian) 
spring celebration which is connected to the visitation of the graves of an-
cestors and saints (Sayyil or Sayyil-bayram) (Naumkin 2005: 7). Another 
example is the (genuinely shamanistic) tatters at trees or “the kissing of 
headstones and the rubbing of graveside dust over one’s face” (Naumkin 
2005: 8). Indeed, the tolerance of pre-existing popular customs and rites 
made Hanafism successful in Central Asia (Naumkin 2005: 7). 
Maturidi, an important Central Asian jurist, was the founder of the Ma-
turidiyah school of thought (Khalid 2007: 25). As Naumkin explains, the 
Maturidiyah became the form in which Hanafism turned into the dominant 
madhab in Transoxiana in the tenth century. Indeed, it was Maturidi who, 
“legitimized the interwovenness of Hanafi Islam with traditional clan and 
tribal networks which remained almost unchanged through the centuries” 
(Salmorbekova and Yemelianova 2010: 214). (Naumkin 2005: 7). In fact, 
customary law played such a significant role in Islamic law that it was 
eventually incorporated as a material source in the latter in the 19th century 
by a Hanafi jurist (Gerholm and Mubarak 2009: 492f).  
Hanafism not only “facilitated the Islamization of pre-Islamic norms 
and traditions,” but it also “helped to escape tensions between the new and 
old systems of beliefs, thus accelerating the smooth adoption of Islam” 
(Naumkin 2005: 7). The possibility to continue old traditions when adapt-
ing the new religion made conversion easier for the Central Asian societies. 
As many authors state, this madhab is more open than others: “On the 
whole, the legal doctrines of Abu Hanifa evidence a liberality and a respect 
for personal freedom that are not that pronounced among other jurists” (Zi-
adeh 2009: 390).  
 
2.2.3. Demarcation: Hanbali School of Law and Wahhabism 
 
Whereas the Maliki and the Sahfi’i schools of law are not important in the 
Central Asian context, the following point should be made concerning the 
Hanbali school and Wahhabism: what today is often regarded as the foreign 
influence on Islam in Central Asia and what is popularly called ‘Wahha-
bism’ or Salafism, is a scriptural interpretation of the Quran, which is main-
ly based on the Hanbali School of law. Ahmad ibn Hanbal is sometimes 
FEATURES OF CENTRAL ASIAN FOLK ISLAM | 53 
considered more of a traditionalist than a jurist because he never wrote 
about fiqh (Ziadeh 2009: 395).  
In the eighteenth century, the school was strengthened by “Ibn’Abd al-
Wahhab and his reform movement in Arabia, which aimed at returning Is-
lam to its simple and pristine beginnings, depending on the Qur’an and the 
sunnah instead of later scholars” (Ziadeh 2009: 395). Abd al-Wahhab, 
“dismissed the long tradition of Muslim jurisprudence (fiqh), which had ac-
cepted a much larger range of sources as authoritative” (Khalid 2007: 45). 
(For the disputes between Hanbalites and Hanafites during the Abbasid ca-
liphate see section 5.1.2.) Petitionary prayer, supplication and the visitation 
of shrines were regarded by Abd al-Wahhab as compromising God’s unity 
(shrik) and were seen as examples of impermissible innovation (bid’a) 
(Khalid 2007: 45). 
 
“Even poetry in praise of the Prophet or other exalted figures, a genre that had pro-
duced some of the noblest verse in the Muslim world, was for ‘abd al-Wahhab 
merely a form of idolatry” (Khalid 2007: 45).  
 
Other Muslims, mainly Shiites and Sufis, were denounced as infidels (Kha-
lid 2007: 45). As Khalid shows, Wahhabism went on to become the state 
religion of the modern kingdom of Saudi Arabia: 
 
“In 1746, the two [‘Abd al-Wahhab and Muhammad ibn Sa’ud] together declared 
war (jihad) on all Muslims who did not share their views on Islamic purity. […] 
Wahhabis were fond of destroying tombs and shrines, demolishing domes over 
houses and palaces, burning books other than the Qur’an, forcing people to pray 
communally, and policing moral conduct and personal behaviour” (Khalid 2007: 
46). 
 
As we will see in the next sections, the aversion of Wahhabi Islam towards, 
for example, worshipping at shrines is shared by contemporary Islamists. 
Because of the explicitly puritanical approach of the Wahhabis and their 
opposition to folk Islam in Central Asia, “the term [Wahhabism] has come 
into indiscriminate use to denote any and all expressions of nontraditional 
Islam” (Khalid 2007: 46). This means it is often used inappropriately. Al-
ready during Soviet times, “ ‘Wahhabite’ was employed as a general term 
of disqualification against all the fundamentalist currents that appeal to a 
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literal reading of the Quran and believe that Islam can be reformed only by 
returning to its origins” (Peyrouse 2007: 45). It is true that those accused of 
being Wahhabis often share the opinion that Islam has to be cleaned from 
modern accreditions (Rotar 2004b). However, those accused of being Wah-
habites are often influenced neither by the teachings of Abd al-Wahhab nor 
the Saudis directly (Peyrouse 2007: 45). As Schoeberlein explains, Wahha-
biya per se has had little impact in Central Asia (Schoeberlein 2009: 106) 
and the Central Asian governments use the term interchangeably with fun-
damentalism for “[…] virtually any Islamic orientation that they deem po-
litically unacceptable, and they treat these terms as synonymous with ‘Is-
lamic terrorist’ ” (Schoeberlein 2009: 105). Khalid therefore suggests using 
the term with circumspection (Khalid 2007: 47). I agree with Khalid and 
Peyrouse and it seems important to me to draw a distinction between de-
vout Muslims wishing to follow the life of the earliest Muslims (or Salafis), 
and those who follow the dogmatic school of Abu Hanifa and Ibn’Abd al-
Wahhab specifically (Wahhabis).  
 
 
2.3. SUFISM 
 
From the 12th century on, Central Asian Hanafism absorbed elements of Is-
lamic mysticism,2 called Sufism (Salmorbekova and Yemelianova 2010: 
214). Indeed, all religions know their own mystic trends, which have often 
influenced each other (Schimmel 1985: 339). Sufism was important for in-
corporating pre-Islamic rituals into Central Asian Islam and for developing 
syncretic characteristics. Buddhism in particular had a great impact on Su-
fism. The Muslim faith in Central Asia also incorporated pre-Islamic be-
haviours. In fact, in many cases holy places, where Christians or Hindus 
                                                   
2  What is mysticism? Chittick (2009: 207) criticizes this term as being vague and 
implying a negative value judgment. Schimmel specifies mysticism as “[in the 
broadest sense] the consciousness of one reality, regardless of whether one calls 
this ‘wisdom’, ‘light’, ‘love’ or ‘nature’. However, such definitions remain at 
best signposts since the goal of a mystic, that oneness which is inexpressible, 
cannot be understood or explained by any normal act of perception” (Schimmel 
1985: 16). 
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used to pray, later became Sufi holy sites, and legends about older saints 
were applied to the new ones (Schimmel 1985: 339).  
Sufism is not bound to the Shia-Sunna split but had a tremendous im-
pact on both in Central Asia (Schoeberlein 2009: 104); neither is it bound 
to a specific school of law (Johansen and Talib 2009: 207). “If kalam and 
jurisprudence depended on reason to establish categories and distinctions, 
the Sufis depended upon another faculty of the soul to bridge gaps and 
make connections” (Johansen and Talib 2009: 210). Indeed, Sufis are rather 
ignorant of the differences and theological debates between the dogmatic 
schools because they prefer to focus on the immediate gnosis (Schimmel 
1985: 35), as Johansen and Talib make clear: 
 
“In general, Sufis have looked upon themselves as Muslims who take seriously 
God’s call to perceive his presence in the world and the self. They generally stress 
inwardness over outwardness, contemplation over action, spiritual development over 
legalism, and cultivation of the soul over social interaction” (Johansen and Talib 
2009: 207).  
 
It therefore seems no surprise then that the most elite expression of Islamic 
teaching has also been produced by Sufis (Johansen and Talib 2009: 207) 
even though Sufism is often associated with folk Islam. 
Generally, Sufism is often contrasted with ‘orthodox’ Islam represented 
by the ulama,3 but in Central Asia there is no broad opposition – political or 
religious – between the two (Schoeberlein 2009: 104). The main difference 
among ulama and Sufis is that: 
 
“ ‘Ulama’ aspire to receive the inspiration from Allah through the perfection of eve-
ryday Islamic rituals with emphasis on the external (zahir) teaching of the Holy 
Qur’an. The pirs evolve a spiritual praxis to construct the presence of God (nur) in 
man by focusing on the inner (batin) teaching of the Holy Qur’an” (Ewing and 
Mannan 2009: 378). 
                                                   
3  See as an example: “Many ‘ulama’ (Islamic scholars) overtly show their antag-
onism to the presence, modes of teaching and scholarship of the Sufis. Among 
the critiques are the reformist ‘ulama’ of highly influential Doebandi School and 
its networks of madrasas (Islamic religious schools)” (Ewing and Mannan 2009: 
378). 
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Whereas the legalistic or scholarly forms of Hanafi Islam were widespread 
in Central Asian cities, Sufism was more prevalent in rural areas and 
among tribal communities (Yemelianova 2010: 19). As I demonstrate in 
section 5.1, nomads were primarily Islamized by Sufi orders (Schoeberlein 
2009: 99). 
First of all, though, I concentrate on the distinct Sufi rituals, which are 
very important for folk Islam in Central Asia, after which I shed light on 
the importance of Central Asia as a region, from where Sufi brotherhoods 
(tariqa) originated and went on to spread across the globe (Schoeberlein 
2009: 104). Finally, I take a closer look at the political involvement of the 
Naqshbandiyah tariqa – from the side of both the ruling class and the oppo-
sition. 
 
2.3.1. Sheik, Silsilah, Kanaqah and Zhikr 
 
What distinguishes a Sufi Muslim from other Muslims? Whereas an ordi-
nary Muslim has to pray namaz five times a day and visit mosque at least 
every Friday (as well as pay zakat to the poor and go to Mecca for hajj), the 
Sufi has more and different obligations or involvements. The main features 
of Sufi practice are (Sultanova 2007: 3): 
 
• Hierarchy within a constant number of members of the congregation 
(led by shaykh, pir or imam) 
• Line of succession (silsilah) 
• Community meetings at a kanaqah or other religious places 
• Performance of dhikr (“Remembrance of God”) 
 
Sufis follow a master (shaykh or pir) who can trace his own masters back to 
the founder of a tariqa, or even to the Prophet Muhammad. This line of 
succession is called silsilah, as Johansen and Talib explain:  
 
“Like other branches of Islamic learning, Sufism has been passed down from master 
[…] to disciple, and the chain of transmission (silsilah) leading back to the Prophet 
has been considered an important part of the master’s credentials” (Johansen and 
Talib 2009: 209).  
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Establishing lineage, therefore, is an important aspect of Sufism. Usually 
pirs, “claim that they inherit their spiritual power from either a pious Sufi 
ancestor or from their connection to the shrine of a past Sufi,” but they also 
attain their spiritual quality through meditation and spiritual practice (Ew-
ing and Mannan 2009: 378). “The masters’ fundamental concern […] is to 
shape the character […] of the disciple so that it conforms to the prophetic 
model” (Johansen and Talib 2009: 210). The pir accepts the murid as his 
student in a ceremony of initiation, in which the student has to pledge a 
vow of fidelity and receives a blessing and the clothes of the arqah, which 
often consists of a special hat (Schimmel 1985: 331). As for the “remem-
brance of God”, the ritual invocation called dhikr, each tariqa has its own 
methods and practices for this. 
The pir instructs his students individually and leads the five prayers in 
the khanqah, the Sufi centre (tekke in Turkish, see Johansen and Talib 
2009: 234). The kanaqah usually consists of a mosque, living quarters for 
the students as well as for guests, and sometimes a madrasa (Islamic col-
lege). The pir lives there with his family and this is usually where one can 
also find a shrine of a deceased pir (Schimmel 1985: 328). Life in the 
kanaqah is organized in a strongly hierarchical way, usually based on vir-
tue; however the hierarchy could also be utilized for the accumulation of 
personal power or for political purposes. The most devoted murid is desig-
nated a khalifa, the successor or representative of the pir, to which he is 
bound by the spiritual chain of teachings. He leads the kanaqah after the 
death of the pir or is sent by him to other places to preach and spread the 
arqah (Schimmel 1985: 333). Sometimes outstanding successors found 
their own tariqa. 
Sufism is not easy to analyze because it is a multi-dimensional phe-
nomenon and therefore I can reach very contradictory conclusions about it 
(Schoeberlein 2009: 104). What I can say, though, is that the visitation of 
shrines, which are often dedicated to deceased Sufis, is an important part of 
Sufism. Many Central Asians regard “the activities associated with such 
holy places […] the most prominent features of their everyday observance 
of Islam” (Schoeberlein 2009: 105). Furthermore, “[…] Sufi rituals consist 
of the recitation of prayers, poems, and selections from the Qur’an and me-
thodical repetitions of divine names (zikr) or Qur’anic formulas, such as 
shahadah” (Sultanova 2007: 3). Each Sufi order has its own methods for 
following the spiritual path by their daily devotional exercises and activities 
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(Sultanova 2007: 3). As Khalid points out, the diverse attitudes of Sufi or-
ders towards society in general goes hand in hand with different attitudes 
towards politics and judicial Islam in particular. So whereas, for example, 
the prevalent Sufi order in Central Asia, the Naqshbandiyah, does practice 
the dhikr silently and in a ‘sober’ manner, other orders might even place the 
greatest emphasis on social deviance such as “going around naked, con-
suming narcotics and hallucinogens, renouncing work and reproductive 
sexuality” (Khalid 2007: 27), though such practices are not common among 
Central Asian Muslims. 
 
2.3.2. Naqshbandiyah 
 
Central Asia was “one of the key regions from which Sufism spread widely 
in the Islamic world” (Schoeberlein 2009: 104). Several tariqa have their 
origin in Central Asia. For example, Abu Sa’id ibn Abi’l-Khair, born in 
Khorasan in 967 AD, was the first Sufi master to establish monastic rules 
for his students albeit without founding a tariqa himself (Schimmel 1985: 
343). Najmuddin Kubra, was another pir, born in Khiva in 1145 AD; he 
founded the Kubrawiyah ariqah, and became important to the Naqshbandi-
yah tariqa (Schimmel 1985: 364). And then there was Baha’uddin 
Naqshband, born in 1318 in a village near Bukhara; the founder of the most 
important Sufi order in Central Asia, the Naqshbandiyah. 
Naqshband belonged to the Central Asian spiritual tradition of Yusuf 
Hamadhani, who himself was the master of Ahmad Yasawi and Abdul 
Khaliq Ghijduwani (Schimmel 1985: 515). They spread Hamadhanis teach-
ings in Central Asia, and Ghijduwani gave Naqshband his spiritual induc-
tion. Naqshband was first of all active in Bukhara and became the patron 
saint of the city (Schimmel 1985: 515). His tariqa not only enhanced its 
spiritual influence but also established relationships with traders, finally be-
came heavily politicized, and gained control of the Timurid court (Schim-
mel 1985: 515). Especially when the tariqa was led by Khwaja ‘Ubaidullah 
Ahrar (1404-90) (who had followers even in the Indian Mughal Empire), 
the Naqshbandiyah had a strong influence on politics (Schimmel 1985: 
516). It was only during the early 19th century that the order’s intellectual 
and organizational centre moved to India, and was led by Ghulam ‘Ali (Al-
gar 2009: 219). Schoeberlein further attests to the importance of this Sufi 
order: 
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“The Naqshbandiyah Sufi order […] became one of the most influential Sufi orders 
across the Muslim world, and Bukhara remained a spiritual center of regional im-
portance even after the Russian conquest, as Bukhara madrasas continued to attract 
students and scholars from many parts of the eastern Islamic world” (Schoeberlein 
2009: 100). 
 
Even now then, the Naqshbandiyah Sufi order remains the most important 
Sufi order not only in Central Asia (as we will see in section 2.4) but also in 
the wider Islamic world. 
Contrary to other orders the Naqshbandiyah does not place much value 
on the monastic or lonely life (Schimmel 1985: 354f). A special feature of 
the Naqshbandiyah is that its members do not have to leave society but can 
(or even should) take part in the political life. For example, it was the con-
viction of the Khwajas (Naqshbandi order led by Khwaja ‘Ubaidullah Ah-
rar) that the execution of political power is a duty since they thought that 
only in this way would one be able to implement the Godly law in each ar-
ea of life (Schimmel 1985: 516). 
The Naqshbandiyah is a pragmatic order which stresses the exoteric 
side of Islam more than other orders. Johansen and Talib distinguish be-
tween ‘sober’ and ‘drunken’ Sufism, and in this regard the Naqshbandiyah, 
would probably be classified as ‘sober Sufism’ (Johansen and Talib 2009: 
213). Naqshbandis practice the quiet dhikr, and thereby distinguish them-
selves to a great extent from dancing or howling dervishes (which are better 
known in the West) (Schimmel 1985: 517). The return to the prophet and to 
the first period of Muslim society (salafiyah) is another feature of the 
Naqshbandiyah tariqa which distinguishes itself from other brotherhoods 
(Halbach 1989: 221). 
 
“The leading characteristics of the Naqshbandiyah are strict adherence to the sha-
ri’ah, a sobriety in devotional practice that results in the shunning of music and 
dance and a preference for silent dhikr, and a frequent (although by no means con-
sistent) tendency to political involvement” (Algar 2009: 222). 
 
Although I often mention that Salafis oppose Sufism, it cannot be conclud-
ed that all Sufi orders oppose Salafi ideas as well because, as we see here, 
the Naqshbandiyah incorporates important Salafi features. It would be very 
interesting to elaborate on the connection between these two on first glance 
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contradictory interpretations of Islamic practice, but this would go beyond 
the scope of this study. 
 
2.3.3. The Resistance Potential of Sufism 
 
Sufism played an important political role in Central Asia not only on the 
side of the ruling élite, but also as an opposition force at different instances 
in history. The order, for example, gained prestige by organizing jihad 
against non-Islamic expansionist regimes such as the Buddhist Oirats and 
Kalmuks (Halbach 1989: 220). In the 19th century, “Sufi figures led some 
of the major revolts against rulers, including the resistance to Russian oc-
cupation of the North Caucasus led by Imam Shamil (1797 – 1871) and the 
Andijan Uprising of 1898” (Schoeberlein 2009: 104). Thereby, their 
strength was based on the Sufi relationship between murid and pir (Halbach 
1989: 213).  
Because of such events Sufism was often characterized as a ‘militant 
motor’ of Islamic resistance against tsarist Russia and later on against the 
Soviet Union (Bräker 1989: 135; Halbach 1989; Bennigsen and Broxup 
1983; Bennigsen and Wimbush 1985). However, Schoeberlein cautions 
against drawing simplistic political assessments about Sufism in general be-
cause Sufism has a multi-dimensional reality (Schoeberlein 2009: 104). He 
therefore criticizes Bennigsen for his conclusion regarding the strength of 
underground Islamic organizations during Soviet times – especially Sufi 
brotherhoods – as a destabilizing factor in the USSR (Schoeberlein 2009: 
100). Yet it cannot be denied that on several occasions Sufism was able to 
increase or maintain its influence in Central Asia because it escaped state 
repression under tsarist and communist rule. The Yasawiyah and Naqsh-
bandiyah, for example, became widespread in the Volga-Urals region dur-
ing the tsarist repression of Islam owing to the fact that for the authorities it 
was more difficult to control these than the legalistic Islam prevalent in the 
cities (Yemelianova 2010: 19). As Yemelianova further states, under tsarist 
rule, Sufism “could not be easily controlled and monitored by the authori-
ties” (Yemelianova 2010: 19). Similarly, Halbach mentions that during the 
Soviet Union Islam was able to survive as an ‘underground Islam’ because 
of the important relationship between teacher and student, which was not 
necessarily bound to the mufti or a mosque (Halbach 1989: 213). I assume 
therefore that the fact that Sufism could survive the strong Soviet repres-
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sion of religion might not be so much due to the ideological foundation of 
the Sufi orders but rather to the organizational networks of the brother-
hoods. The Soviet attempts to eradicate religion (which were based on the 
organizational structure of their primary target – the centralized Orthodox 
Church) therefore failed to a great extent to reach their goals regarding Is-
lam. Interestingly, the personal relationships between pirs and students and 
the private worship of holy sites that persisted during the Soviet era still re-
tain a greater importance than institutionalized forms of religion in Central 
Asia today. The flexibility and inconceivability of Sufism with regards to 
politics might be one reason why contemporary Central Asian regimes have 
not yet adopted a clear stance towards this important strand of Islam which, 
at certain points in history part of the elite and at others part of the opposi-
tion, has demonstrated an enduring potential to mobilize the masses. 
 
 
2.4. FOLK ISLAM: SAINTS CULTURE AND 
MAZAR WORSHIPPING 
 
If the resistance potential of the Sufi brotherhoods was as great as Bennigs-
en supposed during the Cold War, one had to expect that the end of the So-
viet rule would see a noteworthy resurgence of Naqshbandis (Algar 2009: 
222). Whatever the case may be, there are authors who state that the 
Naqshbandiyah not only shaped politics during the Timurid and Shaibanid 
empires but still enjoy a considerable influence on the region today (Sal-
morbekova and Yemelianova 2010: 214; Halbach 1989: 220). Sufism is 
still important in Central Asia in two ways: “the intellectual appeal of Is-
lamic mysticism has remained strong, and the sense of social cohesion pro-
vided by the Sufi organizations has been important” (Johansen and Talib 
2009: 219). The indirect social power which pirs still have on society is un-
disputed. People who stem from an important Sufi family are called khoja, 
and still play an prominent role in religion and politics today, “regardless of 
their own religious activity” (Schoeberlein 2009: 104). Peyrouse argues that 
the khoja families were successful, “in maintaining their positions via a pat-
ronage system and traditions of endogamy that are still in existence today 
[…] even during the Soviet system […] in which favouritism and a corpo-
ratist spirit ruled” (Peyrouse 2007: 44). These families dominated in the 
cultural, educational, scientific and medical domains Soviet Russia and 
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even the qaziyat were led by members of these families (Peyrouse 2007: 
44).4 
Regarding the impact on politics in Central Asia, it is interesting to note 
that whereas in the past, the militant factor in Sufism was stressed, today 
Sufism is often regarded as a mitigating factor for Central Asian Islam. 
Scholars and politicians are, “supporting the notion that Sufism creates a 
safe buffer between Muslims of this region and the more radically oriented 
Islam of the Middle East” (Schoeberlein 2009: 104). However, it is wrong 
to presume that Sufism is a more moderate form of Islam than purist inter-
pretations simply on the basis of its incorporation of syncretistic and ‘pre-
Islamic’ rituals (Schoeberlein 2009: 104). One thing, however, is certain: 
the practices of Sufism and the worshipping at shrines have been controver-
sial subjects in Islam – not only in the past but also in the contemporary 
Central Asian states: “They are often called ‘un-Islamic innovations’, or 
bid’ah, by those who now aspire to bring Islam in the region back to its 
‘true’ roots in the tradition of Middle Eastern fundamentalist movements” 
(Schoeberlein 2009: 105). Among the critics of saints culture today are not 
only ‘Wahhabis’ and Salafis but also contemporary fundamentalists and 
educated modernist Muslims who consider it as superstition (Voll 2009: 
220; 232). For example, during my visit to the region, I met members of the 
modernist Gülen movement as well as women from a private conservative 
praying circle who both expressed disagreement with folk religious practic-
es in the same terms (I subsume under ‘folk Islam’ both, mazar worship-
ping and Sufism). 
When we talk about the revival of Islam in Central Asia, we should first 
of all mention that after independence, folk Islam was able to regain its 
primary function and role in Central Asian society. Indeed, the great major-
ity of devout Central Asian Muslims today do not belong to any of the 
(non-traditional) Salafi groups presented in chapter 3. The resurgence in 
popularity of pilgrimage sites such as the Mausoleum of Sufi leader Ahmad 
Yasawi in Turkestan attests to this. As Schoeberlein makes clear: “For 
many in Central Asia and neighboring regions, the activities associated 
with such holy places are the most prominent features of their everyday ob-
servance of Islam” (Schoeberlein 2009: 105). Kehl-Bodrogi, commenting 
                                                   
4  Examples of such persons are: Turajonzoda (Tajikistan), Kadyrow (Uzbekistan), 
Yusphon Shakirov (Kyrgyzstan) (Peyrouse 2007: 44). 
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on the Khorezm region in Uzbekistan, reiterates this view: “[…] the most 
visible sign of a return to Islam in the public life is the increased popularity 
of local shrine pilgrimage” (Kehl-Bodrogi 2006: 239). In spite of this, it is 
difficult to ascertain how many people in Central Asia belong to the mod-
ern Sufi orders; how many are regular members (those that passed through 
an initiation process), and how many are mere sympathizers. The following 
PEW data regarding the percentage of Muslims who identify with Sufism is 
therefore of great interest to us – although it does not help us to distinguish 
between members of Sufi orders and mere sympathizers: 
 
Figure 4: Percentages of Muslims Identifying with a Sufi Order  
Source: PEW 2012 
 
Figure 4 clearly demonstrates that notable minorities of Central Asian Mus-
lims identify with one or another Sufi order. Furthermore, much higher per-
centages of Tajiks (18%) and Uzbeks (11%) identify with Sufi orders when 
compared with Kyrgyzs (7%) and Kazakhs (1%). The majority of Tajiks 
are thereby related to Naqshbandiyah (16%), a minority to Khwajagan (a 
Shiite branch of the Naqshbandiyah) (PEW 2012: 114; 129). Many of the 
interviewees do not name a specific order but some Kyrgyzs say they iden-
tify with the Kubrawiya branch of Naqshbandiya and some Uzbeks and 
Kazakhs identify with the Yasawiya order (PEW 2012: 129). 
In contrast to clearly defined Sufism, which has a strong hierarchical organ-
ization, in Central Asia the term ‘folk Islam’ refers to the incorporation of 
pre-Islamic behaviours into the Muslim faith in a popular form. Besides 
places connected to saints, in Central Asian folk Islam every cemetery and 
natural phenomenon can become a mazar; “a sacred place where people 
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worship, pray and conduct different religious rituals” (Toktogulova 2007: 
509). Such places often played already an important spiritual role in the 
pre-Islamic Shamanism that was prevalent in the region. There are two 
types of mazars in Kyrgyzstan (Aitpaeva 2007: 16):  
 
• natural mazars: springs, mountains, forests, pits, stones, trees, lakes and 
so on. 
• mazars created by humans: mausoleums of great people, ancient build-
ings, graves of people killed innocently. 
 
Since independence mazar-worshipping has witnessed a real revival. 
According to the Aigine Research Institute in Kyrgyzstan, the growing 
religious consciousness of the population since independence can be 
seen at mazars, which are being visited and worshipped with increasing 
frequency (Aitpaeva 2007: 16). Baktykan, the shaykh who guards the 
holy site at Baytik Baatir’s graveyard near Bishkek, explained that dur-
ing the last decade increasing numbers of visitors came to this mazar 
(interview with Baktykan). The place was abandoned during Soviet 
times because at that time pilgrims were imprisoned or killed (interview 
with Baktykan).  
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 Source: Lisa Harand 
 Source: Lisa Harand 
Image 2: Gravestone of Baytik Baatir’s Friend 
Image 1: Mosque at Baytik Baatir Mazar 
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Today, Central Asians visit holy shrines for many purposes as Kehl-
Bodrogi once again elaborates:  
 
“Khorezmians share the belief common among many Muslims that saints are charac-
terised by their closeness to God which enables them to serve as intermediaries in 
people’s relation to God and to communicate His grace to the ordinary faithful” 
(Kehl-Bodrogi 2006: 240).  
 
Among the visitors at Baytik Baatir’s mausoleum are those who have 
physical diseases or women who cannot become pregnant. They tell 
their problems to the shaykh and afterwards receive instructions from 
her. Often she discovers how to cure people in her dreams. The 
Image 3: Shayk at Baytik Baatir Mazar 
FEATURES OF CENTRAL ASIAN FOLK ISLAM | 67 
shaykh’s assistant explained to me that she has recently cured several 
women of epilepsy. 
Religious practices at shrines are usually handed down from genera-
tion to generation (Louw 2007: 54). People visiting the small mosque of 
Baytik Baatir, built during his lifetime, start by bowing down three 
times in front of the steps which lead up to the building. After this they 
pray first in front of the building, then at his burial ground and finally at 
the graveyard of one of his closest friends. There is also a big stone 
with Arabic inscriptions on which believers stand and make a wish. The 
touching of a horseshoe in the same place is said to help one’s wishes 
come true. 
Apart from visitations of shrines, the invocation of ancestors’ souls 
in order to pray for something is an important feature of Central Asian 
folk Islam. The graph below depicts the percentages of those who find 
such practices acceptable according to the Islamic faith. Furthermore, as 
traditional healing is closely interwoven with religious practices (as the 
aforementioned examples of Baktykan’s spiritual healing power 
demonstrate), the percentage of Central Asian Muslims who visit tradi-
tional healers is also shown.  
 
Figure 5: Percentage of Muslims Supporting Folk Islam 
Source: PEW 2012 
 
Whereas the vast majority of Muslims in all countries regard shrine-
visitation as acceptable under Islam, the percentages of those who inter-
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pret the invocation of ancestors’ souls as acceptable is a great deal 
smaller to the extent that it is a view shared by a majority (marginally 
over 50% or respondents) only in Kazakhstan. The reason why tradi-
tional healers are much more visited in Tajikistan than in the other 
countries could lie in the country’s poor health services. However, this 
assumption cannot be proven with these data.  
In summary, it can be said that, according to the PEW data, the ma-
jority of Central Asian Muslims deem traditional forms of practising Is-
lam as acceptable. There are more adherents to folk Islam, which is un-
derstood to mean mazar-worshipping in general, as opposed to concrete 
memberships in Sufi orders, although Sufism plays an important role in 
Central Asian Islam, even today. 
However, not everyone in Central Asia believes in such stories as 
mentioned by Baktykan or has respect for the practices contributing to 
them. Although it is popular, shrine culture has many critics even today. 
Among them are Salafis in particular but also educated modern Mus-
lims who consider it a superstition to visit the shrines of dead people or 
natural phenomena (Voll 2009: 220, 232). Indeed, despite the omni-
presence of sacred sites in Kyrgyzstan, such people deny their existence 
or describe them either as superstition or something so uncommon that 
it might only be prevalent in some very isolated part of the country (in-
terview with a sympathizer of the Gülen movement; interview with the 
teacher of a private religious class). For them, praying at stones, springs 
and mountains, even if the prayers are directed to Allah, is especially 
sinful, because it disrespects God’s oneness. 
 
 
3. Salafi Isalm: Social Transformation and 
Political Islam 
 
 
 
Today, Islamic fundamentalists who intend to re-establish a Muslim society 
similar to that which existed during the life of the Prophet Muhammad are 
often referred to as Salafis. As Shahin explains, “[…] the salaf are the vir-
tuous forefathers (al-salaf al-salih), and a salafi is one who draws on the 
Qur’an and the sunnah as the only sources for religious rulings” (Shahin 
2009: 29). There are other terms such as ‘Islamism,’ ‘Islamic radicalism,’ 
‘Islamic fundamentalism’ and many others that are used to describe the 
phenomenon of interest in this study. Whereas it is true that these terms are 
often used synonymously (Roy 2007: 59f), it is extremely important to 
clearly distinguish them in order to conduct a thorough analysis of the sub-
ject. I agree with other authors that it is better to speak of Salafis than of 
fundamentalists, because the latter is a western term. As this movement in 
itself is extremely broad I will first give some general notes on it: for ex-
ample, it is worth pointing out that Salafis usually either refer to the Han-
bali School of law or completely reject taqlid (‘imitation’) and thereby the 
affiliation to any madhab (Haykel 2009: 26). They are genuinely anti-
western but do not necessarily oppose modern education or political re-
forms, neither do they necessarily dismiss democracy outright. Further-
more, whereas all Salafis are anti-Sufi and oppose other Muslims, who they 
do not consider to be ‘real’ Muslims, not all of them try to convert them by 
violent means.  
I focus here mainly on the following groups: The Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan (IMU), Hizb ut-Tahrir, Islamic Revival Party, Tablighi Jama’at, 
Fethullah Gülen Movement. Only the first one of these groups, the IMU, 
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openly uses violent means – armed attacks and terrorist acts – in order to 
pursue its political goal of establishing of a caliphate. Although Hizb ut-
Tahrir shares this political objective, it argues that it does not resort to vio-
lent means. The Islamic Revival Party was part of the armed opposition 
during the Tajik civil war but abandoned fighting in the wake of the peace 
accords in 1997. Tablighi Jama’at is a neofundamentalist Islamic move-
ment with many followers, particularly in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The 
movement of Fetullah Gülen, which is totally peaceful, maintains schools 
in Central Asia which are supported by Turkish and local businessmen. 
All these groups follow a very strict interpretation of Islam and are 
called Salafi here (I present a more detailed definition of such non-
traditional groups in the typology of non-traditional Islamic groups in sec-
tion 4.2). Some of them aim at establishing an Islamic society or an Islamic 
state while only IMU propagates violence against the Central Asian states, 
but all these groups are banned as extremist or terrorist organizations by at 
least one Central Asian state. 
In the typology of state regulation of non-traditional groups (section 
9.2) I will go into further details of how the Central Asian governments 
deal with these groups. First I will clear up the confusion surrounding some 
catchwords. Following this I will discuss the definitions of Salafism, Islam-
ism and jihadism. This will be done with a comparison between definitions 
based on ideology and definitions based on the methods used for political 
struggle. Finally, I present the most important Islamic groups which aim at 
transforming Central Asian society into a particularly Islamic one or even 
hope to establish an Islamic state or caliphate and present my own typology 
of these Salafi groups. 
3.1. CATCHWORDS, MISCONCEPTIONS AND 
IMPORTANT TERMS 
In the current discourse on Islam in general and on ‘political Islam’ specifi-
cally, the terms sharia, jihad and terrorism are in common use. Political Is-
lam is often reduced to a militant form of activism and its activists accused 
of illegitimate terrorism. We hear about radical groups who wage jihad 
against infidels or infidel rulers, and then ‘establish’ sharia after coming in-
to power. But what do these terms signify exactly? It is indispensable to 
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have a closer look at these catchwords because they are so broadly used 
(and misused) by mass media and politicians. 
 
3.1.1. Jihad 
 
In Central Asia, instead of jihad, the term ghazawat can also be used (Hal-
bach 1989: 232). It refers to an Islamic doctrine “connoting an endeavour 
toward a praiseworthy aim” (Peters 2009: 252). Jihad has an important 
place in Islamic deontology (fiqh) (Halbach 1989: 216). The term can refer 
to different things, but in the context of Islamic law and in the Quran, it 
commonly means “an armed struggle against the unbelievers” (Peters 2009: 
252). According to Peters its main classical functions are (Peters 2009: 
254): 
 
• motivation of Muslims to take part in war 
• enhancement of legitimacy of a ruler or a movement 
• law of war 
 
In modern times, the doctrine of jihad developed different interpretations: 
there are conservatives, who stick to the classical legal interpretations, and 
there are radical Islamic opposition groups who try to gain influence by us-
ing the term in their own way (Peters 2009: 255). Of course, many have 
tried to appropriate the term for their own ends: 
 
“Throughout Islamic history, governments and opposition movements have declared 
their Muslim adversaries to be heretics or unbelievers (takifr, declaring someone to 
be a kafir, unbeliever) in order to justify their struggle against them. This line of rea-
soning is used by contemporary radical Islamic groups to legitimate their use of 
arms against rulers who are to all appearances Muslims” (Peters 2009: 255). 
 
An example of such a contemporary group is the Islamic Movement of Uz-
bekistan (IMU), which calls the President of Uzbekistan kafir, thereby 
denying his legitimacy as a ruler of Muslims and legitimizing the fight 
against him. Indeed, jihad organizations are generally defined as radical Is-
lamic groups, using violent means for political actions (Peters 2009: 257). 
Although this is true, it is important to note that: 
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“[…] automatically equating jihad to terrorism or to a kind of nihilism is 
largely incorrect. […] Furthermore, the war they wage should not be con-
sidered as necessarily unjust simply because it is legitimized through a reli-
gious vocabulary” (Peters 2009: 257). 
 
All too often, though, jihad is associated with an unjustly waged war, to the 
extent that the term is now often used to describe terrorist behaviour even 
though the concept has its origin in the wars Prophet Muhammad fought 
lawfully in response to aggression, and was originally not allowed to be ap-
plied against civilians, as Peters explains: “Ideas of chivalry forbade warri-
ors from killing noncombatants, especially children, women, and old people 
(Peters 2009: 252). It is furthermore important to note that the term ‘holy 
wars’ typically refers to the Christian crusades, which do not have a coun-
terpart in Islam (Halbach 1989: 216). In fact, as Halbach points out, the 
whole militant dimension of the term is exaggerated and its meaning should 
not be reduced to that of an expansionist war: 
 
• Jihad has an internal and an external dimension and should therefore 
not be translated as war but as effort. Generally too much importance is 
attached to the external dimension and ‘the fight against infidels’. By 
contrast, the internal dimension is the fight against apostasy and an ef-
fort for unity and solidarity in the Islamic community (Halbach 1989: 
216).  
• Jihad is usually justified if it is defensive, an expansionist jihad as a col-
lective duty of Muslims is only legitimate if a caliph organizes the 
struggle (Peters 2009: 253). 
 
To summarize, jihad can be waged not only against non-Muslims but also 
against nominal Muslims who are not believed to be practising the religion 
correctly. Furthermore, the term can be used to refer to a defensive war 
with legitimate grounds. 
 
3.1.2. Sharia and Fiqh 
 
In the context of Islamic radicalism we often hear that Islamists want to ‘es-
tablish’ sharia. The term sharia conjures horrific images for a westerner 
such as the stoning of innocent women or the chopping off of hands. It is 
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therefore necessary to note that sharia is a positive condition in the Quran. 
Every Muslim has to follow the rules of sharia, by virtue of his belief, as it 
describes the “expression of Allah’s command for Muslim society” (Ency-
lopedia Britannica). The term means literally, “the path leading to the wa-
tering place” but in the western media and public a misconception prevails 
regarding it. As Roy makes clear: 
 
“Here [in the debate on Sharia] total confusion rules. One can reject the Sharia as 
anachronistic and antifeminist, but in any event it is a legal system with norms and 
interpretations. Sharia is not by itself arbitrary, but defines a space of law […] “ 
(Roy 2007: 74, translated by the author). 
 
Sharia is therefore more to do with Islamic jurisprudence. In fact, the ‘path’ 
can only be totally known by God while the “human attempt to know the 
shari’a” is called fiqh (Rabb 2009: 255). 
 
“In this sense, shari’ah is God’s will expressed as an ideal reflecting perfect justice 
and equality. The human articulation of the ideal is a dynamic process that must 
constantly be worked and reworked to address new situations” (Rabb 2009: 255). 
 
Sunnis derive fiqh from the four following sources of Islamic law: 
 
• The Quran 
• The Sunnah (prophetic practice and that of the imams) 
• Consensus (ijma’) 
• Analogical reasoning (qiyas) 
 
There is no scope to go into more detail here, however a final point worth 
mentioning is that contemporary groups often use the term merely for polit-
ical purposes. They carry out ‘jihad’ in order to delimit themselves from the 
West (Roy 2007: 53). Yet it is not only Islamists who use jihad and sharia 
as catchwords in their propaganda; conservative counter-propagandists also 
avail themselves of these terms to conjure fears of an Islamic threat. 
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3.1.3. Terrorism 
 
Terrorism is a tactic of warfare and a communication strategy with a dual 
intention since the aim of a terrorist attack is often not only the victims 
themselves, who are also used to convey the terrorists’ message (Girardin et 
al. 2002: 8). This message is directed towards two different types of recipi-
ents: the enemy (which might be the government or the whole population 
which the civilian victims are part of), who should be frightened by the at-
tack, and sympathizers and supporters of the terrorists within their own 
ranks (Waldmann 2003: 88). Based on the analysis terroristisches Kalkül 
by Waldmann (Waldmann 2003: 88) I define terrorism as follows: 
 
• Terrorism takes place as an act of violence against civilians. 
• It aims at causing anxiety on the one hand and sympathy and malice on 
the other. 
• It provokes political consequences. 
 
With this definition I deliberately do not make a distinction between state 
and non-state actors.1 In my analysis, all actors should be analyzed and 
characterized using the same criteria. As civilians I consider persons who 
do not hold public office and do not take part in fighting. Politicians are not 
defined as civilians as they are representatives of the country they work for. 
People working in the security sector and military personnel are not consid-
ered civilians even in a situation where they do not wear their uniform or 
are not on duty (because non-state combatants are usually also regarded as 
                                                   
1  In this regard the definition used here differs to a great extent to terrorism defi-
nitions used by states. As an example, see the definition of the US Department 
of Defense: ‘The term terrorism means premeditated, politically motivated vio-
lence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clan-
destine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.’  (DoD 2003: xii). 
Here the term noncombatant refers to civilians as well as to army personnel that 
are unarmed or not on duty during the time of the attack (PoGT 2003:xii). Alt-
hough the definition of a civilian is different, the author of this study agrees with 
the US definition in that a terrorist attack has a political motivation and is di-
rected against civilians. However, the restriction that all terrorist groups are non-
state actors is strictly disputed. 
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combatants twenty-four hours a day). Attacks against politicians and mili-
tary personnel are by this definition not acts of terrorism but acts of guerril-
la fighting (which does not necessarily mean that these attacks are legiti-
mate or do not in many cases violate international law). 
Not only are terrorists usually considered criminals, but their political 
ambitions are also often rejected as unjustified. For this reason govern-
ments use this term to try to delegitimize the armed struggle of political op-
position groups while at the same time resistance fighters try to prove the 
‘terror strategy’ of the state to legitimate their resistance fight (Daase 2001: 
55). 
Physical violence is defined by Clausewitz as a means to force the ene-
my to do what one wants him to do (Clausewitz 1952: 90). Terrorism used 
by non-state actors is violence that is usually used against a much stronger 
force. In this sense, terrorism is an indirect and asymmetric strategy. The 
sixth century Chinese thinker Sun Tzu, as well as the Chinese revolutionary 
Mao Tse-tung wrote much about asymmetric strategy and how the weak-
ness of an actor can be used as a strength (Stahel 2002: 2): Good 
knowledge of the terrain, for example, or the ability to move like a fish in 
the water, are advantages that terrorists as well as guerrilla fighters can 
make use of. Terrorist and guerrilla tactics seem to be quite similar because 
both of them use asymmetric strategies, however they are distinct: guerrilla 
tactics are used by separatist groups to fight against the military and police 
to gain control over territory whereas terrorists do not have territorial goals; 
instead they seek to wear the enemy down over a long time period by 
committing acts of violence against civilians thus forcing politicians to give 
in to their demands (Kuster 2006: 47). An example of a terrorist group in 
the region is the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which has been 
declared a foreign terrorist organization by the US Center for Defense In-
formation (CDI). The IMU is active in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan 
and Afghanistan and was accused of taking hostages on several occasions 
in 1999 and 2000, including four US citizens (see CDI).  
In France, terror was employed by the Jacobins in 1789 as a systematic 
state programme known as ‘régime de la terreur’ (Al Treiki 2003: 30). State 
terrorism usually refers to abuses of power by governmental institutions 
against their own populations (Al Treiki 2003: 31). 20th century examples 
of terrorist states include the totalitarian regimes of Nazi Germany, fascist 
Italy and the USSR under Stalin. They used immense repression to bring 
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about the total obedience of their peoples (Al Treiki 2003: 31). More recent 
examples of state terrorism might be Indonesia during the regime of Sukar-
no in 1965, Cambodia in the 1970s or North Korea under Kim Jong-il. 
Even though the governments of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and 
Tajikistan are seen as authoritarian by Islamist movements and human 
rights organizations, who accuse them of human rights abuses and repres-
sion against their own population, they are not terrorist states. Interestingly, 
Islamists also accuse some western powers – primarily the US and Israel – 
of being terrorist states. As Bin Laden has argued: “The truth is that the 
whole Muslim world is the victim of international terrorism, engineered by 
America at the United Nations” (Bin Laden 1998).  
3.2. POLITICAL ISLAM AND SALAFISM 
3.2.1. Commonalities of Salafi Groups 
Salafis refer to the first three generations of Muslims which ended with the 
death of Ahmad ibn Hanbal 855 C.E.. All changes which influenced the 
faith after this point are considered un-Islamic innovations to the extent that 
the “Salafis claim to be members of the only victorious group that will be 
saved in the Hereafter” (Haykel 2009: 27). Fellow Muslims, as Haykel 
makes clear, can also therefore be considered infidels: 
“The traditional targets of Salafi attacks are the Shi’ah, the Sufis, any persons who 
visit gravesites, and finally, followers of Ash’ari theology. […] The recently more 
politicized Salafis have added to this list of enemies any Muslim who subscribes to 
modern ideologies such as nationalism, democracy, socialism, and more significant-
ly any rulers, governments, or systems of rule that do not strictly apply Islamic law 
and teachings” (Haykel 2009: 27). 
Whereas Salafis previously only opposed Central Asian folk Islam because 
the latter is so intimately interwoven with pre-Islamic traditions, they have 
only more recently accused the Central Asian rulers of being ‘infidels’ and 
therefore have added them to their list of enemies. 
Salafi groups are united by a particular theology and a hermeneutics of 
scriptural sources (Haykel 2009: 28). More specifically, these groups’ 
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shared purpose is their commitment to particular theological doctrines that 
are associated with the pre-modern group known as the Ahl al-Hadith. Ac-
cording to Haykel this involves among other things:  
 
• “a return to the authentic beliefs and practices of the first three ‘genera-
tions’ of Muslims […] 
• an emphasis on a particular understanding of tawhid (God’s oneness), 
[…]; 
• claiming that the only valid sources of authority are the Qur’an and 
sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad […] and the consensus of the Proph-
et’s companions; 
• arguing that a strict constructionist interpretation of the Qur’an and 
sunnah is sufficient to guide Muslims for all time and through all con-
tingencies […]” (Haykel 2009: 27) 
 
Salafis do not have a sure footing in Central Asia: because of their wish to 
live a ‘pure’ Islam as did the first generation of Muslims, Salafis reject lo-
cal traditions related to the practice of religion in Central Asia (in contrast 
to the traditionally strong Hanafi madhab, Salafis classically refer to Han-
bali school of law; see Shahin 2009: 29). As with fundamentalists in other 
religions, Salafis distinguish themselves from other believers by their very 
strict interpretation of holy texts. By contrast, the written word is not of 
great importance to the average Central Asian Muslim, who is not used to 
read the Quran. Instead, being Muslim is connected to being part of a 
community that claims to have ancestral lines to the Prophet Mohammad 
(Khalid 2007: 19ff) (this is comparable to the importance of silsilahs for 
Sufism; see section 2.3.1). Schlageter expresses this observation even more 
radically: 
 
„Many Muslims in Central Asia share a fundamental ignorance with regards to Is-
lam. […] The Qurans which were initially donated in large quantities by Saudi Ara-
bia and Pakistan were ritual objects, used for marriages and national customs. Al-
most no-one can read them“ (Schlageter 2003: 165; 166, translated by the author). 
 
PEW survey data about Quran reading confirms that Central Asians rather 
seldom read Quran (in many other regions such as in South Asia, Middle 
East and Africa around 50% of all Muslims read Quran every day). How-
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ever, it would be wrong to call the Quran a mere ‘Ritualobjekt’ there: in 
Kyrgyzstan 18% of the Muslims read the Quran every day and further 32% 
read it at least once a week (PEW 2012: 50). This is the highest result for 
all Central Asians, which is interesting because traditionally Kazakhs and 
Kyrgyzs are said to be less ‘scriptualist’ than Tajiks and Uzbeks (see sec-
tion 6.1.3 for this). 
 
Figure 6: Quran Reading by Central Asian Muslims  
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3.2.2. Salafis in History 
 
Despite the aforementioned commonalities, the Salafi movements that ex-
isted at different points in time had more or less diverse (political) agendas. 
In the late 12th century, for example, Salafis, “pointed to the ‘adulteration’ 
of Islam by various regional non-Islamic borrowings which they blamed for 
the political and economic decline of the Abbasid caliphate” (Yemelianova 
2010: 13), while more recently they have combined anti-colonial, anti-
western and anti-Israeli messages and organized themselves into grassroots 
societies and political parties to proclaim their ideas (Yemelianova 2010: 
14). Shahin distinguishes the following stages in Salafi history (Shahin 
2009: 29ff): 
 
• Classic Salafiyah, 8th and 9th century: Ibn Hanbal (founder of the Han-
bali School of Law) “laid out the tenets that later shaped the Salafiyah” 
(Shahin 2009: 29). The classic Salafiyah emphasized the “primacy of 
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the revealed text over reason,” (see also section 5.1.2) set strict guide-
lines for the use of independent reasoning (ijtihad) and restricted the 
use of analogical reasoning (qiyas) (Shahin 2009: 29: 30). Later, 
(through the teachings of Taymiyah), the Salafiyah became anti-Sufi 
and anti-philosophical because they rejected philosophy owing to its 
Greek influence. 
• Premodern Salafiyah, 18th century: Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab 
(1703 – 1792) referred to Ibn Hanbal’s and Ibn Taymiyah’s teachings 
and aimed at purifying the “Arabian Peninsula from un-Islamic practic-
es and build[ing] an Islamic state modelled on that founded by the 
Prophet” (Shahin 2009: 30). Later Wahhabi movements also “advocat-
ed religious purification, moral and social reform” (Shahin 2009: 30). 
The contemporary (mis-) use of the term Wahhabi has already been 
noted in section 2.2.3).  
• Modern Salafiyah, turn of the 20th century: their main representatives 
are Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad ‘Abduh. During their 
time, the movement was characterized by its, “essentially intellectual 
and modernist nature and by the diversity and expanse of its objectives” 
Shahin 2009: 30). These features of the modern Salafiyah are similar to 
those of the Jadidis (see section 5.2.2) in that they regarded education 
and political reform as essential. Furthermore, they were the forerun-
ners of contemporary pro-democratic Islamist parties like the IRPT (see 
section 3.4.2) because as Shahin makes clear:  
 
“Many reformist intellectuals attempted to reformulate Islamic concepts in the 
light of modern political ideals and practices. They reinterpreted such concepts 
as shura (counsel) and ijma’ (consensus) and equated them with democracy and 
a parliamentary system. In practice, they called for gradually increasing repre-
sentation in administrative and political institutions” (Shahin 2009: 32). 
 
The modern Salafiyah regarded autocratic rulers and despotism as the 
main stumbling blocks for progress in Islamic societies. Their move-
ment developed in the context of confrontation with western colonial-
ism: “the Salafiyah worked to assert the validity of Islam in premodern 
times and to prove its compatibility with reason and science” (Shahin 
2009: 31). They were anti-colonialist and nationalistic in a pan-Islamic 
regard (Shahin 2009: 33). As with the contemporary Gülen movement 
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(see section 3.5.1), their approach revived the original Qur’anic mes-
sage but also offered an alternative “to the literalism of traditionalist in-
terpretations” (Shahin 2009: 31). I will come back to the here men-
tioned present-day groups later on. 
• Modern Islamic Movements: 20th century. Modern Islamic Movements 
such as Hasan al-Banna’s (1909-1949) Muslim Brothers (Egypt) and 
Abu al-A’la Mawdudi’s (1903-1979) Jama’at-i Islami (on the Indian 
subcontinent), both of which developed in the 1930s, are regarded as 
heavily influenced by the historical Salafis. In contrast to the modern 
Salafis, they did not support legal, political and educational reforms, but 
were instead populist in approach and “focused on reforming the moral-
ity and beliefs of the Muslim individual as a precondition for the reform 
of the society as a whole” (Shahin 2009: 34). It is my view that present-
day groups such as Tablighi Jama’at share the following features with 
the Muslim Brothers and Jama’at-i Islami: “strict monotheism, divine 
attributes, purifying Islam from accretions, anti-Sufism, and developing 
the moral integrity of the individual” (Shahin 2009: 34). I will refer to 
such present-day groups later on as fundamentalist Salafis. 
 
Although all Salafis share the common aim of establishing an Islamic so-
ciety, uniting all Muslims and living according to the Quran and the Sun-
nah, the measures to realize this ideal distinguishes them, as Haykel asserts, 
“Salafi groups are numerous and often in contestation with each other, es-
pecially over matters of political action and the means of effecting reform 
of Muslim society” (Haykel 2009: 28). In the literature and, by extension, 
in political practice, different classifications of contemporary Salafi groups 
have been developed. Some are based on their underlying ideology and 
others are based on their tactics and behaviour. The following section gives 
some examples of such definitions. 
 
3.2.3. Different Definitions of Political Islam 
 
Olivier Roy, the renowned expert on political Islam and terrorism makes a 
distinction between neofundamentalists, who aim at Islamizing society 
from the bottom up, and Islamists, who want to seize political power to 
transform society from the top down. He moreover characterizes the 
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neofundamentalists as cut off from tradition and local culture and as being 
therefore a symptom of globalization (Roy 2007): 
 
“Modern Salafism  is both the consequence as well as the driving force of decultur-
alization. In no way is it the reaction of a traditional society which rejects moderni-
zation” (Roy 2007: 77). 
 
As was already briefly mentioned in section 2.4 on folk Islam, traditional 
understandings of religion and their commingling with pre-Islamic religious 
rituals are regarded by moden Salafi movements as highly superstitious and 
sinful. 
Although they aim to establish an Islamic state, Roy considers neofun-
damentalists to be primarily religious. As he explains, in their eyes, the 
state can solely declare Sharia the law of the land, but above that it cannot 
enact any laws (Roy 2007: 74). In his view, then, neofundamentalists re-
gard sharia as the key to society and their only political concept. Islamists 
on the other hand, regard Islam as a political ideology from which many 
different political claims are derived (Roy 2010: 53). According to Roy, 
Neofundamentalists are primarily successful in rural areas, whereas Islam-
ists (whom he describes as primarily political) tend to find more support in 
cities (Roy 2010: 53). I find it difficult to confirm this view, though, as cor-
responding data are not available.  
Considering the same factors which affect contemporary developments 
in the realm of Islam, which Roy refers to as globalisation, Khalid argues 
that mass education and modern media call traditional authorities into ques-
tion. Modernization has had an ‘objectifying’ impact on religion in general 
and on Islam in particular (Khalid 2007:12). In accordance with Roy he al-
ludes to Islamists as having a political ideology that derives political goals 
and a need for action directly from the written sources of Islam (Khalid 
2007: 13). They do not only appeal to a new political order but, as with the 
20th Century Islamic movements mentioned earlier, also to the transfor-
mation of the individual (Khalid 2007: 14). It seems that he would also 
agree with Roy on the question of whether Islamists are de-territorialized 
and de-culturalized, as he goes on to say: “Islamism is modern in that it 
presupposes the objectification of Islam, for only when Islam is separated 
from custom, tradition, and indeed history can it become a stand-alone ob-
ject that can in turn be applied to the practice of politics” (Khalid 2007: 13). 
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As we see, in many regards Roy and Khalid are in agreement. One key dif-
ference between the two theorists, though, is that whereas Roy uses the 
term ‘fundamentalists’ for groups such as Al-Qaida, Khalid defines this 
group, as well as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), as jihadist, 
as the following passage demonstrates: 
“These groups [IMU, Al-Qaida] differ from Islamists, because they have little or no 
political program beyond the conquest of power and the subsequent imposition of 
the shariat as the law of the land. They interpret jihad in a purely military sense, and 
unlike the Islamists, have no interest in the transformation of society beyond polic-
ing norms of behaviour” (Khalid 2007: 19). 
He explains that jihadism arose in the context of the Soviet invasion in Af-
ghanistan and the Islamic Revolution in Iran when Saudi Arabia, Pakistan 
and the US supported the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan (Khalid 2007: 
16, 17). A further category that Khalid discerns are the modernists: these 
argue that Islam calls on its adherents to be progressive and they therefore 
challenge ulama and Sufi shayks, accusing them of corrupting religion 
(Khalid 2007: 13).  
Similar to Khalid, Haykel distinguishes groups according to the form of 
political engagement they advocate and therefore distinguishes between po-
litical and jihadist Salafis: 
• Those calling for violent action are called jihadis
• Those engaging in nonviolent political activism are harakis
Furthermore, he adds a group of Salafis who deny all forms of political or-
ganization and action are therefore are called quietist taqlidis. They argue 
that “obedience to Muslim rulers is religiously mandated” (Haykel 2009: 
26). Another author, who distinguishes Islamists based on their behaviour 
and tactics is Hafez: 
“By moderates I mean those individuals and groups that shun violence and insur-
gency as a strategy to effect social change and, instead, seek to work through state 
institutions, civic associations, or nonviolent organizations to Islamize society and 
politics. Conversely, radicals are those who reject accommodation with the state re-
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gime, refuse to participate in its institutions, and insist on the necessity of violent 
revolution or mass mobilization to Islamize society and politics” (Hafez 2003: 5). 
 
A final ideology-based definition worth mentioning in the specific context 
of Central Asia is that made by Peyrouse, who distinguishes between con-
servative Hanafis and fundamentalist Hanbalis. At the vanguard of the lat-
ter he names Ziyauddin Babakhan, who was the supreme mufti of SADUM 
during Soviet times and whose family led this institution for three genera-
tions. 
All these definitions incorporate important aspects (distinction of means 
used by a group, the priority given to religion over politics or vice versa 
and the character of the movement: progressive or backward-looking). 
However, since no generally accepted terms yet exist, I will elaborate my 
own definitions for the main groups that are active in Central Asia. I will 
now introduce the most prominent non-traditional religious groups active in 
the region and subsequently elaborate my own typology for categorizing 
them in chapter 4. 
 
 
3.3. JIHADISTS: ARMED WARRIORS FOR 
THE CALIPHATE 
 
Islamic Terrorism is here understood as attacks against civilian targets per-
petrated by jihadists. Furthermore, the establishment of an Islamic state 
with the introduction of sharia as the law of the land would be jihadists’ 
primary and most fundamental political act when establishing an Islamic 
state. PEW survey data regarding attitudes of Central Asian populations 
towards Islamist terrorist acts are therefore of great interest to us. Figure 7 
shows how the level of acceptance is proportional to the wish of Muslims 
to introduce sharia as the law of the land. I consider the level of support for 
both issues surprisingly high for a region that is very often described as on-
ly superficially Muslim or where most of the people regard themselves only 
as ‘ethnic Muslims’. 
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Figure 7: Approval for Terrorist Attacks Compared to Support for Sharia 
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Recently there have been many reports by Central Asian online media on 
individuals from the region who have gone to Syria in order to fight there 
alongside local jihadis. This is comparable to Chechens and Arabs who 
fought alongside the Taliban and Al-Qaida in the 1990s in Afghanistan. 
However, despite the existence of a global network of jihadis, these affiliat-
ed groups do not belong to a single homogenous tradition. In other words, 
although Central Asian Muslims are influenced by globally agitating Islam-
ic networks there is no ‘Islamic Mastermind’ responsible for coordinating 
jihad-networks in the CIS-countries (Halbach 2010a: 86). In order to quali-
fy this statement I will now present the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
and its successor organizations. 
3.3.1. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and 
Islamic Jihad Union 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, several Islamist groups emerged in 
the Ferghana Valley. Voluntary militia and patrol units were active in the 
Uzbek cities Namangan, Andijan and Kokand, and groups such as Adolat, 
Islam Lashkarlari and Tawba even established control over mosques and 
government buildings (Khamidov 2009: 153). Those in charge of these 
groups went on to become leaders of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
(IMU) (Naumkin 2005: 96). The governmental policy towards these pre-
cursors to the IMU changed over time:  
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“Initially, President Karimov maintained dialogue with Islamic organizations, defer-
ring some powers of the local governments to them. This allowed the authorities 
time to focus on bolstering the security structures – the army, police, and national 
security service (the successor to the KGB). By 1993, the Uzbek authorities began to 
renege on their prior agreements with the Islamists and launched a frontal attack on 
them” (Khamidov 2009: 153).  
 
Subsequently, hundreds of them were jailed or fled the country to Tajiki-
stan and Afghanistan, where they continued fighting. In Tajikistan “Ethnic 
Uzbek Islamist fighters led by Namangani and Yuldashev fought alongside 
the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) in the Tajik Civil War (1992- 1997)” 
but were obliged to leave the country after the Tajik government and UTO 
peace accords had been signed (Khamidov 2009: 153). Namangani and 
Yuldashev, however, refused to comply with the Tajik government’s de-
mands and fled with their combatants to the Garm Valley, which became 
their stronghold in the late 1990s (Khamidov 2009: 153). In 1998 they 
founded the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), (in Russian IDU for 
Islamskoe Dvijeniie Uzbekistana).  
Ideologically, the IMU is influenced by Salafism but it has always 
avoided being directly linked with a particular group of Sunnism in order 
not to alienate itself from supporters of different schools of thought (Kha-
zanov 2005: 33). Due to its legitimation of violence, the movement can 
clearly be characterized as a jihadist organization since fighting is one of its 
main reasons to exist, as Salmorbekova and Yemelianova make clear: “Un-
like the Islam Lashkarlari, the Adolat and Tawba, the IDU [= IMU] priori-
tized political and military engagement rather than religious education and 
indoctrination” (Salmorbekova and Yemelianova 2010: 222). Indeed, the 
group is so committed to armed struggle that it has almost become apoliti-
cal:  
 
“These groups [Al Qaida, IMU] differ from Islamists, because they have little or no 
political program beyond the conquest of power and the subsequent imposition of 
the shariat as the law of the land. They interpret jihad in a purely military sense, and 
unlike the Islamists, have no interest in the transformation of society beyond polic-
ing norms of behaviour” (Khalid 2007: 19).  
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Or, as Roy puts it:  
 
“Like all neofundamentalists the group is primarily religious and not political, as 
they are not really interested in the state, the nation or the establishment of political 
institutions but just aim at the strict implementation of Sharia (Roy 2007: 68; 107).” 
 
Some governments say that the IMU widened its scope in 2004 to the 
whole of Central Asia and Xingjiang and has since renamed itself the Is-
lamic Movement of Turkestan (IMT). Members of the IMU, however, have 
denied this claim (Khamidov 2009: 155). A real successor organization of 
the IMU is the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), which was responsible for acts of 
terrorism 2004 in Tashkent and 2009 in Andijan (interview with 
Ponomarev).  
 
3.3.2. Caucasus Factor 
 
One reason why particularly the “oil-rich west” of Kazakhstan has been the 
victim of terrorism more recently could be due to “social tension and dissat-
isfaction at inequality and living standards” (Lillis 2011). During my field 
work in Central Asia I learnt from OSCE staff members about the influence 
of Caucasian radical groups in the region and in Kazakhstan specifically. It 
is interesting to mention this connection because the link between Central 
Asian jihadists and Afghanistan is much more prominently reported in the 
literature.2 The relationship to the Caucasus suggests itself, though, as 
Chechnya and Dagestan are historically (and in some parts also geograph-
ically) much closer to Central Asia than Afghanistan. Indeed, this is also 
true to a special extent for western Kazakhstan not least because of the ra-
ther high percentage of ethnic Chechens living in Kazakhstan as a result of 
Stalin’s deportation policies who today still maintain family ties to their 
relatives in Chechnya. 
According to my interview-partners (interviews with members of OSCE 
Units in Almaty and Bishkek), groups affected by the Chechen civil war 
                                                   
2  Police shootings and suicide bombings in Atyrau, Taraz and Boraldai (near Al-
maty) in 2011 were reportedly executed by Jund al-Khilafah (JaK), a Central 
Asian groups of jihadis fighting in the Afghan-Pakistan border area against in-
ternational troops (Zenn 2013). 
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primarily target security forces. The actions of such groups can be charac-
terized as clearly political statements. For example, in May 2011, a man 
executed a suicide attack in Aktobe in north-western Kazakhstan against 
the KNB security services (Lillis 2011).3  
As the following report shows, though, these Caucasian radicals do not 
appear to be entering Kazakhstan to wage jihad there. On the contrary, it 
appears to be the Kazakhs who are leaving their country to join their co-
fighters in Dagestan: 
 
“In October 2010 Russian police shot dead a Kazakh citizen from Aktau who they 
said was an extremist holed up in an apartment in the Caucasus republic of Dage-
stan, […] In July 2009 five alleged militants carrying Kazakh passports were shot 
dead in Dagestan, and this [2011] February two alleged extremists from Kazakhstan 
surrendered to police in Dagestan […]” (Lillis 2011). 
 
More evidence of this view is provided by Vitaly Ponomarev from the 
Memorial Human Rights Center who judges that there are no Caucasians 
coming to Kazakhstan to take up armed struggle but rather the other way 
round. The detentions of Kazakhs abroad, reported by Lillis above, concurs 
with this assessment. Furthermore, the many reports about Central Asians 
leaving for Syria during 2013 also indicate that international jihadis do not 
come to Central Asia to fight but rather that Central Asians prefer to join ji-
had elsewhere.4 This, however, could change of course if a more severe 
conflict between violent Islamists and Central Asian governments were to 
develop. Other reports about Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan claim that a new 
IMU is forming itself with recruits from Chinese Autonomous Uighur prov-
ince as well as with “militants from Caucasus and other Russian regions” 
(Seisenbekova 2011b). 
                                                   
3  He was described by the security services as a criminal and not an Islamist, 
though. 
4  See for example the following news articles: www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st= 
1387878900; www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1384942260; http://rus.azattyk. 
org/content/kyrgyzstan-syria-suzak-jihad/25176282.html. 
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However, the facts for confirming such speculations are rather vague and 
the conflation of IMU with HT detracts from the reliability of the report. In 
any case, the fact that international relationships between militant organiza-
tions exist is a concern for both Central Asian governments and societies. 
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3.4. ISLAMISTS: POLITICAL PARTIES 
 
The Central Asian states are corrupt, their economic situation is dire and 
traditional societal structures are disintegrating due to growing urbanization 
and high percentages of migrant workers abroad. In this context, Islamists 
argue that the poor economic situation and the rampant corruption could be 
solved if the society and the state followed the rules of social justice deriv-
ing from the Quran. Islamists refer to the ideal of an austere ruler (Mat-
veeva 2010: 36) and make reference to moral guidelines grounded in Islam-
ic principles which would solve society’s problems (Murzakulova and 
Schoeberlein 2010: 156). In addition, the official clergy is ill-equipped to 
deal with the difficult socio-economic situation in Central Asia, paying lit-
tle attention to people’s sorrows: 
 
“Theological incompetence, corruption and the pro-government position of many 
registered Muslim clergy, as well as their avoidance of a debate with Islamists on vi-
tal socio-economic political and ideological issues, undermined public trust in them” 
(Salmorbekova and Yemelianova 2010: 237; see also Halbach 2010a: 84).  
 
The data presented in Figure 8 show the opinions of Central Asian Muslims 
concerning the political influence of religious leaders and their attitude to-
ward religious parties (there are no data available for Uzbekistan). 
 
Figure 8: Attitudes towards Political Islam among Central Asian Muslims  
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Source: PEW 2013 
90 | SECURITIZATION OF ISLAM IN CENTRAL ASIA
In this section I will present some political parties or groups who take these 
concerns seriously and who use Islam as a basis for their political ideology. 
First of all, Hizb ut-Tahrir will be characterized. After that, the Islamic Re-
naissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), the only institutionalized religious 
party in Central Asia, will be presented. 
3.4.1. Hizb ut-Tahrir 
Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) was founded in Jerusalem in 1953 by Taqi al-Din al-
Nabhani (1909-1977), who had links to the Muslim brotherhood; currently 
the best known Salafi group, the brotherhood has its origins in Egypt in 
1928. HT has since its very beginning maintained its ideological and opera-
tional cohesion (Taji-Farouki 2009: 423, 425), as Karagiannis explains: 
“Hizb ut-Tahrir’s consistency is associated with a dogmatic and consistent imple-
mentation of its ideology, which envisions a peaceful overthrow of the existing re-
gimes in Muslim countries” (Karagiannis 2010: 48).  
Despite its political goal, which is to establish a caliphate, this transnational 
movement differs from jihadi groups in that it can be regarded as a purely 
political party which is conceptualized and organized in a modern way 
(Khalid 2007: 160; Roy 2004: 67). It also regards itself not as a religious 
organization but as a political party that draws its legitimacy from Quranic 
sources (Karagiannis 2010: 40). 
Hizb ut-Tahrir has been increasing its influence in Central Asia since 
the mid-1990s and has a considerable membership there (Taji-Farouki 
2009: 423). At first glance, this is surprising since it emphasizes the unity 
of the ummah whose concomitant denigration of national peculiarities 
seems to contradict the regional understanding of the nation as well as of 
religion and Islam in particular (Khalid 2007: 162). However, as Khalid 
explains, although they have transnational links, the political Islamist 
groups in Central Asia (IRPT, HT and IMU):  
“[…] have roots in domestic political realities and focus primarily on local issues. 
They are not implantations of a global Islamist movement with a monolithic agenda. 
[…] [but] represent forms of homegrown opposition to the political order” (Khalid 
2007: 164).  
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In Khalid’s opinion, the success of HT is understandable because it ties in 
with the populations’ dissatisfaction with the political and moral order in 
the region; it stands for the fight against corruption and the abolition of the 
recently established borders between the former Soviet republics (Khalid 
2007: 163f). With their agenda, the party was able, “[…] to respond effec-
tively to the ideological vacuum created by the collapse of Communism 
and problems of socioeconomic deterioration” (Taji-Farouki 2009: 424). 
When they claim that they can provide better security, growth and welfare 
than a secular state, their advantage is that they seem credible since they are 
God-fearing and therefore should not be corruptible (Matveeva 2010: 19). 
HT’s political aim is to build a modern welfare state (Khalid 2007: 161). 
With their reference to the Quran, the party constructs Islam as an ideology 
that is superior to capitalism and socialism: it emphasizes justice and inclu-
sion and criticizes the neo-colonial exploitation by global western hegemo-
ny (Taji-Farouki 2009: 424). Its political agenda has a clear goal: the re-
establishment of the caliphate and a Pan-Islamic state. Hizb ut-Tahrir sees 
the Quran as “the only acceptable source of political thought; the ummah 
constitutes a unitary entity and the caliph symbolizes its political cohesion” 
(Karagiannis 2010: 94). The party’s historical narrative and its reference to 
the caliphate must be understood in terms of its original contraposition “to 
secular Pan-Arabism in the struggle to reverse the fragmentation caused by 
the implantation of nation-states and Israel” (Taji-Farouki 2009: 424). It in-
terprets nationalism as a western innovation and regards the borders be-
tween Muslim countries as artificial creations (Karagiannis 2010: 42). This 
makes the party especially popular in the Ferghana Valley with its arbitrary 
demarcations. According to Naumkin, the party changed its focus in Uz-
bekistan in the wake of the Andijan events 2005. It started to criticize the 
government by 
 
„[…]addressing the daily needs of the population. This is in marked contrast to pre-
vious publications, in which the HT paid much attention to Middle Eastern prob-
lems, such a support for the Palestinians and criticism of Zionism” (Naumkin 2005: 
164). 
 
More generally, the party’s leaflets criticize local governments and also 
contain anti-American, anti-western, and anti-capitalist propaganda 
(Khamidov 2009: 155).  
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Interestingly, HT does affiliate members from different madhabs, as the 
party itself points out:  
 
“The party […] invites all Muslims to carry Islam and adopt its systems regardless 
of their nationalities, colours and madhahib (Schools of Thought), as it looks to all 
of them according to the viewpoint of Islam” (HT).  
 
In the eyes of Naumkin, this openness is tactical since it enables HT to 
build on its transnational status and gain supporters from different strands 
of Islam. As he explains, “a number of researchers believe that Nabhani 
was an adherent of Hanbalism on questions of law, rejecting in particular 
the tribal laws” (urf and adat) (Naumkin 2005: 135). Yet even if we assume 
this to be true, today they do not preach the idea of takfir nor are they fixed 
on bid’a, which would be typical for Salafis (Naumkin 2005: 145). Indeed, 
according to Salmorbekova and Yemelianova, HT should be classified as a 
moderate Salafi group: 
 
“It should be noted that compared to other Salafis, and especially Wahhabis in the 
North Caucasus, who have treated the local Islamic traditions as bid’a (sinful inno-
vation), Tahriris have attuned their da’wa to local ‘folk’ Islamic traditions. They 
have been respectful of local ‘urf and ‘adat norms and appreciative of regional 
Hanafi Islam. They have also been more cautious in applying the concept of kurf 
(non-belief) in relation to the actions and policies of local and national government 
officials” (Salmorbekova and Yemelianova 2010: 224).  
 
Apart from its moderateness, HT also differs from other Salafi groups in 
the political measures it propagates. Although it does not participate in 
democratic processes, neither does it directly advocate armed jihad for es-
tablishing the caliphate. According to some authors, it is even open to dia-
logue with Central Asian governments (see Salmorbekova and Yemeli-
anova 2010: 224; Naumkin 2005: 146). For the moment, it only considers 
armed jihad as an option for defence (Roy 2004: 255). The party is there-
fore not classified as a jihadist organization (Salmorbekova and Yemeli-
anova 2010: 224). Yet, if Hizb ut-Tahrir’s “position against the launching 
of jihad is purely tactical” (Roy 2004: 256), and justifies jihad at a later 
stage, this means that it cannot be called strictly non-jihadist either (Naum-
SALAFI ISALM: SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION AND POLITICAL ISLAM | 93
kin 2005: 145). This is why I classify the party here as non-violent but po-
tentially jihadist.  
What we know for certain is that Central Asian governments are con-
cerned by the party’s activities in their countries and have banned it as an 
extremist or terrorist organization. Indeed, even though it claims to use only 
peaceful means “[…] the governments of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have 
blamed it (without convincing proof) for various violent acts on their terri-
tory” (Khalid 2007: 161). Since the Andijan events in Uzbekistan in 2005, 
the Central Asian governments have intensified their repression of HT and 
other Islamist groups (Salmorbekova and Yemelianova 2010: 225). 
Despite the big differences in relation to the means used for their politi-
cal struggle, apart from their common goal (an Islamic caliphate), there is 
evidence of personal links between members of the IMU and Hizb ut-
Tahrir. For example, former HT members from Central Asia fled to Af-
ghanistan in the late 1990s and joined the IMU ranks there (Khamidov 
2009: 155). Furthermore, “the IMU has supposedly used HT literature to 
teach its illiterate members to read” (Khamidov 2009: 155). Despite these 
connections, I assume that in addition to the question of violence, the fol-
lowing differences speak for a clear distinction between them: 
• The IMU has a predominantly national agenda, its most important goal
being the overthrow of the Karimov regime, whereas the HT is a large
transnational movement.
• The IMU pays money to its members for their membership in contrast
to HT, which concentrates its efforts on convincing members to join
their group with leaflets and books (Khamidov 2009: 155).
• The fees that party members pay to HT are its main source of income,
whereas the IMU is involved in criminal activities such as drug traffick-
ing and hostage taking (Salmorbekova and Yemelianova 2010: 222).
While the non-violent HT shares the goal of establishing a caliphate with 
IMU, the Islamic Revival Party, which I will introduce next, would be 
compatible with democracy, although it once was an armed conflict party in 
the Tajik civil war. 
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3.4.2. Islamic Renaissance Party 
At the June 1990 Congress of Muslims in the USSR, the Islamic Renais-
sance Party (IRP) was legally founded as a pan-Soviet political party with a 
religious foundation. Already during its foundation, the IRP was criticized 
by young Salafi revivalists, who took issue with it because it did not strive 
for an Islamic state (Naumkin 2005: 57). With regard to its ideology, the 
party therefore can be classified as moderate Islamist (compared to the 
HT’s goal of an Islamic caliphate). After independence, however, the Party 
was outlawed in all Central Asian countries, as Naby explains: 
“The IRP- […] languished in the tribally organized and more superficially Islamized 
parts of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan) while it compet-
ed for political power in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan” (Naby 2009: 157).  
In Tajikistan, it became part of the opposition during the civil war from 
1992-1997. In the peace accords, it gained a 30% share of parliamentary 
seats and was promised some ministerial posts. Since then, Tajikistan is the 
only Central Asian country in which a religious party can participate legally 
in the political process (in all other countries the existence of religious par-
ties is forbidden). It is therefore worth taking a closer look at this party and 
how it gained its share of governmental power. 
It is debatable whether the Tajik civil war should be considered first and 
foremost as a war between secular ex-communists and Islamists or, rather, 
a “struggle of regional factions that for various reasons had chosen different 
political orientations and ideological garments” (Khazanov 2005: 30). In 
fact, the members of the IRPT primarily stemmed from the Gharm and Ka-
rategin regions, while the ex-communists gained support from Russia and 
Uzbekistan and mainly had members from the Kuiab, Khujant and Gissar 
provinces (Khazanov 2005: 30). In any case, the United Tajik Opposition 
(UTO) was principally made up of Islamists, with Democrats playing a 
merely supportive role.  
During the civil war, the IRPT fought for an Islamic state but trans-
formed itself into a modern political party after the peace agreement so that 
it is now compatible with democracy and comparable to the Turkish Justice 
and Development Party (Karagiannis 1997: 97). The IRPT participated in 
the 1999, 2005 and 2010 elections but boycotted the November 2006 presi-
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dential election (Naby 2009: 158). In the 2013 presidential elections the 
IRPT supported a female secularist human rights lawyer as a challenger for 
Rahmon (Najibullah 2013). However, according to Naby, the “establish-
ment of an Islamic society” remains “the ultimate goal of the IRP […]” 
(Naby 2009: 158). The party has the following three fundamental objec-
tives: spiritual revival, economic freedom and the “political and legal 
awakening of Muslims with the aim of activating in everyday life the basics 
of the Qur’an and the sunnah” (Naby 2009: 158). In this regard, the party is 
a typical Islamist party. It mainly represents Hanafi madhab but claims to 
have members from all over Tajikistan, among them even Ismailis (inter-
view with Kabiri). The party brings together members with more and less 
radical ideas, which has given rise to factions (Naumkin 2005). Salafi ele-
ments in the IRPT, for example, condemn Novruz celebrations or the visit-
ing of mazars and oppose the organization of expensive funerals (interview 
with researcher for Alert International). 
 Source: Lisa Harand 
The IRP members see themselves as reformists who combine anti-
imperialism against the West and Russia with progressive ideas for the im-
provement of society and Islam as the route to socio-political development 
(Naby 2009: 158): 
Image 4: Meeting at the IRPT Headquarter in Dushanbe 
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“The thirty-two-point agenda of the IRP stresses moral interpersonal actions, the de-
fense of Islam against the accretion of any ‘ignorant contemporary’ (i.e., non-
Islamic) doctrine, and the resolution of disputes through the Qur’an and sunnah. In 
addition, the agenda supports the promotion of sports and health programs, provision 
of welfare for the needy, private ownership of property, and support of ecological 
activity” (Naby 2009: 158).  
However, when asked what he would change first, if he had the oppor-
tunity, Kabirir, the president of the party, responded that he would a) 
hold free elections; b) fight corruption; and c) allow for more religious 
freedom in the country (interview with Kabiri). 
 Source: Lisa Harand 
The reasons for these demands are that since the peace accords the 
IRPT has been losing seats in parliament. After the 2010 elections it re-
ceived only two parliamentary seats (which means a share of less than 
3% instead of the assured 30%) and no ministerial posts. The party 
therefore accuses the government of election fraud.  
The Tajik government fears the IRPT and closely monitors its opera-
tions. The party, for example, has to provide the names of all members to 
the government. As it fears the repression of its members the IRPT does not 
Image 5: Kabiri, President of the IRPT (Dushanbe) 
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release all names or sometimes advises sympathizers not to become mem-
bers (they fear, for example, that officials or Muftis could lose their job if 
they were known to be party members) (interview with Kabiri). Also in 
other regards the party does not fully respect the law: it is, for example, a 
fact that the party holds illegal prayers at its headquarters in Dushanbe, 
which is forbidden by a law that restricts Muslim worship to mosques, 
homes, and cemeteries. 
According to a researcher for Alert International, the party is totally 
powerless at the moment. It usually only criticizes governmental policies 
on religious issues and tries not to jeopardize the relatively good relation-
ship it currently has with the government by avoiding any open confronta-
tion. Confronted with the party’s powerlessness, Kabiri explains that the 
party is far too interested in stability to engage in protests such as demon-
strations (interview with Kabiri). 
3.5. MODERNISTS AND NEO-FUNDAMENTALISTS:
SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION 
As has already been stated, Central Asian governments tend to classify all 
Salafi influences on Islam in their countries as foreign. This is why it is es-
pecially important to have a closer look at actually foreign movements – 
even more so because it is undeniable that transnational movements have a 
stark influence on Central Asians and on how Islam is practiced today in 
Central Asia. In the following section two transnational Islamic groups will 
be presented which declare themselves as apolitical and non-violent: the 
Turkish Gülen movement and the Pakistani-Indian Tablighi Jama’at. Both 
are presented as examples of religious movements aiming at the transfor-
mation of the society. Whereas I describe the Gülen movement as modern-
ist, the Tablighi Jama’at are fundamentalist and backward-looking. For this 
reason the current chapter begins with Figure 9 which shows different un-
derstandings of the relationship between religion and modernity. For the 
PEW survey Central Asian Muslims were asked: 
• whether they think there is a conflict between religion and modern soci-
ety; and
• whether they think there is a conflict between religion and science.
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Figure 9: Relationship between Religion and Modernity 
Source: PEW 2013 
As we can see from Figure 9, the majority of Central Asian Muslims are 
neither backward-looking nor anti-modernist. On the contrary, most Central 
Asians are among those who are “least likely to see a conflict between be-
ing devout and living in the contemprorary world” compared to other re-
gions in the world (PEW 2013: 128). This may help account for the ex-
traordinary expansion of the Gülen movement in the region over the last 
few years. 
3.5.1. Nurcu and Gülen Movement 
The Gülen movement is named after Fetullah Gülen, a Turk who currently 
lives in the United States. The Gülen movement (FG), which also calls it-
self Hizmet movement is a neo-Nurcu movement,5 an offshoot of the origi-
nal Nurculuk movement, which was founded by Bediüzzaman Said Nursi 
(1876-1960). Nursi “was educated in a Naqshbandi circle”, but although he 
placed an emphasis on mystical and spiritual Islam, he was never a member 
5  See for example Gülen News: http://gulennews.de/. 
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of a Sufi order (Kuspinar 262; Mardin 2009: 257f).6 He believed that Mus-
lims should take advantage of western technology and knowledge and was 
interested in developing a new form of education, combining religious and 
positivist sciences (Kuspinar 2009 260; Mardin 2009: 258). His goal was to 
establish a republic based on Islamic principles and Turkish nationalism 
(Markedonov 2013: 25). The Gülen movement, however, is not political; 
Peuch describes it as a socio-religious movement (Peuch 2004). It places a 
particular emphasis on education at the secondary school level (9th to 11th 
grade). Additionally, the movement finances universities such as Suleyman 
Demirel and Ahmet Yesevi University in the Kazakh cities Almaty and 
Turkistan, as well as the Kyrgyz-Turkish Manas University in Bishkek 
(Peuch 2004).  
 Source: Lisa Harand 
Fetullah Gülen, who was born in Erzurum in 1942, “has had a complicated 
and controversial relationship with Turkish authorities” (Markedonov 2013: 
25). He was accused of clandestine religious activities, indoctrinating 
6  Despite this, the World Almanac of Islamism describes the Gülen movement as 
‘mainstream Sufism’. See: http://almanac.afpc.org/fetullah-g%C3%BClen-move 
ment. 
Image 6: Manas University in Bishkek 
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youths in illegally run summer camps, and infiltrating the Turkish military 
(Markedonov 2013: 25). Yet although Gülen was accused of diverse of-
fenses against the Turkish state, today his activities are considered as “use-
ful for the promotion of Turkish national interests. The movement therefore 
benefits from the support of the Turkish embassies” abroad (Markedonov 
2013: 26). According to Peuch, “it is in Kazakhstan, where it has some 27 
schools, that the Gulen community has been the most successful […]” 
(Peuch 2004) but the movement is active in all Central Asian countries. The 
common ethnic origins that Kazakhs, Kyrgyzs and Uzbeks share with 
Turks not only explains the special influence the movement has in Central 
Asia; the fear that it is spreading a pan-Turkish ideology is at the same time 
the main reason for governmental restrictions on its schools, especially in 
Uzbekistan and in Persian Tajikistan. However, the lack of educational re-
sources in Central Asian countries has led many to welcome the Turkish 
schools, especially in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan: 
“[…], unattractive salaries have drained the profession of many of its most compe-
tent teachers and university professors. With its teams of dedicated Turkish-born 
teachers and its emphasis on modern technology, the Gulen community has helped 
local governments overcome this situation” (Peuch 2004). 
In addition to the high educational standard, many parents send their chil-
dren to Gülen schools because the fees are economical (Markedonov 2013: 
27; interviews with sympathizers of the Gülen movement). In Bishkek I 
was able to observe first-hand how well-equipped the private ‘Silk Road In-
ternational School’ is. It is headed by a Turkish director while teachers 
come from different Islamic countries. Sports and performance spaces are 
available and pupils already begin receiving English instruction at kinder-
garten level. The students’ parents work for the Kyrgyz government or for 
international organizations. It is not uncommon to see nine-year old school 
children playing with their iPhones during recess or paying with $100 bills 
at the school’s kiosk. 
In the literature, the running of private schools is more prominently 
treated than the maintenance of charity lyceums. It is even often stated (e.g. 
Peuch 2004) that the education provided by the movement is totally secular. 
However, my research revealed different findings: in Dushanbe I was in-
formed that students at these schools who receive a special promotion be-
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cause of their high school achievements have almost no free time because 
of their very tight timetables which not only include lessons and time for 
homework but also Islamic learning and reading namaz. In this way a 17-
year old boy is busy from 5am in the morning until 10pm in the evening 
with one hour off at midday (interview with an independent Tajik research-
er). What has to be stressed, though, is that although the secondary schools 
claim not to be especially religious, there are stories of parents of students 
who have expressed concerns regarding either the religious transformation 
of their children or a very tough timetable without any free time (see also 
Markedonov 2013: 27). In addition, I can give an example of an Islamic 
college in Bishkek, a madrasa, which is also sponsored by the Gülen 
movement. Forty students from all over Kyrgyzstan receive three years of 
free secondary education there.7 
 Source: Lisa Harand 
The students have to pass an entrance examination but afterwards they are 
fully provided for. During the first year they live at the madrasa, and during 
the second and third years they live in a dormitory in the city. The founda-
7  This seems to be no exception – I was told that other such schools exist in Nary 
and Osh, for example. 
Image 7: Madrasa supported by Gülen Movement in Bishkek 
102 | SECURITIZATION OF ISLAM IN CENTRAL ASIA
tion not only pays for their education but also their food (they eat together 
with their colleagues at the madrasa), accommodation and sports and cul-
tural activities (interview with a sympathizer of the Gülen movement). The 
students are schooled in literature, history and languages but also pray to-
gether five times a day (namaz) and are instructed in Islamic subjects such 
as Arabic grammar, hadith and the reading of the Quran. 
Generally, at Gülen schools special emphasis is laid on sciences, ethics, 
and self-discipline. (Peuch 2004). The teaching is usually in English and 
Turkish but also in local languages (Peuch 2004). When I met members of 
the movement in Kyrgyzstan I was astonished by their excellent language 
skills and how well-travelled they were. To give an example: one of my 
Kyrgyz interview partners had lived abroad for seven years, mainly in Tur-
key and Switzerland, obtaining a Masters degree in Business Administra-
tion in the latter. Today he works in a business consultancy for foreign 
companies in Kyrgyzstan. His office is affiliated to the Gülen movement 
and located in a building together with other Gülen enterprises. One of 
these is a charitable organization and another is ‘Radio Maral’ – the Gülen-
radio for Kyrgyzstan. 
 Source: Lisa Harand 
Image 8: Gülen Radio Maral in Bishkek 
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It is very typical for the Gülen movement that apart from education, it is ac-
tive in the fields of business, media and charitable work. Indeed, the 
movement not only runs schools but also large and small businesses, stu-
dent apartments and even organizes weekly ‘discussion circles’. This ex-
plains why schools are being built by either Gülen-owned or Gülen-linked 
companies such as the Turkish company Serhat or by organizations such as 
the Tolerance Foundation (Markedonov 2013: 26f). The fact that sympa-
thizers not only meet other members once a week to read and discuss 
Nursis and Gülen’s texts, but also work in firms affiliated to the movement, 
or often live in student-homes run by Gülen (or, like my interview-partner, 
in an apartment rented very cheaply from a fellow sympathizer) lends this 
religious group the appearance of a sect.8 
Apart from the fact that being a member seems to have a far-reaching 
effect on their lives (as it impacts which friends they have, the restaurants 
they choose and the places where they work and live), the following can be 
said of the political ideology that the movement is built on: 
“In contrast to the Salafis, the Fethullahcilar movement suggests a focus on under-
standing Islam through education. […] Gülen considers the primary tasks of the Fe-
thullahcilar not to be in conflict with official policy […] the movement interprets 
armed jihad as a mistake […]” (Markedonov 2013: 26). 
In the words of Fetullah Gülen, terrorism is incompatible with Islam be-
cause “in true Islam there is no terror since the killing of a human being is 
equivalent to disbelief (kufr)” (Gülen 2012). Besides arguing against terror-
ism, the Gülen movement is apolitical and it stresses the importance of tol-
erance and love in its interpretation of Islam (Akdag 2012). Nonetheless, 
government responses to the Gülen movement in Central Asia differ greatly 
from country to country. In Kyrgyzstan many government officials even 
send their children to Gülen schools, such as the International Silk Road 
8  The fact that not all employees of affiliated firms are members or sympathizers 
of the movement could counterpose this statement (I was told that at Radio Mo-
ral, for example, only 80% of staff were sympathizers). However, this could be 
judged as a good recruiting-strategy since it demonstrates that not only is it inte-
rested in isolating its members from too many outside influences but also in gai-
ning new members. 
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School in Bishkek, and over time, Gülen teachings may have had a major 
influence on the elite for this very reason (interview with a sympathizer of 
the Gülen movement). In general it is clear that the influence of the Fetullah 
Gülen movement in Central Asia is profound and, by disseminating its 
modernist understanding of religion, has had a part to play in the revival of 
Islam in the region. 
3.5.2. Tablighi Jama’at 
Tablighi Jama’at (TJ) is a transnational movement with a global outreach 
and a clear centre in South Asia – in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. The 
movement was founded in 1926 under the leadership of Maulana Muham-
mad Ilyas (1885-1944) “in the context of British colonial and cultural dom-
ination” (Reetz and Mumtaz 2009: 293) and “in order to purify Islam of 
Hindu and Christian influences” (Roy 2004: 156). The group follows “or-
thodox Deoband traditions and emphasize taqlid (following the established 
schools of Islamic law) over ijtihad (independent reasoning)” (Reetz and 
Mumtaz 2009: 297). It has 12 to 15 million followers worldwide and spread 
to Central Asia in the 1980s (Reetz and Mumtaz 2009: 293, 295). Today, 
Tablighi Jama’at is considered “the largest Muslim missionary group in the 
world […], its annual conference has become the second largest Muslim 
congregation after the hajj” (Ismailbekova & Nasritdinov 2012: 180).  
The members of this Islamic missionary movement do not proselytize 
among non-Muslims. Instead they seek to bring Muslims back to “true Is-
lam” and correct their practices (Markedonov 2013: 29). Tablighi Jama’at 
attaches considerable importance to dawat – preaching by inviting others to 
the mosque. Every Tabligh should fulfil this duty in exact time spans: three 
days per month, one month per year and four months in a lifetime (see 
Nasritdinov 2012). This means that preaching is not restricted to the clergy 
but that “everyone who joined the Jama’at became an instant preacher” 
(Reetz and Mumtaz 2009: 295). The dawat is strongly connected to travel-
ling. Nasritdinov very neatly explains the implication travelling has for the 
spiritual experience and process of a Tabligh (Nasritdinov 2012). On their 
journeys the members of the movement are organized in groups (jama’at) 
of 10 people who “invite the local Muslims to assemble in the mosque or 
some other meeting place, and present their message in the form of six di-
rectives” (Reetz and Mumtaz 2009: 294). 
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Roy regards the fact that every Tabligh is an instant preacher as grounds 
for classifying the movement as neofundamentalist. He argues that neofun-
damentalists are more interested in the immediate experience of faith than 
in thorough religious knowledge and scholarly learning (Roy 2004: 165). 
Along with Salafis and other fundamentalists, the movement shares a 
strong disdain for Sufi practices and other ‘innovations’, as Reetz and 
Mumtaz explain: 
“It rejects such popular expressions of religion as the veneration of saints, visiting 
shrines, and observing the syncretic rituals associated with popular Sufism. Jama’at 
workers are rigid in following orthodox rituals and practices and in observing the 
rules of shari’ah” (Reetz and Mumtaz 2009: 297).  
The fact that the movement is rather more interested in the transformation 
of the individual and less in social change also fits Roy’s classification of 
Tablighi Jama’at as a neofundamentalist movement. Karagianni also states 
that the group can be considered neofundamentalist because it operates 
mosques and schools (Karagiannis 2010: 52). 
Despite this, my own experience with a member of Tablighi Jama’at 
was that of a quite tolerant person. Although he explained on a theoretical 
level why he did not regard it as correct to pray at a saints’ grave, he did 
read the Quran for the other people present at this place because he was the 
most knowledgeable person there. Such tolerant behaviour does not fit 
Roy’s neofundamentalist description. Furthermore, Nasritdinov’s research 
and his work with Ismailbekova, in which they reveal conflicting observa-
tions, make me hesitant to conclude that we are dealing with an exclusion-
ary organization or movement.  
In terms of its political ambitions it seems appropriate to conclude that 
since the movement is primarily interested in the transformation of the in-
dividual into a good Muslim, it is apolitical. As Alexiev makes clear:  
“Tablighi Jamaat officials work to remain outside of both media and governmental 
notice. […] By eschewing open discussion in politics and portraying itself only as a 
pietistic movement, Tablighi Jamaat works to project a nonthreatening image” (Alex 
Alexiev, cited in Markedonov 2013: 28).  
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Reetz and Mumtaz (2009: 292) also consider Tablighi Jama’at to be apolit-
ical citing as reasons the fact that it neither aspires to an Islamic state such 
as a caliphate nor proclaims armed jihad. In certain countries, such as Paki-
stan, India, Indonesia and Malaysia, the movement even profits from the 
fact that governments accept it as an “antidote to militant Islam” (Reetz and 
Mumtaz 2009: 298). Not so in Central Asia: Uzbekistan banned Tablighi 
Jama’at as an extremist organization in 2004, Tajikistan followed in 2006, 
Russia in 2009 (Markedonov 2013: 29) and Kazakhstan in 2013. Only in 
Kyrgyzstan is the movement still able to operate legally, though its mis-
sionary trips are regulated by the Muftiate. 
It is difficult to give a clear answer regarding the movement’s organiza-
tional structure. Whereas Tablighis themselves claim not to have a strong 
formal organization, “a closer look at their functioning reveals that this is 
far from true. Their international administration has become very strong 
and robust” (Reetz 2008, cited in Ismailbekova & Nasritdinov 2012: 183). 
Indeed, its vertical and horizontal structures appear to function fairly well 
as we see in the example of Kyrgyzstan. Here a national council called 
mashura (Arabic for council) oversees the adherents of the movement 
(Zenn 2013). Decisions concerning domestic issues are taken at these na-
tional councils and, “are passed down to the regional, city and local levels” 
where they reach the individual mosques (Ismailbekova & Nasritdinov 
2012: 183). Moreover, Ismailbekova and Nasritdinov write that on their 
trips to India, Kyrgyz jama’ats:  
“[…] report the success and difficulties of their practice in Kyrgyzstan: the range of 
issues reported can include the number of 3-day, 40-day and 4-month jama’ats, 
which travelled inside Kyrgyzstan and abroad, the quality of everyday local efforts, 
the main patterns and trends in comparison to previous years, etc. They also receive 
instructions and recommendations form the veterans of the movement, which are 
then brought back to Kyrgyzstan” (Ismailbekova & Nasritdinov 2012: 183). 
Despite this, the impact of the existence or non-existence of a hierarchical 
structure with regards to fundamentalist elements in the movement remains 
open to discussion. Ismailbekova and Nasritdinov and a researcher for Alert 
International all argue that only a strong leadership and hierarchical struc-
ture could prevent the Tablighis from being overrun by political movements 
(Ismailbekova & Nasritdinov 2012: 183; interview with researcher for Alert 
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International). Nevertheless, my interview partner from Alert International 
questions Ismailbekova’s and Nasritdinov’s assertion that the organization 
is strong enough to resist fundamentalist elements. Furthermore, there are 
critics who argue that the movement is Salafi; that it aims at establishing a 
global Islamic caliphate, and even maintains connections to al Qaida (Zenn 
2013). However, these arguments refer to individual relationships or 
changes of members of one group to the other rather than organizational 
links between the two groups (interview with a researcher for Alert Interna-
tional). 
 Source: Lisa Harand 
Compared to the progressive Gülen movement Tablighi Jama’at is back-
ward-looking and conservative. At first sight Tablighis seem to be much 
more devout than Gülencis because of their Pakistani dress code of long 
shirts and wide trousers. My Tabligh interview-partner, for example, 
described himself as God’s slave, which sounds extreme. By contrast, a 
sympathizer of the Gülen movement with his band collar shirt, v-neck pul-
lover and intellectual speech seemed moderate and almost western. Which 
of these two movements is having a broader effect on Islam in Central Asi-
a? This question is impossible to answer in the scope of this study. How-
ever, it seems to me that the Gülen movement is much more difficult to pin 
down than the Tablighi Jama’at. Moreover, the Gülen movement’s projects 
Image 9: Kyrgyz Member of Tablighi Jama’at 
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to transform society are much more diversified and complex than the Tab-
lighi’s proselytising efforts among fellow Muslims. 
 
 
4. Typology of Islamic Groups 
 
 
4.1. FOLK-ISLAMIC GROUPS 
 
The revival of Islam has manifested itself in the resurgence of Islamic rites 
in the personal lives of Central Asians and in the increase of visitations to 
the graves of saints (Kehl-Bodrogi 2006: 236). In the wake of 9/11, this re-
vival of Islam can easily be misinterpreted as a strengthening of fundamen-
talist Islam. A more objective perspective and a more thorough analysis re-
vealed, however, that many different groups have contributed to this reviv-
al. To fully understand this phenomenon, these groups need to be differen-
tiated from each other and studied separately. As was demonstrated in the 
last chapter, ‘extremist’ and ‘foreign’ Islamic groups have gained ground in 
Central Asia. More importantly, though, is the larger impact which has 
been made by the increased popularity of the following traditional religious 
practices: 
 
• Sufism 
• mazar-worshipping 
 
Research has shown that Sufism is most widespread in Tajikistan and Uz-
bekistan and to a lesser degree in Kyrgyzstan. In Kazakhstan, however, Su-
fism is not very popular. It is important to understand that religious folk 
practices such as the invocation of ancestors and the visitation of holy 
shrines are traditional practices in Central Asian Islam and are therefore ac-
cepted by the majority of citizens in all Central Asian countries. Indeed, 
these practices are accepted as a part of their Islamic beliefs. 
Sufism is always bound to a very hierarchical organizational structure 
and can become political under certain circumstances. Although there are 
110 | SECURITIZATION OF ISLAM IN CENTRAL ASIA
many similarities to mazar-worshipping, the latter is less organized and I do 
not know of any political mobilization of mazar-shayks for example. I as-
sume that the increased influence of folk Islamic groups after the independ-
ence of the Central Asian countries was not due to the proselytizing efforts 
of their members. Instead, the perceived stronger influence can better be 
explained by the change in the behaviour of the general population which 
previously had had to hide its religiosity but was now permitted to express 
it more openly. Thus a large part of the revival of Islam in Central Asia can 
be attributed to the reemergence of folk Islam in the public sphere which 
was a result of a greater freedom to express religious beliefs. 
4.2. NON-TRADITIONAL ISLAMIC GROUPS 
Apart from a reinvigorated folk Islam, proselytizing efforts of Salafi groups 
further contributed to the revival of Islam in Central Asia. Salafis intend to 
re-establish a Muslim society as it existed during the life of the Prophet 
Muhammad and the first three generations of Muslims. While all Salafis 
undertake proselytizing efforts to achieve this goal the movement is none-
theless very diverse, as I have shown in the previous chapters. In spite of 
the similarities described in 3.2.1, Salafis can be differentiated according to 
their relationship to politics and to the means they adopt for their political 
struggle. There are modernist Salafis who seek to Islamize society through 
education and embrace modernity; fundamentalist Salafis who are back-
ward-looking and reject any political engagemen, and there are also politi-
cal Salafis who I call Islamists because they use Islam as a political ideolo-
gy. Important to note is that not all Salafis are jihadis, who receive the most 
attention in the (western) media due to their call to violent action (Haykel 
2009: 26). Also, when we refer to the concept of jihad, we must bear in 
mind that no other Islamic expression has ever been as misused as often as 
this one. Jihad, which is usually translated as holy war, though a closer 
meaning would be effort, is not restricted purely to external conflict and 
aggression but also denotes the internal and defensive struggle of Muslims 
(Halbach 1989: 216). As was shown in section 3.1.1 the understanding of 
jihad is an important criterion when differentiating between the different 
Salafi groups:  
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“[…] Salafi mainstream ulama consider jihad as a collective rather than an individu-
al duty. They also believe that even if there is jihad, there are rules of conduct during 
war that should be respected” (Roy 2004: 254).  
 
Jihadis on the other hand regard jihad as an individual duty and use this 
concept to legitimize violence against civilians. 
In order to discuss the relationship between Islam and politics in Cen-
tral Asia, it will be helpful to adhere to the following definitions of the rel-
evant groups: 
 
• I use the term ‘non-traditional’ for all those groups who reject Central 
Asian religious folk traditions, the commingling of religious practice 
with pre-Islamic rituals and the interwovenness of religion and ethnici-
ty. 
• It is my understanding that Salafis are those Muslims who have a social 
utopian non-traditional ideology and attempt to proselytize others in or-
der to purify Islamic society. 
• Islamists refer to all Salafis who politicize Islam and who use Islam as a 
political ideology in order to Islamize society. 
• Jihadists are those Islamists who furthermore justify the use of violence 
to achieve the same goal. 
 
All these groups share the common feature that they reject the influence of 
culture and tradition on religion and in this sense can be regarded as non-
traditional. Furthermore, they are Salafis (or neo-fundamentalist according 
to Roy’s definition) as they wish to bring the society back to the ‘true’ faith 
of the first three Muslim generations. Whereas all groups hope to transform 
society in one way or another, both modernists and fundamentalists aim at 
transforming society from the bottom up, whereas Islamists and jihadists 
try to Islamize society from the top down. I suppose that all jihadists are Is-
lamists, although there might be some difference in the importance they at-
tribute to religion and politics. Whereas Islamists are primarily political and 
refer to religion as the basis of their political activity, jihadists do the oppo-
site: they are primarily religious and, as Roy maintains, their only political 
act consists of declaring the religious law to be the law of the land. I as-
sume furthermore, that Islamists can resort to violent means (and become 
jihadists) although remaining primarily political under certain circumstanc-
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es (such as during the Tajik civil war, where the IRPT was engaged as an 
armed conflict party). 
I would like to summarize the definitions mentioned above as follows: 
Table 2: Typology of Non-Traditional Islamic Groups 
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Foreign vs 
Central Asian 
As we will see in the next chapters, Central Asian governments seek to 
lump all these groups together as negative foreign influences on home-
grown Islam. Contrary to Central Asian folk Islam, which is closely in-
tertwined with the Sunni Hanafi School and is open to pre-Islamic cus-
toms and traditions known as urf and ‘adat, Salafis traditionally refer to 
the Hanbali school of law. Because of their desire to live a pure Islam, 
Salafis reject such local traditions as bid’a (unjustified innovation). 
However, this does not mean that all Salafi groups in Central Asia are non-
Hanafi. On the contrary, most adhere to the local school of law to some de-
gree or simply reject the identification with any legal dimension of Sunni 
Islam. This is further proof of the heterogeneity of religion. Additionally, 
not all Salafi groups active in Central Asia have a foreign origin; the Islam-
ist IRP and the jihadist IMU, the only two groups who have openly promot-
ed violent means in their political struggle (with regards to the IRPT  this 
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was the case during the civil war but is no longer true), are genuinely Cen-
tral Asian groups. 
Even though it is true that Salafism has certain Central Asian roots as 
can be found in groups such as IRPT and IMU, foreign groups such as HT, 
Fetullah Gülen and Tablighi Jama’at have had a large impact on the new 
strength of the scriptural interpretation of Islam in the region. As these 
groups have only come to the region during the last few decades, it is 
wrong to describe their diffusion as simply a revival of Islam – instead we 
have to bear in mind that the majority of the Salafi groups have brought 
new interpretations of Islam to Central Asia. Although the religious policies 
of the Central Asian states are highly controversial (as we will see in the 
next chapters), they are based on these proselytizing efforts by foreign and 
domestic Salafi groups. 

 
 
PART II  
POLITICS AND ISLAM:  
CASE STUDIES OF POLITICAL REGIMES  

 
 
5. History of Politics and Islam  
in Central Asia 
 
 
 
Central Asian history is important for gaining an understanding of the con-
temporary religious policies of the independent states. For example, the 
Uzbek nation-building strategy refers to Timur while the contemporary 
Muftiates have their origin in the Soviet offices, which in turn are the suc-
cessors of tsarist institutions. But history is also necessary to help us under-
stand non-state movements. For example, the involvement of Naqshbandi-
yah tariqa in politics centuries ago, its suppression during tsarist and Soviet 
times, as well as the mobilization-potential it demonstrated during this pe-
riod, helps shed light on its current status. This chapter does not seek to 
give a general overview of the history of the region, but is rather more con-
cerned with the development of contemporary religious self-images and 
governmental restrictions on Islam. In order to gain an overview of the 
many different aspects which have played a role in Islam in the past and 
still have an influence today, I summarize in this chapter the history of the 
most important empires in the region, as well as internal developments 
within Islamic thinking and practice. I start with the Islamization of the re-
gion.  
 
 
5.1. EARLY EMPIRES AND ISLAMIZATION OF 
CENTRAL ASIA 
 
Islam is one of the main world religions and it is the prevalent religion in 
Central Asia. It spread from contemporary Saudi Arabia, where Prophet 
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Muhammad lived in the 7th century, to other regions. Ever since Arab con-
querors first incorporated Transoxiana, also called Mawarannahr (the lands 
between the Amu Darya and the Sir Darya), into the Arab caliphate in the 
8th century, different waves of Islamization have spread through Central 
Asia (Naumkin 2005: 6).  
From the 8th century onwards, different Muslims and Muslim groups 
from Central Asia have shaped the history of the Muslim world, and the re-
gion, “could present a unique success story in the Islamic world” (Kaplony 
2005). For centuries Bukhara was a centre of Islamic learning: it is the 
birthplace of one of the most important Sufi orders, the Naqshbandiyah, 
and famous personalities such as the jurist Abu Mansur Muhammad al-
Maturidi, the scientist Abu Nasr al-Muhammad al-Farabi and the rationalist 
philosopher Abu ‘Ali Ibn Sina all originated from this region (Khalid 2007: 
25).  
Generally speaking, the people living around the oases on the Silk Road 
were the earliest Central Asian converts to Islam because they were the first 
to come into contact with merchants advocating the new religion. 
 
“One decisive factor in the Islamization of Central Asia was the bustling caravan 
transport. The merchants were amongst the first to spread Islamic religion and cul-
ture” (Schlageter 2003: 74, translated by the author). 
 
As a result, the first Islamic strongholds in the region were the cities of Bu-
khara, Samarkand and Kokand (Schlageter 2003: 161). The sedentary peo-
ple in these cities were Islamized by the Arabs of the Abbasid caliphate in 
the 8th century. By contrast, the nomads in the region were less accessible 
for the new religion and so their conversion took a great deal longer, as 
Khalid explains: “Many nomads entered the orbit of Muslim civilization 
[…] from the tenth century on, but conversion to Islam was a gradual pro-
cess that lasted into the eighteenth century” (Khalid 2007: 26). Under the 
Qarakhanid dynasty many nomads of the Kazakh Steppe were Islamized in 
the second half of the 10th century (Schoeberlein 2009: 99) and from the 
10th to the 12th century Tajik merchants brought Islam to the nomads who 
lived on modern-day Kyrgyz territory (Karagiannis 2010: 33). Yet more 
important for the conversion of the nomads than the spreading of Islam by 
commerce, however, were “the efforts of charismatic Sufi shaykhs” 
(Schoeberlein 2009: 103). It was under their influence that the conversion 
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of Kazakh nomads continued until the eighteenth century (Schoeberlein 
2009: 99, 220). 
As we can see, the Islamization of the Central Asian peoples depended 
on their way of life on the one hand. Conversely, their way of life had an 
influence on how the new religion was practiced. Whereas we can find 
many impressive Islamic monuments in the traditionally sedentary regions 
(mainly in Uzbekistan but also in Tajikistan), there are few historical Islam-
ic buildings in the lands of the nomads in mountainous Kyrgyzstan or in the 
far reaching steppes of Kazakhstan. 
Due to such differences, as well as the fact that the nomads were Islam-
ized later than the sedentary populations, it has often been said that the no-
madic peoples are less religious than the sedentary ones (Schoeberlein 
2009: 103). Thereby the assumption has been that Islam today is rooted to a 
lesser degree in a society if the society was originally (even hundreds of 
years ago) coerced to convert; if it was Islamized at a later point in time, or 
if it tended to abstain from the usage of written sources (all this is said to be 
the case with the nomadic societies in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan – alt-
hough the latter is not true as we could see in 3.2.1). However, “no con-
sistent relationship can be observed anywhere in the Islamic world between 
high levels of literacy and devotion to Islam, and […] right from its begin-
nings in the core of the Arab world, Islam has found strong adherents 
among nomads” (Schoeberlein 2009: 103). As a consequence, Schoeberlein 
proposes not to exaggerate the importance of reading the Quran as an indi-
cator of religiosity. In any case, it is true that there still are some differences 
between the originally nomadic peoples and those who have been sedentary 
for centuries. This is important to consider if we want to come to a conclu-
sion regarding the contemporary revival of Islam in Central Asia.  
In the following sections, I focus on the different Central Asian empires 
and their impact on Islam; namely whether they a) brought Islam to the re-
gion b) fought against it or c) declared it as their state dogma. 
 
5.1.1. 8th Century: Umayyads 
 
The Umayyads (661 – 750), who were Arabs from Mecca, had their centre 
of power in Damascus and expanded their empire to contemporary parts of 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In the late 7th century they con-
trolled Bukhara, Samarkand and the Ferghana Valley under Umar II (Ber-
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zin 1996). It was predominantly people living in cities who adopted the 
new religion in the mid-eighth century. The Arabs’ primary interest was not 
the expansion of Islam, but rather the military and economic advantages 
they could gain by controlling the Silk Road (Berzin 1996). A mass conver-
sion of non-Muslims would have signified a financial loss for the new rul-
ers because only non-Muslims would have had to pay a poll tax (Enderlein 
2005: 61). At any rate, the Arabs were the first who brought Islam to Cen-
tral Asia and changed the life of the occupied people to a great extent: 
 
“In order to integrate Transoxiana into their domain, it was not unusual for the Arabs 
to take drastic measures. The land was declared property of God or rather property 
of God’s surrogate on Earth. It was leased and taxed” (Schlageter 2003: 74, translat-
ed by the author). 
 
Interestingly, the so called waqf religious property remained important until 
the very beginning of the communist era.1 
 
5.1.2. 8th-13th Century: Abbasids 
 
The Umayyad Empire was troubled by internal quarrels and finally de-
stroyed by the Abbasids (749 – 1258). They were supported by Persians 
from the 9th century on and adopted the Persian style of administration 
(Blair and Bloom 2005a: 93). The Abbasids legitimized their fight against 
the Umayyads by labelling the older regime ‘unholy’ and by tracing their 
right to rule back to the uncle of the Prophet Muhammad (a relationship 
that was closer to the Prophet than the Umayyads’) (Enderlein 2005: 63; 
Blair and Bloom 2005a: 91). It is important to note that when Kalif al-
Mamun was in power, questions such as human freewill were broadly dis-
cussed in Islam.2 He promoted the rationalistic view on this matter (which 
                                                   
1  For the contemporary role of waqf in the Islamic world see: http://webcache. 
googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:TpBQClBR0hEJ:www.unhabitat.org/ 
downloads/docs/3546_80031_ILP%25207.doc+&cd=5&hl=de&ct=clnk&gl=ch. 
2  “The dispute between the traditionalists and the rationalists took on very harsh 
forms, sometimes even within the same madhhab. Whereas the former made an 
absolute out of emulating authority (whether books or preceptors), the latter 
largely relied on methods of reasoning, analogies, and mental conclusions (eve-
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was opposed predominantly by Ahmad ibn Hanbal, the founder of the Han-
bali School of Law), declared it as state dogma and pledged the ulama to 
avow themselves to this interpretation (Blair and Bloom 2005a: 90). The 
following quote summarizes the Abbasids’ theology: 
 
“First, they stressed the absolute unity or oneness (tawd) of God. From this it was 
logically concluded that the Qurn could not be technically considered the word of 
God (the orthodox view), as God has no separable parts, and so had to be created 
and was not coeternal with God” (Encylopaedia Britannica c). 
 
This rationalistic religious view was coupled with great military power. 
With their capital in Baghdad and Samarra, the Abbasids derived their mili-
tary force from guards from Central Asia, who they could rely on when in-
ternal quarrels threatened their power (Blair and Bloom 2005a: 93). The 
loyal army of the caliphate became known as Mamluks, who were mainly 
slaves with Turkic roots (Encylopaedia Britannica c). 
 
5.1.3. 9th-10th Century: Samanids 
 
During the rule of the Abbasids, many parts of their empire were controlled 
by different local dynasties as well as by independent empires which were 
under the suzerainty of the Abbasids. In this way, Transoxiana was ruled by 
the Samanids 875 – 999, who established their centre of power in Bukhara 
(Blair and Bloom 2005a: 93). Islam was their state religion (Naumkin 2005: 
6) and they developed a double-identity as campaigners against pagans and 
Shiites, as well as protectors of Iran against the Turks (Kaplony 2005). Al-
ready during their rule, Central Asia became a hub of Muslim sciences and 
commerce: 
 
                                                   
rything that became the pivot of kalam). In various regions of the Abbasid cali-
phate, the Hanafites seriously conflicted with the Hanbalites, followers of Ah-
mad b. Muhammad b. Hanbal (780-855), who fully depended on the traditional 
sources of Islam and literal understanding of texts, admitting ra'y only as a last 
resort, when traditional sources could not give an answer to the question that 
arose” (Naumkin 2005: 9). 
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“Under the loosely centralized feudal government of the Smnids, Transoxania and 
Khorsn prospered, with a notable expansion of industry and commerce, attested by 
the use of Smnid silver coins as currency throughout northern Asia. The main cit-
ies of Samarkand and Bukhara became cultural centres. Persian literature flourished 
in the works of the poets Rdak and Ferdows, philosophy and history were encour-
aged, and the foundations of Iranian Islamic culture were laid” (Encylopaedia Bri-
tannica d). 
Although these philosophers were Persians, the contemporary Turkic Cen-
tral Asian states refer to them – for example one of the biggest universities 
in Almaty, Kazakhstan, is named after Ferdowsi. From the Samanid dynas-
ty on, the present-day Uzbek cities remained 
“[…] important centers of Islamic learning and culture, as market centers on the Silk 
Road, and as the core of major world and regional powers from the Samanids to the 
Chagatayids, Timurids and Shaibanids […]” (Schoeberlein 2009: 99). 
As we will see later on, reference to the historical importance of these cities 
is an important part of contemporary nation-building by the Uzbek gov-
ernment. 
5.1.4. 10th-12th Century: Qarakhanids and Seljuks 
The Samanid dynasty disintegrated in 999, and the Turk Qarakhanids took 
over in Transoxiana, but they soon came under the control of the Seljuqs 
(Encylopaedia Britannica a). 
The Seljuqs (Great Seljuq Empire: 1038 – 1157) were Turkic nomads 
from the Oghuzen confederation of tribes, who were deployed by Central 
Asian rulers to fight the Arab invaders. Around 960 AD they converted to 
Islam and secured their own territories. For some time, they controlled one 
of the most far-reaching Muslim regimes (Hattstein 2005a: 348). Because 
of their Turkic origin they could not claim a direct relationship to the 
Prophet Mohammad. Instead, they relied on honorary titles which they re-
ceived from the caliph in Baghdad to religiously legitimize their rule 
(Hattstein 2005a: 348). Under the rule of Nizam, the Seljuks promoted the 
integration of Sufism into the state religion, maintained many excellent 
madrasas, and established a strong central power (Hattstein 2005a: 350ff). 
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In addition to honorary titles they also sought to legitimize their rule 
through an increasing reliance on sharia as a system of positive jurispru-
dence; through the maintenance of political stability, as well as through 
their prosperity (Hattstein 2005a: 352).  
The relationship between Seljuks and Qarakhanids shifted. Whereas the 
Seljuqs initially came under the suzerainty of the Qarakhanids, they domi-
nated the latter at the end of the 12th century (Hattstein 2005a: 348; 352). 
Finally, the Seljuks were defeated by the Chinese Qara-Khitai in 1141 
(Hattstein 2005a: 351); the Qarakhanids fell under the domination of the 
latter, and the regime of the Seljuks disintegrated in 1157 AD (Encylopae-
dia Britannica a). At the very beginning of the 13th century the Qarakhanids 
gained their independence again for some years but were finally stamped 
out by the Shah of Khorezm (Encylopaedia Britannica a).  
 
5.1.5. 11th-13th Century: Khorezm-Shahs 
 
The Khorezm-Shahs (1077–1231) first ruled as vassals of the Seljuks in 
modern day Central Asia and Iran and (taking advantage of a civil war 
among the Seljuks) subsequently gained their independence (Encylopaedia 
Britannica e; Hattstein 2005a: 353). Under their rule, the Central Asian oa-
ses flourished, as Hattstein observes: 
 
“Under the rule of Tekish’s son Ala ad-Din Muahhad (1200 – 1220) the Empire of 
Khorezm experienced its greatest triumphs and its most precipitous fall. After 1206 
he acquired the entire domain of the Ghurids (1208 he carried Herat), cast off the 
formal suzerainty of the Qara-Khitai in 1210 and in the aftermath enlarged his re-
gime at the expense of the Qarakhanids and Qara-Khitai. Thereby his domain cov-
ered for a short time the largest area in the history of Islamic empires“ (Hattstein 
2005a: 353, translated by the author). 
 
In spite of this high-time, the empire’s decline was invoked after initially 
good contacts with the Mongols turned sour. In the early 13th century, the 
Khorezm-Shahs maintained contact with Genghis Khan (1167-1227), the 
leader of the Mongols. When they imprisoned and slaughtered Mongol 
merchants and ignored Mongol requests for compensation, this provoked 
Mongol expansion to the west (Hattstein 2005a: 353).   
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5.1.6. 13th-14th Century: Mongols 
 
Under the Mongols, Central Asia witnessed very hard times. “Under Gen-
ghis Khan’s leadership, Mongol forces destroyed numerous cities in 
Transoxania and Khorasan in an unprecedented display of terror and anni-
hilation” (Encylopaedia Britannica b). This was not only a disaster for the 
people, but also for Islam (Naumkin 2005: 10): 
 
“Although the Mongols did not bear any particular antimus against Islam, their ac-
tions had a destructive impact on the religious and cultural traditions of Transoxiana. 
Islam was displaced from its position as the recipient of political protection or pat-
ronage, and its moral and ethical imperatives were subordinated to Mongol practic-
es” (Khalid 2007: 26). 
 
The Mongol invasion thus brought an end to centuries of Islamic rule. 
Ghengis Khan replaced the Islamic sharia with the Mongol yasa, a code of 
law and ethics that probably goes back to the early 13th century (Hattstein 
and Delius 2005: 613; Khalid 2007: 26). Whereas earlier empires had relied 
on their link to the Prophet Muhammad, during the next centuries the legit-
imacy of rule was strengthened if rulers could trace back their ancestry to 
Genghis Khan (Blair and Bloom 2005b: 388). “Mongol rule thus undid the 
hegemony of Islam in the political realm” (Khalid 2007: 27). 
The situation improved for Islam when the Mongols converted in the 
14th century and re-established it as the official religion in Central Asia: 
Özbek Khan (1313-1341), the Golden Horde’s leader, made Islam the reli-
gion of state (Schoeberlein 2009: 99; Naumkin 2005: 10). Afterwards, the 
Mongol Chagatayids and the Il-Khans also converted to Islam (Blair and 
Bloom 2005b: 388). However, the weakness of these three states allowed 
Timur to come to power in the 14th century (Cannon 2009: 380). 
 
5.1.7. 14th-15th Century: Timurids 
 
Timur (1336-1405) was a Mongol from the Barlas tribe which used the 
Turkic language and therefore is sometimes wrongly considered to be a 
Turkic tribe: the contemporary Uzbek government, for example, publicize 
Timur as part of their heritage. He served as a vizier for Ghengis Khan’s 
son Chagatai (ruler over the Chagatayids), who became Timur’s first victim 
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(Cannon 2009: 380). Timur took over Samarkand as capital, and the territo-
ry under his influence soon became almost as large as the former empire of 
Ghengis Khan. However, his dynasty could not tightly control it: “A mere 
hundred years after Timur’s first military victories, Timurid power had 
fragmented into petty states” (Cannon 2009: 380). Timur’s fall was there-
fore almost as precipitous as his rise. This was partly because he concen-
trated on single cities and regions and did not develop a concept for the 
administration of the state (Hattstein 2005b: 414). 
As far as religion was concerned, he was theoretically as tolerant as his 
Mongol predecessors, and the formalism of the Muslim schools of law did 
not dominate. Instead he tried to combine the Mongol yasa with the sharia 
(Hattstein 2005b: 408). Under his rule, Sufism and local saints cultures 
flourished (Hattstein 2005b: 408). Sufism became not only an important 
aspect but even a dominant part of cultural life (Khalid 2007: 10): 
 
“[…] in that era, it was no longer the ulama, as it was before the conquest, but Sufi 
shaykhs and ishans who played a paramount role in the religious class. Sufi symbols 
and rituals […] became the quintessence of popular Islam, joining together diverse 
ethnic groups of the population” (Naumkin 2005: 10). 
 
This led the root for the contemporary integration of Sufism into folk Islam. 
In spite of Timur’s religious tolerance, even Muslims were among those to 
fall victim to his extreme cruelty. For example, during the capture of Delhi 
(1398): “[…] his armies wantonly destroyed the lives and property of many 
Muslims and Hindus” (Cannon 2009: 380). In fact, Timur was even crueller 
than the legendary Ghenghis Khan and the mass murder of civilians and the 
destruction of cultural centres could not be compensated by the cultural ex-
tension of Samarkand by deported artists and craftsmen (Hattstein 2005b: 
408). 
One significant change during the Timurid era was the relocation of the 
capital, so whereas in the past the Islamic centre had been in Persia it now 
shifted to Samarkand (Hattstein 2005b: 414). As a consequence, under Ti-
mur’s rule, the region again became a centre of Islam and especially under 
Timur’s grandson Ulugh Beg (1394-1449), “masterpieces of Muslim archi-
tecture – mosques, mausoleums and madrasas, such as the Shah-i Zinda en-
semble, the Bibi Khanum mosque, the Gur-e Amir Mausoleum, and the 
Ulugh Beg madrassa, were built” (Naumkin 2005: 11).  
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5.1.8. 16th-18th Century: Shaybanids 
 
The Shaybanids were the successors of the Timurids in Central Asia. Their 
Uzbek empire was named after Muahammad Shaybani Khan (1500 – 
1510), the chief of a confederation of Islamized Turko-mongol nomads 
from the steppes, who established his sovereignty over a part of Ma Wa-
ra’al-Nahr (Holzwarth 2005: 431f; Naumkin 2005: 10). In 1507 Shaybani 
Khan ruled over eastern Khorasan, Transoxania, Khawarszm, Turkistan and 
the Ferghana Valley (Holzwarth 2005: 432).  
The second generation of the Shaybanid Khans in particular maintained 
a close relationship with the Naqshbandi Sufi order, which was able to 
transfer its influence from the Timurid era to the Uzbek empire (Holzwarth 
2005: 432). The heads of the Sufi orders were descendents of wealthy 
khodja-families from diverse cities (Holzwarth 2005: 432). Amongst other 
things, the societal influence of the Sufi orders was one reason why the re-
gion did not expand beyond externally demarcated borders (Holzwarth 
432). Bukhara was the main capital of the Shaybanids in the 16th century 
because it had been of great importance for Islam since ancient times and 
was also the stronghold of the Naqshbandiyah (Holzwarth 2005: 433). Dur-
ing this empire, Bukhara replaced Samarkand as the economic centre and 
Silk Road junction (Holzwarth 2005: 433). 
 
5.1.9. 18th-19th Century: Khanates and Emirates 
 
Already by the 17th century, the Shaybanid Khanate had been weakened: 
Balkh was temporarily occupied by the Moghul Empire while Bukhara was 
attacked by Khiwa (Holzwarth 2005: 434). After a deep political and eco-
nomic crisis from 1720-1770, the Uzbek empire disintegrated into several 
principalities (Holzwarth 2005: 434). Three new Uzbek dynasties subse-
quently emerged in the northern part of the former empire, which were able 
to re-establish political stability and economy (Holzwarth 2005: 435): 
 
• Kokand Khanate: the Uzbek Ming separated from Bukhara and founded 
their capital in Kokand in 1740, countering the Kyrgyz tribes and the 
Dsungars there. They maintained good contacts with the Chinese who 
granted them privileges for their commerce with Kashgar. In addition, 
the Kokand Khanate which, apart from the Ferghana Valley, also con-
HISTORY OF POLITICS AND ISLAM IN CENTRAL ASIA | 127 
trolled Tashkent, was an important mercantile partner for Russia 
(Holzwarth 2005: 435).  
• Bukhara Emirate: the Mangyts regained control of Bukhara in 1750. 
Unlike their predecessors and neighbours, the Mangyts, “were not rec-
ognized as descendants of Genghis Khan and therefore could not bear 
the title of khans and were called amirs” (Naumkin 2005: 11). They 
emphasized the religious role of their political rule and tried to lead a 
disciplined lifestyle as a good example for their citizens. Some regarded 
themselves as mere followers of the Naqshbandiyah and refused any 
gaudiness. Again, Russia was an important trading partner for the Bu-
khara Emirate, which was trying to regain its influence over Kokand 
and Khiwa (Holzwarth 2005: 435). 
• Khiva Khanate: Khiva was the capital of Khwarezm. Here the nomadic 
life was more pronounced than in the other two dominions. Between 
1742 and 1770 Turkmens and Uzbeks fought against each other, and fi-
nally the ruler (and since 1804 Khan) of the Uzbek Qungrat managed to 
gain suzerainty over the Turkmens (the latter separating only in 1855 
when they became independent as the Tekke-tribes). Khiwa was well 
known as a centre of the slave trade – the city alone employed around 
40,000 slaves (Holzwarth 2005: 435). 
 
In the Khanates of Kokand and Khiva as well as in the Emirate of Bukhara, 
Hanafi Sunni Islam remained the official religion and throughout the region 
Sufi shaykhs retained a strong influence on politics (Naumkin 2005: 11). In 
the late 19th century these last Uzbek empires were incorporated into tsarist 
Russia and later on became part of the Soviet Union. This meant that hun-
dreds of years of Islam as (quasi) state religion – only interrupted during 
the rule of Genghis Khan – came to an end. 
 
5.1.10. 16th-20th Century: Russian Tsars 
 
The first Muslim territory to be occupied by the Russians was the land of 
the Tatars around Kazan in the 16th century. What later became Kazakhstan 
was gradually incorporated into the Russian regime from the mid-18th cen-
tury on. The Central Asian regimes also came under Russian control: the 
Emirate Bukhara in 1868, the Khiva Khanate in 1873, and Kokand Khanate 
in 1876. This means that the territory of today Kyrgystan, Tajikistan and 
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Uzbekistan were incorporated into tsarist Russia in the late 19th century 
(ARDA). This period was accompanied by resistance and strong repression 
against the local population: “The Kyrgyz staged a major revolt against the 
Tsarist Empire in 1916 in which almost one-sixth of the Kyrgyz population 
was killed” (ARDA: KG). 
Literature about the tsarist period in Central Asia usually goes into de-
tails of the reigns of Peter I (reigned: 1682 – 1725) and Catherine the Great 
(reigned: 1762 – 1796). Whereas Peter I ruled very cruelly, Catherine the 
Great’s politics were influenced by enlightened absolutism and allowed the 
Tatar Muslims not only ownership of land but also gave them the right to 
religious freedom under the ‘Toleration of All Faiths’ edict in 1773. Cathe-
rine the Great evoked the ‘Orenburg Mohammedan Spiritual Assembly’ in 
1788, headed by a mufti and established in Ufa for administering the affairs 
of the country’s Muslims (Ro’i 2000: 100f). On the one hand, this had ad-
vantages for the Muslims who now were officially recognized and whose 
suppression was stopped (Yemelianova 2010: 19). On the other, the assimi-
lation of Muslims into the state had advantages for the regime, too; for ex-
ample, Muslim nomads were called upon to settle and were thereby easier 
to control (Ro’i 2000: 100f). 
On the whole, the religious policies of the Russian tsars were ambiva-
lent. Periods of relative religious freedom alternated with periods of forced 
assimilation and the curtailment of religious rights (Kappeler et al. 1989: 
117). Or, as Schoeberlein puts it: 
 
“The czarist policy toward Islam varied from highly suspicious, considering that fa-
natical Islam was the cause of uprisings against the czarist authorities, to tolerant 
and broadly supportive, reflecting the idea that Islam could be a civilizing factor, es-
pecially among nomads” (Schoeberlein: 2009. 100).  
 
Compared to what was to come under communism, though, Russian tsars 
did not interfere too much in the religious life of Central Asians, who were 
allowed to operate their own religious schools and religious courts (Keller 
2001). Tsarist Russia was primarily interested in Turkestan’s natural re-
sources (as cotton became increasingly important at the end of 19th centu-
ry), and in having a buffer area between itself and Great Britain during the 
‘Great Game’ (1835 – 1840) (Keller 2001).  
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5.2. THE COMMUNIST STATE AND ISLAM  
IN CENTRAL ASIA 
 
5.2.1. Bolshevik Revolution and the Central Asian  
Socialist Soviet Republics 
 
After the Revolutions of 1917, the Russians could not keep Central Asia in 
check. In Uzbekistan in particular, the Bolsheviks faced stiff resistance 
(ARDA: UZ). An outstanding role for the final communist conquest over 
Central Asia must be reserved for Frunze’s efforts as a military leader of 
the Bolsheviks. Frunze, who originated from Bishkek (which was named 
after him from 1926-1991), was one of the most important military figures 
of the Civil War (Encyclopedia Britannica d). Not only did he lead the 
Eastern, Southern and Turkestan fronts of the Soviet Army but the Bukha-
ran Emirate was also eliminated under his command (Frunse 1885-1925). 
Total control over the region was only fully reestablished in 1925 when the 
contemporary nation-states became terrirtorial and administrative entitites 
as Socialist Soviet Republics (SSR) (ARDA): 
 
• Uzbekistan in 1924 
• Tajikistan in 1929 (from 1925 on Tajikistan had been an Autonomous 
SSR inside the Uzbek SSR; with its transformation into its own SSR, 
“present-day Sughd province was transferred from the Uzbek SSR to 
the newly formed Tajik SSR in 1929” (ARDA: TJ). 
• Kazakhstan in 1936 
• Kyrgyzstan in 1936 
 
The general effects of communism were felt most strongly by Central 
Asians through Soviet agricultural policies. During the 1920s and 1930s the 
collectivisation of agriculture and the forced settlement of nomads brought 
about a terrible famine which resulted in the death of around 1.5 to two mil-
lion Kazakhs. Stalin’s ‘Virgin Lands’ campaign in the 1950s and 1960s was 
another Soviet agricultural project with far-reaching consequences for Ka-
zakhs: 
 
“Soviet citizens were encouraged to help cultivate Kazakhstan’s northern pastures. 
This influx of immigrants (mostly Russians, but also some other deported nationali-
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ties) skewed the ethnic mixture and enabled non-Kazakhs to outnumber natives” 
(ARDA: KZ). 
Another well-known disaster in Central Asia, also unleased by Soviet agri-
cultural policies, was the intensive production of cotton and grain. This “led 
to overuse of agrochemicals and the depletion of water supplies, which 
have left the land poisoned and the Aral Sea and certain rivers half dry” 
(ARDA: UZ). These negative developments, however, went hand in hand 
with the introduction of a modern education and health system and unfore-
seen infrastructural progress. Clearly the impact of Soviet politics on Cen-
tral Asian life was immense; I will therefore not go into the general changes 
they brought about but will instead restrict my analysis to the religious pol-
icies under communism. 
5.2.2. Religious Policies under Communism 
Directly after the revolution in 1917, the Soviet government paid little at-
tention to the role of Islam. The Bolsheviks prioritized dealing with Christi-
anity over Islam because Moscow’s main religious problem seemed to be 
the Russian-orthodox church which tightly identified itself with the tsarist 
regime and was ingrained in the Russian population (Bräker 1989: 136). In 
addition, the Bolsheviks seemed to realize that Islam was the most im-
portant force shaping Central Asian society and therefore were reluctant to 
fight it for fear of antagonizing local people, whose main attitude was al-
ready anti-Russian. This meant that while all tsarist court systems were 
abolished by a law passed in 1917, the Muslim courts, which were 
acknowledged during the tsarist rule, persisted, “because authorities were 
afraid of adding to the already intense anti-Russian hostility” (Keller 2001: 
31f). Furthermore, Moscow was a long way from Turkestan (how Central 
Asia was called in these times) and in the early years the infrastructure and 
resources for maintaining strict control over this region and abrogating Is-
lam were not available (Keller 2001). In 1918 all waqf property was nation-
alized and sharia courts prohibited, however, the Soviet state was not yet 
able to provide education. In 1922 the nationalization was reversed and not 
only the religious schools but also sharia courts were permitted to operate 
legally again. Therefore, Central Asians practiced their religion quite freely 
notwithstanding the anti-religious communist ideology in the 1920s. How-
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ever, these relatively tolerant years did not last long, as Schoeberlein high-
lights: 
 
“[…] after a period of relatively limited interventions in the decade following the 
Revolution, a very severe campaign was unleashed to suppress Islam. This was 
aimed primarily at transforming or liquidating those aspects of society in Central 
Asia and the Caucasus that were perceived as blocking the ‘building of socialism’, 
and all those identified as Islamic leaders were classified as the ‘class enemy’ ” 
(Schoeberlein 2005: 100). 
 
The destruction of Islamic traditions in the name of creating a socialist uto-
pia included closing mosques, madrasas and maktabs. The religious élite 
was physically liquidated and local traditions concerning marriage, circum-
cision and burial were prohibited (Schoeberlein 2005: 100). The most se-
vere repression of Central Asian Muslims took place under the anti-religion 
campaigns launched by Stalin and Khrushchev. Stalin fought against na-
tionalist deviations, which included the practice of religion (Simon 1986: 
14). One of the most terrible periods for Central Asians and nomads, who 
were among the most severely affected, was when Stalin welcomed or even 
consciously caused a famine to break the political will of non-Russian peo-
ples (Simon 1986: 15) (see the ‘Virgin Lands’ campaign mentioned above). 
During the Stalin and Khruschchev eras the transfer of Islamic 
knowledge by scholars as well as by representatives of folk Islam was inter-
rupted: 
 
“[…] under Stalin hundreds of people with both local and textual knowledge of Is-
lam – pirs, shaikhs, ulama, Islamic intellectuals – were executed in a brutal attempt 
to break the connections of future generations with their Islamic past” (Vernon 
2009: 280). 
 
Islam was successfully suppressed from the public sphere and the physical 
presence of Islam was reduced by the destruction of mosques and madrasas 
(Khalid 2007: 2). Furthermore, many holy places were destroyed or con-
verted into anti-religious museums (Bennigsen and Wimbush 1985: 132). 
People feared to visit the mosques or holy shrines because this could ruin 
their careers or “draw the unwanted attention of the government” (Vernon 
2009: 280). Those who continued to visit the mazars in defiance of such 
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risks were occasionally detained and as a consequence mazars were gradu-
ally abandoned (interview with Baktykan). 
Yet the Soviet religious policy was not based on coercion alone 
(McGlinchey 2006). The very cruel politics alternated with periods of rela-
tive respite for Central Asian Muslims.3 Kappeler (1989) regards this as a 
continuity of the (alternately tolerant and repressive) religious policies of 
the tsars (Kappeler et al. 1989: 127). Especially during Second World War, 
the Soviet regime depended on the mobilization of the Muslim population 
and therefore made concessions to the practice of religion (Schoeberlein 
2009: 100; Bräker 1989: 141). Religious activities and practices were once 
again permitted and the status of nomads was enhanced (Yemelianova 
2010: 23). In this context, additionally to the TsDUM in Ufa, further reli-
gious administrations for Muslims were established such as the Spiritual 
Administration of the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan (SADUM).4 
Indeed, the establishment of SADUM in Tashkent in 1943 represented, “a 
public admission of what had been apparent for several years – that the 
fight to eradicate Islam was over” (Keller 2001: 245). 
The new official Islamic institutions took up some threads of the Jadid-
is. The Jadidis were Muslim reformers who had been active in Central Asia 
since the 19th century and argued that modern education would improve the 
spiritual, economic and physical well-being of Muslims. Efforts were taken 
“to eradicate practices associated with Islam that were seen as being at odds 
with successful modernization, such as restrictions on women’s roles, pay-
ment of bride-price in arranged marriages, and expensive celebrations asso-
ciated with circumcision, marriage, and other community events” (Schoe-
berlein 2009: 105). These policies were complemented by solid measures in 
the social, educational and economic fields to integrate Muslims into the 
Marxist-Leninist system (Bräker 1989: 142). Although many Jadidis initial-
ly welcomed the Bolshevik revolution in the hope of social progress, they 
too soon became victims of the anti-religious campaigns. 
                                                   
3  At the same time, Muslims in other parts of the Soviet Union (Chechens, Kurds, 
Bulgarians) suffered collective deportation because they were accused of col-
laboration with Nazi Germany (Yemelianova 2010: 24). 
4  Under communist rule, the Orenburg Mohammedan Spiritual Assembly in Ufa 
further persisted and was renamed Central Spiritual Directorate of the Muslims 
of Inner Russia and Siberia (TsDUM) (Ro'i 2000: 101). 
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5.2.3. Official Islam and Nationalization of Religion 
 
Under Soviet rule “an active atheism was pursued” (Naumkin 2005: 
21). The majority of Central Asian mosques were destroyed or closed by 
the communists. Apart from small village mosques, which were effectively 
closed (Roy 2000: 152), very few mosques (around 300-400 for the whole 
Soviet Union) were registered with and declared legal by the Soviet admin-
istration (Ro’i 2000: 181). These mosques were allowed to operate but wor-
ship was restricted by SADUM which now represented the official Islam 
and also controlled Muslim education. The texts of the Muslim sermons 
had to be ratified in advance (Ro’i 2000: 255). Whereas registered 
mosques and the clergy were controlled by SADUM “at the same time 
shrine-based religious activities were denied any legal framework. […] 
[The] Soviets took pains to demonstrate that shrine-based beliefs and 
practices were actually un-Islam” (Kehl-Bodrogi 2006: 235) and Sufi 
brotherhoods were persecuted (Naumkin 2005: 21). 
Apart from the monitoring of Islamic content through SADUM, the au-
thorities also specified political issues, such as economic restructuring pro-
grams, which had to be included in the sermon (Keller 1988). As the au-
thorities depended on the imams to reach out to people, the official Islamic 
elite could take advantage of its position as an intermediary (McGlinchey 
2006: 129). This gave the Muslim clergy, which could maintain its role af-
ter independence, relative autonomy: 
 
“That the ‘Soviet Muslim clergy’ was not simply an extension of the Soviet ideo-
logical apparatus of KGB is evident in the diverse positions that these figures are 
now known to have taken in traditionalist versus reformist debates in Soviet times 
and the more open debates on these issues that are taking place in the post-Soviet pe-
riod” (Schoeberlein 2009: 105). 
 
Despite the strongly totalitarian religious policies of the communists, in 
practice the official clergy remained at least to some extent heterogeneous 
(see also Keller 2001). However, only those imams who cooperated fully 
with the Soviet authorities could be sure not to be replaced. Sometimes the 
registered clergy even perverted their faith to the extent that they could jus-
tify communist rule as the will of Allah, who sent Marx and Engels to at-
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tain socialism, arguing that communism corresponded with a righteous 
Muslim society (Ro’i 2000: 253f).  
From the 1960s on Islam survived officially thanks to the new percep-
tion of religion as part of nationality: in the wake of national politics, reli-
gion, together with culture and ethnicity, was not only tolerated but even 
cultivated in a folkloristic way (Khalid 2007: 85ff). I will later on refer to 
these policies as the ‘traditionalisation or nationalization of religion’. Dur-
ing this period even party members could describe themselves as Muslims, 
which implied that being Muslim was a cultural question and that it was 
even possible to be an ‘atheist Muslim’ (Pelkmans 2006). In order to pro-
mote the Soviet image in the Muslim world, students of Islamic theology 
were henceforth sent to friendly Sunni Arab countries for their studies (Roy 
2000: 151).5 As a consequence of these relaxed religious policies, the re-
vival of Islam started in the early 1980s. When the authorities realized this, 
they launched a “final large scale anti-Islamic campaign”, which targeted 
“ ‘popular religious practices’, Islamic funeral rituals and what was labelled 
‘nationalist tradition’, such as circumcision, marriage ceremonies and the 
practice of kalim (bride price)” (Kehl-Bodrogi 2006: 237). This phase last-
ed until the policies of glasnost and perestroika which were, after some de-
lay, applied in Central Asia as in the rest of the Soviet Union (Kehl-
Bodrogi 2006: 237): 
 
“At the end of the decade, the restrictions were largely lifted and the public display 
of Islamic religiosity became increasingly evident” (Kehl-Bodrogi 2006: 237). 
 
5.2.4. Central Asian Roots of Salafism 
 
The aforementioned contact with Sunni Arab countries (Libya, Syria, Egypt 
and Jordan), had an impact on the content of official Islam in the USSR: 
 
“[…] young students of religion who were sent there came back deeply influ-
enced by the thinking of the Muslim Brotherhood. These young ulemas displayed 
                                                   
5  This opening towards other Muslim regions had the unintended effect that some 
students were thereby influenced by the thinking of the Muslim Brotherhood 
(Roy 2000: 151). At any rate, they still collaborated with the authorities and re-
mained loyal to the USSR (Roy 2000: 151).  
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their political loyalty towards the USSR, but at the same time they were elaborating 
an uncompromising brand of Islam” (Roy 2000: 151). 
 
They did not agitate against the Soviet rule but instead “played a long-term 
game of compromise with the authorities and re-Islamization of society” 
(Roy 2000: 151). Peyrouse explains that these young ulama, influenced by 
Arab political Islam, laid the foundations of Central Asian Salafism. He as-
serts that the present day revival of Salafi Islam has its roots in Soviet reli-
gious policies, and is primarily an indigenous development: “It was the 
Russian repression of reformist Islam leaders that led to the rise of funda-
mentalist Islam in the region during the Soviet period” (Peyrouse 2007: 40). 
Already at that time, the scripturalist Salafi Islam was contrasted by the 
government with Central Asian folk Islam (as we will see later on, only the 
roles ascribed to them by governments changed after independence). 
Whereas “in pre-Soviet Central Asia, the veneration of saints (avliyo) 
played a prominent role in Islamic piety”, this “interrelation between 
mosque and shrine […] became seriously disturbed” (Kehl-Bodrogi 
2006: 235). Naumkin found out that in the 1980s the Salafis were sup-
ported by the communist party committees “in order to use them against 
the influential and therefore dangerous traditional Islam” and in order to di-
vide the religious class (Naumkin 2005: 52). Sufism (and the Naqshbandi-
yah specifically) was declared ‘parallel Islam’ or even ‘illegal Islam’ be-
cause it was less institutionalized than scholarly Islam and therefore less 
tractable and more feared by the Soviet authorities (Bräker 1989: 134).6 
Sunni and Shiite Islam, on the other hand, were usually summarized as of-
ficial or institutionalized brands of Islam in Soviet literature (Bräker 1989: 
134).  
The impact of individuals’ trips to Arab countries on the religious de-
velopment of the region is especially apparent in the influence of the Ba-
bakhan family, who led SADUM from 1943-1957. Ishan Babakhan and af-
ter him, his son, Ziyauddin Babakhan were supreme muftis (Peyrouse 2007: 
42f). Ziyauddin studied at al-Azhar University in Cairo and tried to present 
himself as a Hanafite, but returning from his first stay in the Middle East, 
                                                   
6  At any rate, there has always been a commingling between the two; "One should 
not imagine that Sufism in Central Asia is antagonistic with the scholarly Islam 
of the ulemas" (Roy 2000: 148). 
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he brought with him many Hanbali publications. Furthermore, he opposed 
local traditions and customs, denouncing them as ‘un-Islamic,’ although he 
stemmed from a khoja family himself (Peyrouse 2007: 43).7 His fatwas, for 
instance, not only pointed out that “circumcision is not obligatory in the 
Quran,” denounced “excessive expenditure occasioned by marriages and 
the dowry principle”, and “criticized the cult of saint worship” (Peyrouse 
2007: 43): 
 
“His puritanism led him to regard the Central Asian traditions as superstitious prac-
tices contrary to the renewal of Islam. […] His particular fundamentalist orientation, 
then, favoured a non-Hanafite re-Islamicization of the young Soviet generations. 
[…] Paradoxically, however, the political authorities preferred to support the fun-
damentalist theologians rather than the conservative elements and the Sufi move-
ments […]” (Peyrouse 2007: 44). 
 
It was during the time of Ziyauddin Babakhan’s leadership of SADUM that 
“the Muslims of Central Asia witnessed the beginnings of a schism be-
tween Hanafite conservatives and the newer, much more fundamentalist, 
informal movements influenced by Hanbalism and Shafiism” (Peyrouse 
2007: 45). 
When more tolerant religious policies were finally implemented under 
Gorbachev in late 1988 and early 1989, former mosques reopened and for-
mer parallel mullahs could overtly perform their tasks: 
 
“[…] the parallel mullahs left their jobs in the kolkhoz (albeit keeping their plots of 
land), put on turbans and long robes and installed themselves in the mahalla 
mosques which were either reopening or were being built” (Roy 2000: 153). 
 
Already by 1990 1,330 mosques were registered all over the USSR and the 
“number of madrasa students rose to several hundreds” (Yemelianova 
2010: 27). During the last years of the Soviet Union, mullahs could decide 
more freely what they wanted to preach in their sermons and the former 
‘official Islam’ of the Soviet Union was no longer so strictly defined. 
 
                                                   
7  For the explanation khoja of this term see section 2.4. 
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5.2.5. Unofficial Islam in the Soviet Union 
 
Although the repressive religious policies of the USSR were very broad, 
they were not totally successful or effective, as Keller states: 
 
“A good part of the fault lay with the party itself, which too often issued vague, con-
tradictory, and impossible-to-fulfil orders. However, at all levels of the Central 
Asian governing structure Muslims found ways to ignore orders that they deeply op-
posed (especially concerning women’s status), turn a blind eye as clergy served on 
collective farms and evaded taxes, and make sure that their children understood the 
rudiments of religion. Convinced Communists, regardless of ethnic affiliation, were 
too few in number to stop this tide of evasion” (Keller 2001: xvf). 
 
In short, the means to implement the theoretically totalitarian ideas of the 
communist party were often lacking. As Roy makes clear, the control of re-
pression was “limited by the structure of the KGB itself: either it was local 
and complicit in what was going on, or it was town-based and unaware” 
(Roy 2000: 152). This may explain why Keller (2001) concludes that even 
under Stalin, the regime was not totalitarian in its practice (even if so theo-
retically). Further evidence for this is provided by Schoeberlein who writes 
that, “gathering at unofficial mosques, visitation of officially closed shrines, 
and the traditional life-cycle rituals although never officially accepted, were 
still maintained” (Schoeberlein 2009: 100). Shrines “ – museumized or not 
– remained focal points for popular Islam” (Louw 2007: 54). Yet it was in 
the area of non-institutionalized religious education that Soviet measures of 
eradication were particularly unsuccessful since such education, “depends 
more on a personal relationship with a teacher than an attachment to a reli-
gious or state institution” (Fathi 2011: 177).  
So, despite Stalin’s best efforts, an unofficial or ‘underground’ Islam 
persisted. Other reasons for the persistence of a parallel Islam include the 
fact that what was forbidden went underground, or the fact that the official 
clergy supported and was in contact with its unofficial counterpart: 
 
“This official clergy was never cut off from the parallel clergy. Both came from the 
same environment: that of the provincial Sufi religious families. The official mullahs 
always had their initial education at the hands of the parallel mullahs. […] The 
channels of communication have always been open, not least as a result of family 
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and local links. The official mullahs who did not become muftis were sent to run the 
official mosque of their district of origin, where they re-established their old infor-
mal contacts with the parallel mullahs. The policy of the official mullahs was not to 
suppress the parallel clergy but to control it” (Roy 2000: 151). 
Official and unofficial clergy often stemmed from the same khoja-families. 
The popular parallel Islam was represented by pirs, who still oversaw the 
Sufi shrines, and biotunchis, women who taught Islam in their private 
houses. As a consequence of the closure of most mosques during the Soviet 
period, especially in rural areas, people attended unregistered mosques, 
which were administered by parallel-mullahs (Schlageter 2003: 173). They 
met at traditional teahouses (chaykhana) or other non-religious public plac-
es (Yemelianova 2010: 25). I can conclude, then, that Islam remained im-
portant to the Central Asian people throughout the communist decades. 
(Yemelianova 2010: 25). As Yemelianova makes clear, this was particular-
ly evident during celebrations of the main life-cycle events, such as births, 
circumcisions, marriages and deaths. 
 
 
6. General Comparison of Contemporary 
Regimes 
 
 
 
All four Central Asian Republics became independent in 1991 as a result of 
the dissolution of the USSR. They did not have to struggle for their seces-
sion. In the absence of their own national liberation movements, their sov-
ereignty resulted from the decisions of Jeltsin (Russia), Krawtshuk 
(Ukraine) and Schushkewitsch (Belarus) when they signed a document to 
dissolve the Soviet Union (Petric 2011: 166). As Matveeva makes clear, 
“With the break-up of the Soviet Union, independence was forced on Cen-
tral Asian states rather than won by them” (Matveeva 1999: 24). In addi-
tion, although the Central Asian states were not founders of the Common-
wealth of Independent States (CIS) on 8 December 1991, they immediately 
became members two weeks later on 21 December 1991. 
Independence led to the emigration of many Russians from the Central 
Asian republics, most notably from Kazakhstan and, during the civil war, 
from Tajikistan. One consequence of emigration in these two countries was 
the effect it had on their economies. Borjian, referring specifically to Tajik-
istan, states that: “The rapid departure of Russians from the [Tajik] republic 
has resulted in a shortage of skilled labor, professionals, and industrial 
managers […]” (Borjian 1997). By contrast, in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan 
not only the economic but also the infrastructural situation has deteriorated 
since independence. For instance, it took Uzbekistan eleven years to 
achieve its 1989 production level, the first of the CIS states to do so, but 
even so and in spite of subsidized staple foods, many Uzbeks today still live 
below the poverty line (Schulze 2010: 52). 
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Apart from economic and infrastructural problems, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz-
stan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan share institutional similarities which derive 
directly from their Soviet past. Indeed, the fact that the Soviet style of gov-
ernance is still strong in all countries is an extremely important factor, not 
least because of the implications for regional identity, which as Matveeva 
points out, is “reflected in common political phenomena from referenda to 
extend presidential powers into the next millennium” (Matveeva 1999: 23), 
but also, as we shall see, since the national Muftiates are successor institu-
tions of the Soviet SADUM.  
All four countries are also currently concerned with developing both a 
cohesive national identity and countering security issues. Indeed, another 
commonality between these countries can be observed in the emergence of 
Islamic groups and states’ reactions to them, which again can be attributed 
to their shared Soviet past. As we have already seen, Soviet ulama estab-
lished contacts with Arab countries in the 1960s and brought ‘foreign’ in-
terpretations of Islam to the region. Early Salafi groups had already started 
to appear during Soviet times and furthermore, the first political party based 
on Islam, the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) was founded during the re-
form years as an all-Soviet party under the presidency of Gorbachev (Roy 
2000: 1; Schlageter 2003: 162). This resurgence of Islam has continued in 
the post-USSR era to the extent that today, 
 
“[…] there is a strong impulse within the societies to assign a new importance to Is-
lam as a guiding principle for changes in the social, political and moral order, in 
ways that will present challenges for both the traditional practice of Islam and the 
secular character of societies” (Schoeberlein 2009: 106). 
 
The political leaders of the Central Asian countries, however, try to subdue 
political Islamic groups which challenge their position (Schoeberlein 2009: 
106): “[…] they all pursue policies toward Islam that reflect a deep anxiety 
that it could become a powerful force opposing Soviet-style secularism and 
undermining the legitimacy of existing regimes” (Schoeberlein 2005: 98). 
Although in all countries more and more restrictive laws are being enacted, 
legacies and practices on the restriction of religious groups and political 
parties differ. I will elaborate on these differences in section 7.3 and present 
my typology of state restrictions on folk Islam and Salafi groups in 
chapter 9. 
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This brings us to other differences which have emerged in the former Sovi-
et republics since they became independent. What Matveeva wrote fifteen 
years ago has become even more true: “Today, the political development of 
the five Central Asian countries displays more diversity than uniformity, 
and Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are 
now distinct entities to a much greater extent than they were as Union Re-
publics” (Matveeva 1999: 23). So whereas in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan 
the former first secretaries of the Communist Soviet party were able to stay 
in power, Kyrgyzstan underwent several regime changes and a civil war 
raged in Tajikistan. Besides the differing political trajectories of these 
countries, developments in the social and economic domains and differ-
ences in the ethnic composition of the states suggest diverging conflict po-
tentials. Concerning the issue of political Islam, I show that although there 
are various ways of dealing with the opposition and promoting well-
controlled versions of Islam, in all societies illegal practices and groups still 
persist since constricted political freedom of choice leads to the problem 
that the opposition, which consists mainly of Islamists, establishes itself 
outside the state institutions (Khazanov 2005). 
I will now compare issues regarded as relevant for social conflict by 
theories such as relative deprivation theory, social movement theory and 
political opportunity structure theory. The comparison in this sense is theo-
ry-led and presents considerations and information on conflicts in the re-
gion. In the first part of the next chapter I compare general aspects such as 
demography, ethnicity and the socio-economic situation as well as infra-
structure and the political system of the Central Asian states.  
In a more specific comparison, I afterwards concentrate on state institu-
tions dealing with religion and the role of religion in the constitution. I then 
take a closer look at the religious laws of the contemporary governments 
and how they are implemented. Finally, I compare the security sectors of 
the Central Asian states according to factors such as domestic resources, in-
ternational military aid and alliances. Although these latter aspects are more 
relevant for my study, the former more general comparison is important, as 
well, since it describes the context of the specific religious and security pol-
icies and what will be included in the computer simulation as context-
legitimacy of the state. 
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6.1. DEMOGRAPHIC SITUATION 
 
6.1.1. Demography 
 
The two smallest Central Asian countries, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are at 
the same time the most mountainous and the ones with the smallest popula-
tions of 6 and 8 million, respectively. Uzbekistan is the Central Asian coun-
try with by far the biggest population of around 28 to 29 million people and 
the highest net-migration rate of – 2.55 yet it has the lowest birth rate with 
17.2 births per 1,000 populations as well as the lowest population growth 
rate (0.94%). The most populous country after Uzbekistan is geographically 
the largest, Kazakhstan, which has around 15 to 18 million citizens. It has 
the highest median age of all Central Asian countries (29.5 years – this is 
still low by international standards; Switzerland’s average age for example 
is 41.8). Furthermore, Kazakhstan is the only Central Asian country with 
more than 50% urban population and a positive net migration rate of 0.42 
while Kyrgyzstan for instance shows a net migration rate of – 7.13. Tajiki-
stan has the lowest average age at 23.2 as well as the lowest degree of ur-
banization with a percentage of only 26.5. Additionally, it shows the 
strongest migration to cities with an annual rate of 1.65%. I will go into fur-
ther details of work migration in section 6.2.3. 
 
Table 3: Demographic Benchmarks 
 Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
Population 
Total population  18 million 6 million 8 million 29 million 
Urban population 
in % of 
total population 
53.6 35.5 26.5 36.2 
Age structure 
15-24 years in % 16.9 19.4 20.4 21.1 
Median age 29.5 25.4 23.2 26.6 
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Population growth 
Birth rate per 1,000 
of population 
20.03 23.67 25.49 17.2 
population growth 
rate in % 
1.2 0.97  1.79 0.94 
Net migration rate 
per 1,000 
of population 
0.42 -7.13 -1.19 -2.55 
Source: CIA World Factbook (2012) 
 
6.1.2. Ethnicity 
 
The biggest Russian minority in the Central Asian states today lives in Ka-
zakhstan, where they amount to over 23% of the population and mainly live 
in the north of the county. Kazakhstan is the only state where the titular na-
tion constitutes only just over half of the population (ARDA: KZ). This was 
not always the case but has only become so recently as a result of state’s 
successful efforts to entice significant numbers of ethnic Kazakhs living 
abroad back to their homeland by means of economic incentives (inter-
views with Indira Burnashev). 
Significant numbers of ethnic minorities can also be found in Kyrgyz-
stan, where ethnic Uzbeks living mainly in the south of the country consti-
tute 14% of the population, and Tajikistan, where ethnic Uzbeks living 
mainly in Sughd province make up around 15% of the population. 
These areas with significant minorities are most prone to ethnic con-
flicts. The most recent example of this was the 2010 conflict in Osh, where 
around 420 people lost their lives (ICG 2012). It is still debatable what in-
fluence Islam had on this conflict. Even if it did play a minor role, it was 
undoubtedly the representation of Uzbeks in Kyrgyz society which was the 
main factor. Uzbeks claim that they are underrepresented in the national 
government. Kyrgyz on the other hand take issue with Uzbeks for having a 
monopoly in the business sector. Uzbeks in the south not only feel margin-
alized and forced out of public life, they also suffer concrete discrimination, 
as ICQ point out:  
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“[…] most Uzbek-language media have been closed; […]. International organisa-
tions report continuing persecution of Uzbeks by a rapaciously corrupt police and 
prosecutorial system, almost certainly with the southern authorities’ tacit approval” 
(ICG 2012: i). 
The reference to ethnic identity in politics became a more significant issue 
after independence due to the partially arbitrary demarcation between the 
former Soviet Republics. Discrimination based on ethnic origins is not only 
a problem in Kyrgysztan, but takes place in Kazakhstan against Russians 
(Freedom House 2013 a) and in Uzbekistan against Tajiks. In Uzbekistan, 
for example: 
“The belief that senior positions in government and business are reserved for ethnic 
Uzbeks is widespread. Moreover, the government appears to be systematically clos-
ing schools for the Tajik-speaking minority” (Freedom House 2013 d). 
It is questionable how far ethnic differences were a primary source of con-
flict in South Kyrgyzstan or if they were rather instrumentalized by stake-
holders to mobilize the masses in the conflict. It is important to note that 
data about the ethnic composition of the Central Asian societies are used 
and misused as a political instrument and therefore should be carefully 
dealt with. This holds true also for the data presented in Table 4.  
Table 4: Ethnic Composition of Central Asian Societies 
Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
Ethnicity  63% Kazakhs 
24% Russians 
65% Kyrgyzs 
14% Uzbeks 
13% Russians 
80% Tajiks 
15% Uzbeks 
1% Russians 
1% Kyrgyzs 
80% Uzbeks 
6% Russians 
5% Tajiks 
3% Kazakhs 
Source: CIA World Factbook (2012) 
6.1.3. Religion in Society 
A strong correlation between ethnicity and religion exists in Central Asia. 
Ethnic Russians usually belong to the Orthodox or another Christian 
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church, which makes Christianity the second biggest religious community 
in all of the four Central Asian countries after Islam (see Table 5). 
 
Table 5: Religious Composition: Muslims and Christians 
 Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
Muslims in % 70% 75% 90% 88% 
Christians in % 26% 20% No data 9% 
Source: CIA World Factbook (2012) 
 
The ethnic origin of a person can also often reveal the madhab he or she 
adheres to. The Shafi’i Muslims living in Kazakhstan, for example, are 
usually Chechens (ARDA: KZ). 
There are regional differences in the adherence or devotion to religion. 
In every country there are certain regions which are regarded as especially 
religious, such as the Fergana Valley in Uzbekistan or the area around 
Shymkent in south Kazakhstan. Salafis, becoming more numerous in recent 
years in Tajikistan (in the whole country there are around 5,000 according 
to government estimates) are most prevalent in Dushanbe, Sughd, and 
Khatlon (ARDA: TJ). Finally, in Kyrgyzstan “religious practice in the 
south is more traditional and devout than in other regions” (ARDA: KG). 
This observation is linked to ethnicity, as well, as many Uzbeks live in the 
south of Kyrgyzstan as well as in the south of Kazakhstan. 
Due to SADUM’s headquarters being in Tashkent, Uzbeks have for a 
long time played a leading role in religious affairs throughout the region. 
During Soviet times, the SADUM “administration’s staff was made up al-
most exclusively of Uzbek clergy and all correspondence was conducted in 
Uzbek” (Rotar 2004a). As a result, Ponomarev and Jukeyeva claim that in 
1989 most imams in Kazakhstan were non-Kazakhs, the majority of whom 
were Uzbeks (Ponomarev and Jukeyeva cited in Rotar 2004a). This 
changed only after independence when a “deliberate displacement of ethnic 
Uzbeks from their positions as imams at mosques began” (Rotar 2004a). In 
addition to being the seat of SADUM, Uzbekistan still retains its im-
portance within Islam today as the main historical Islamic cities are located 
on its territory.  
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As Table 5 further shows, in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 9 out of 10 people 
are Muslims – the biggest percentages among the Central Asian states. At 
the same time, Tajiks and Uzbeks are said to practice their religion more 
actively than Kazakhs and Kyrgyzs, as Rotar (2004b) makes clear: “Most 
devout Muslims in Central Asia are ethnic Uzbeks and Tajiks”. This is usu-
ally explained with the assumption that the originally sedentary populations 
are more devout than the ‘superficially Islamized’ nomads (see section 5.1). 
My interviewees generally also stated that the Tajik and the Uzbek popula-
tions are ‘more religious’ than the Kazakh and Kyrgyz people and my own 
observations affirmed this – in Tajikistan in particular I met many more 
people performing the mandatory five prayers a day than in the other coun-
tries. 
Even so, I challenge the widespread opinion that particularly the Mus-
lim populations of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan constitute only “nominal 
believers” who “do not practice their faith actively” (ARDA: KG), and who 
“call themselves Muslims [but] drink alcohol, do not fast in the month of 
Ramadan and hardly ever attend mosque” (Rotar 2004b). As I show in sec-
tion 9.1, the religious policies of the Central Asian states have had a signif-
icant impact on the practice of religion and on the attendance of religious 
services; for example, more scripturalist interpretations of Islam and reli-
gious worship have spread among Kyrgyzs while these have become less 
popular in Uzbekistan.  
Demographic factors also play a role in the religiosity of the local popu-
lation: in Tajikistan it is particularly city residents and young people under 
the age of 20 who are becoming more observant (ARDA: TJ). This is also 
the case in Uzbekistan:  
 
“Outside of Tashkent, practicing Muslims outnumber non-practicing Muslims […] 
mosque attendance continued to increase, particularly among younger men, who 
constitute the majority of worshipers” (ARDA: UZ). 
 
In Kyrgyzstan, however, I observed that especially older people were be-
coming more devout – a phenomenon that is known in Europe as well. 
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6.2. SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION 
 
6.2.1. Natural Resources, Energy and Infrastructure 
 
The economic situation of the Central Asian states is very diverse. Kazakh-
stan, for example, is an exceptional case; its GDP per capita is much higher 
than in other Central Asian countries. Whereas Kazakhstan GDP amounts 
to $14,100, the GDP of Uzbekistan is $3,600, Kyrgyzstan $2,400 and Ta-
jikistan $2,300 respectively. Recently Kazakhstan has become especially 
concerned with the expansion and exportation of its energy resources as 
well as with the diversification of the economy outside the energy sector 
(ARDA: KZ). Not only the country’s vast natural resources but also its 
relative political stability give Kazakhstan an economic advantage over its 
Central Asian neighbours (ARDA: KZ). Apart from Kazakhstan, Uzbeki-
stan is another main energy producer of the region: while the former holds 
eighteenth place in the country comparison for crude oil production the lat-
ter holds fifteenth place in the country comparison for natural gas produc-
tion. 
 
Export Commodities (CIA World Factbook): 
 
• Kazakhstan: oil and oil products, natural gas, ferrous metals, chemicals, 
machinery, grain, wool, meat, coal 
• Kyrgyzstan: gold, cotton, wool, garments, meat, tobacco, mercury, ura-
nium, electricity, machinery, shoes 
• Tajikistan: aluminium, electricity, cotton, fruits, vegetable oil, textiles 
• Uzbekistan: energy products, cotton, gold, mineral fertilizers, ferrous 
and nonferrous metals, textiles, food products, machinery, automobiles 
 
Table 6: Economic Benchmarks 
 Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
Economy 
GDP real growth rate 
in % 
5.0 -0.9 7.5 8.2 
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GDP per capita in $ 
(country comparison) 
14,100 
(95) 
2,400 
(185) 
2,300 
(189) 
3,600 
(171) 
Energy 
Crude oil production in 
bbl/day 
(country comparison) 
1,635,000 
(18) 
1,000 
(98) 
215 
(100) 
104,400 
(49) 
Natural gas production 
in million cu m 
(country comparison) 
20,200  
(33) 
12.5 
(90) 
40 
(85) 
62,900 
(15) 
Source: CIA World Factbook (2012) 
 
However, the most important economic sectors are conflict-prone. As the 
income from the energy sector in Kazakhstan, for example, makes up two 
thirds of the national budget (Schulze 2010: 33) it is hardly surprising that 
the state does not respond kindly to disruptions to oil production. In De-
cember 2012, after more than six months, an oil-workers’ strike against 
Usenmunaigas (affiliated company of Kazmunaygas) in Zhanaozen turned 
bloody. During the celebration of Kazakhstan’s independence, protestors 
set fire to administration buildings and the oil company’s headquarters. The 
police responded with lethal force. Officials state that 16 people were killed 
and around 100 injured, however correct numbers might be higher (Bens-
mann 2012: 7).1 Similarly, in Kyrgyzstan, the exploitation of the most im-
portant export-product, gold, also led to protests. 
 
“The protests against the operations of the Kumtor gold mine (which generates 12% 
of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP) in the Issyk-Kul district in the north of the country, continued 
until 3 June and resulted in 50 people being injured. The protesters demanded to be 
paid damages for the destruction of the environment caused by gold mining and to 
have social allowances increased for miners (the mine is now the property of the 
Canadian company Centerra Gold)” (Lang 2012). 
                                                   
1  See also Amnesty International report: http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/ 
press-releases/kazakhstan-no-accountability-entrenched-torture-2013-07-11. 
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The Krygyz conflict concerning the conditions for gold exploitation are be-
tween Kyrgyz citizens and an international private company. Yet in con-
trast to the Kyrgyz case, in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan the companies ex-
ploiting natural resources are still in the hands of the state. This is also true 
of Uzbekistan’s second most important export product: cotton. International 
observers regularly criticize the government policy of forced cotton harvest 
among school children (Antonikis 2012).2 In recent years though, the gov-
ernment has sought to “[…] gradually lessen its dependence on agriculture 
while developing its mineral and petroleum reserves” (ARDA: UZ). Also in 
the poorest of the former Soviet countries, Tajikistan, the main export com-
pany is state run: the Aluminium company Talco. It is directly controlled 
by President Rahmon and was criticized by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) for “most worrisome financial operations [which] remain non-
transparent” (Helmer 2008). 
Economic problems have become more conflict-prone since independ-
ence: 
 
“As part of the Soviet Union, the five countries were tightly woven into a single sys-
tem. These interdependencies have proven difficult to unravel, and have produced 
serious imbalances. During the Soviet era, the countries were obliged to work to-
gether. Now they no longer have to get along, and usually do not, especially as far as 
energy is concerned” (ICG 2011). 
 
Several exclaves were formed when the Soviet Union dissolved, especially 
in the Ferghana valley. This still occasionally leads to territorial disputes, 
for example the conflict in Batken Oblast, an Uzbek exclave in Kyrgyzstan 
(Wechlin 2013). As recent events have shown, infrastructural problems of-
ten serve as triggers for such disputes: in January 2013, in the village of 
Hoshjar around 40 Kyrgyz were taken hostage and cars destroyed because a 
high-voltage mast was erected on the territory of the enclave (ZA 2013: 
28). This shows how easily violence can erupt in a conflict-prone environ-
ment. Violence has flared up in such situations not only between popula-
tions and governments but also between states: in January 2014 a border 
dispute between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan led to many casualties on both 
                                                   
2  For an official Uzbek statement about cotton production see: http://www. 
gov.uz/en/helpinfo/agriculture/10020. 
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sides – again, the main trigger seemed to be the energy supply of a Tajik 
enclave situated in Kyrgyzstan:  
 
“Tajik forces fired mortars at a water pump. Kyrgyz authorities fear this may be just 
the opener in a series of strikes on strategic water facilities along the disputed border 
with Tajikistan. As the population along the Kyrgyz-Tajik border grows the risk is 
greater than ever that a local dispute over resources could rapidly become an interna-
tional crisis” (Dalbaeva 2014). 
 
Apart from inter-state problems, energy supply and the poor infrastructural 
situation are other major possible causes of unrest in the Central Asian 
states. The International Crisis Group even offers Kyrgyzstan’s poor eco-
nomic situation as an explanation for the overthrow of President Bakiyev in 
2010 (ICG 2011); I present the more specific conditions of the political 
Central Asian systems in section 6.3.  
 
6.2.2. Poverty 
 
Indeed, Tajikistan, was already the poorest Central Asian republic during 
Soviet times and therefore profited in a special way from inner-Soviet eco-
nomic assistance. As such, since the break-up of the Soviet Union its econ-
omy has suffered disproportionately, as Borjian explains: “In many facto-
ries production has decreased dramatically or even ceased, owing to inter-
ruption in imports of raw materials and to fuel shortages” (Borjian 1997). 
Therefore, “the country remains the poorest in the former Soviet sphere” 
(ARDA: TJ). Due to NATO intervention in neighbouring Afghanistan, the 
country receives a significant number of international visitors as well as 
military and economic assistance (ARDA: TJ). Yet despite this Tajikistan 
still has the highest percentage of the population living under the poverty 
line (39.6%). It is followed by Kyrgyzstan (33.7%), Uzbekistan (17%) and 
Kazakhstan (5.3%). It is important to note, though, that these figures are es-
timates. Neither are the unemployment rates in the following table of great 
value since they are official rates, which are not reliable. In Uzbekistan, for 
example: 
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“[…] the government’s statistical agency said the unemployment rate had fallen to 
under 4.8 per cent of the able-bodied population. The World Bank, meanwhile, puts 
the figure at between 20 and 30 per cent, varying across the country” (IWPR 2013a). 
 
In order to have at least some indication of the economic situation in these 
countries, I present here the most reliable estimates. 
 
Table 7: Poverty Benchmarks 
 Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
Population below 
poverty line in % 
5.3 33.7 39.6 17.0 
Unemployment rate 
in % 
5.3 
8.6 
(2011) 
2.5 
(officially; 
in reality 
much 
higher) 
4.8 
(officially) 
20-30% 
(WTO) 
Distribution of Family 
Income - GINI- Index 
(Social stratification) 
28.9 33.4 32.6 36.8 
Source: CIA World Factbook (2012) 
 
For relative deprivation theory (which explains conflicts by deprivation de-
riving from unequal distribution), even more interesting than the percentage 
of people living under the poverty line is the Gini index. It measures the 
distribution of wealth with a value between 0 and 1, whereby 1 means a 
perfect unequal distribution. I will here have a look at the distribution of 
family income with an index elaborated by the CIA World Factbook based 
on the Gini Index. This index measures the degree of inequality in the dis-
tribution of family income in a country:  
 
“If income were distributed with perfect equality, the Lorenz curve would coincide 
with the 45 degree line and the index would be zero; if income were distributed with 
perfect inequality, the Lorenz curve would coincide with the horizontal axis and the 
right vertical axis and the index would be 100” (CIA World Factbook 2012). 
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A clearer indicator than mere unemployment rates and the Gini Index, this 
Index of family income shows how Central Asian citizens are affected by 
the unequal distribution of economic resources. The index reveals that the 
income of families is most unequal in Uzbekistan, whose economy has 
stagnated in recent years, followed by Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakh-
stan in this order. These findings coincide with my own impressions in the 
field. Whereas in Kazakhstan at least some trickle-down effect is observa-
ble in the cities of Astana and Almaty, in Uzbekistan – although it has the 
second highest GDP per capita – not much wealth seems to reach the gen-
eral population. However, even in Kazakhstan, where the best distribution 
is observed, a great conflict potential lies in the problem of social stratifica-
tion (Schoeberlein 2009: 106). Despite the impression that the Kazakh state 
is often able to buy off its people, here too there is a growing discontent 
among its citizens (interview with a member of OSCE in Almaty).  
6.2.3. Migrant Labour 
Many poor individuals emigrate to Russia from the Central Asian countries 
in search of work to improve their own and their family’s economic situa-
tion. In Tajikistan, the remittances of migrant workers constitute almost 
half its GDP. Not only people from Tajikistan, but also many from Kyrgyz-
stan and Uzbekistan head for Russia, where “some stay only for seasonal 
work, while others settled down semi-permanently” (IWPR 2013a). Experts 
estimate that Uzbekistan “has lost 2 to 3 million [citizens] in recent years 
due to the growing trend of labor migration to neighboring countries, par-
ticularly Russia and Kazakhstan” (ARDA: UZ). For this reason, travel con-
straints have been implemented to prevent Uzbeks from seeking employ-
ment abroad – they need for example an exit visa, which is often issued se-
lectively (Freedom House 2013d). Overall, 70 to 80% of all Kazakh, Kyr-
gyz and Tajik migrants move to Russia (UNECE 2012: 7). They often re-
side illegally and official figures might be much too low as is shown in 
Table 8. Moreover, since “the early 2000s, […] labor migration has been 
growing steadily” (Anichkova 2012). Occasionally, migrant workers are 
regarded as especially prone to extremist proselytizing efforts as they are 
cut off from their families and find themselves in difficult economic cir-
cumstances (Vinson 2013), however, to deal with this issue here goes be-
yond the scope of my study. 
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Table 8: Numbers of Migrant Workers Abroad 
 Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
Remittances of migrant workers 
% of GDP 
(Anichkova 2012) 
- 27-29 % 49% 10-13 % 
Estimations of numbers of migrant workers by different sources 
Official figures 
(2004 – 2008) 
(Anichkova 2012) 
- 300,000 - 250,000 
Estimations by 
Anichkova 
(Anichkova 2012) 
- 800,000 1.5 million 3 million 
Najot human rights 
group 
(see IWPR 2013a) 
- - - 5 million 
 
The Central Asian states are members of different international economic 
organizations. Kyrgyzstan was the first Central Asian country to join the 
WTO in 1998; the others walled off their domestic markets until recently 
(Schulze 2010: 66). Tajikistan was the second country to join in March 
2013. While Uzbekistan applied for membership to the World Trade Or-
ganization in 1994, and Kazakhstan in 1996, neither have yet become 
members (WTO 2013). Other international economic organizations include 
the Eurasian Economic Community (EURASEC) which was founded in 
2001 by Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in order to 
decrease duties among member countries. 
 
6.2.4. International Trading Partners 
 
It is important to note Central Asian states’ international trading partners 
because some of them also play an important role in the security sector. As 
we see in Table 9 China, with around 20%, is the biggest export partner of 
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both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on the other 
hand export less than 10% to their Chinese neighbour, but import a lot more 
products from there – around 55% of Kyrgyz imports and 42% of Tajik im-
ports come from China. While Russia does supply “Kyrgyzstan with petrol 
products duty free” (Rickleton 2013b), a much higher percentage of Ka-
zakhstan and Uzbekistan’s imports come from Russia than their smaller 
neighbour. China is therefore Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan’s second most 
important import partner after Russia.  
Kazakhstan seems to be the most important trading partner for its Cen-
tral Asian neighbours (probably primarily with oil), whereas Turkey is the 
most significant export partner to Tajikistan and to a lesser degree is im-
portant as an import partner to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Iran has be-
come a key contractor of assisted infrastructure projects in Tajikistan, for 
example of Sangtuda-2 hydropower plant (Freedom House 2013c). China 
also plays an important role in Central Asia in the domain of infrastructure 
building. 
Table 9: International Trading Partners 
Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
Membership 
in WTO 
(WTO) 
no yes yes no 
Membership 
EURASEC 
(EURASEC) 
yes yes yes no 
Exports 
Partners 
(CIA World 
Factbook 
2012) 
China 21% 
Russia 9.9% 
France 9.3%, 
Germany 
6.9% 
Italy 5% 
Canada 4.8% 
Ukraine 4.7% 
Romania 4.1% 
Uzbekistan 
28.8% 
Kazakhstan 
22% 
Russia 14.6% 
China 7% 
UAE 6.3% 
Afghanistan 
5.7% 
Turkey 
30.5% 
China 9.6% 
Iran 7.7% 
Afghanistan 
6.5% 
Kazakhstan 
4.9% 
Russia 4.3% 
China 18.5% 
Kazakhstan 
14.6% 
Turkey 13.8% 
Russia 12.8% 
Ukraine 
12.5% 
Bangladesh 
8.9% 
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Imports 
Partners 
(CIA World 
Factbook 
2012) 
Russia 31.6% 
China 26.6% 
Germany 6% 
Ukraine 4.4% 
China 55.9% 
Russia 17.7% 
Kazakhstan 
6.4% 
China 42.3% 
Russia 16.2% 
Kazakhstan 
10.1% 
Turkey 5.7% 
Iran 4.2% 
Russia 20.6% 
China 16.5% 
South Ko-rea 
16.3% 
Kazakhstan 
12.8% 
Germany 
4.6% 
Turkey 4.2% 
 
6.2.5. Social Infrastructure: Health and Education 
 
I am interested in the infrastructure the states are able to provide and main-
tain owing to the major contribution this makes to the living standards of 
ordinary people, a factor that theories such as relative deprivation refer to, 
and which will be considered in the simulation as context-legitimacy.  
Health expenditures range from 4.3% in Kazakhstan to 6.2% in Kyr-
gyzstan. Countries with a smaller GDP therefore spend a proportionally 
higher amount on health services. There are fewer physicians in the poorer 
countries of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which have only a little over 2 phy-
sicians per 1,000 people, while Kazakhstan has both the highest physician 
density (3.88 per 1,000) and the highest hospital bed density at 7.6 per 
1,000. However, the other countries, which have about one bed for 200 
people, have the same rate as countries with developed economies such as 
Switzerland. 
The high hospital bed density might be a consequence of the Soviet 
health system. However, the entire infrastructure was inherited from the 
Soviets and since independence the health and education sectors have suf-
fered in all Central Asian countries (ICG 2011).3 
 
                                                   
3  For further reading on health services see McKee, Martin; Healy, Judith, Fal-
kingham, Jane (ed.) (2002): Health Care in Central Asia. European Observatory 
on Health Care Systems. World Trade Organization. Buckingham: Open Uni-
versity Press. Availalbe at: http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007 
/98386/E74484.pdf (2.2.2014). 
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“The quality of education and healthcare has plummeted with the end of the social 
safety net. In some countries, notably Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, these sectors have 
almost ceased to exist” (ICG 2011). 
 
In the educational domain, Kyrgyzstan stands alone with an expenditure of 
5.8% of GDP, whereas Kazakhstan shows a percentage of 3.1 and Tajiki-
stan 3.9. No data is available for Uzbekistan. The school life expectancy in 
all countries amounts to 12 years, except for in Kazakhstan, where it lies 
three years above this average.  
 
Table 10: Infrastructural Benchmarks 
 Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
Health 
Health 
Expenditures 
in % of GDP 
4.3 6.2 6.0 5.3 
Physicians 
per 1,000 
population 
3.88 2.3 2.01 2.62 
Hospital bed 
density per 
1,000 
population 
7.6 5.06 5.2 4.6 
Education 
Education  
expenditures 
in % of GDP 
3.1 5.8 3.9 No data 
School life 
expectancy 
in years 
15 12 12 12 
Source: CIA World Factbook (2012) 
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In a nutshell, the Human Development index measures health, education 
and living standards at an aggregate level. The indicators which the index 
includes are life expectancy at birth (for measuring health), mean years and 
expected years of schooling (for education) and gross national income per 
capita (for living standards). Predictably, Kazakhstan shows the highest 
level of human development. This country was able to improve its social, 
educational and health systems owing to its income from the energy sector 
(Schulze 2010: 33). It is followed by Uzbekistan with Kyrgyzstan and Ta-
jikistan receiving the lowest measures. Nevertheless, we should keep in 
mind that “a country’s overall index can conceal the fact that different 
groups within the country have very different levels of human develop-
ment” (HDI). In particular, Uzbekistan gets a better rating than Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan because of its higher GDP, though this is very unequally dis-
tributed. Therefore this measurement should be used cautiously in this case. 
I will therefore combine HDI with the Gini-Index of family income when 
developing my own indicator for the context-legitimacy of the Central 
Asian states in section 11.2.2. 
 
Table 11: Human Development Index 
 Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
Human  
Development 
Index (HDI) 4 
0.754 0.622 0.622 0.654 
 
According to the International Crisis Group, the poor infrastructural situa-
tion is a possible source of unrest and could even serve to bolster Islam: 
 
“The rapid deterioration of infrastructure will deepen poverty and alienation from 
the state. The disappearance of basic services will provide Islamic radicals, already a 
                                                   
4  “The first Human Development Report introduced a new way of measuring de-
velopment by combining indicators of life expectancy, educational attainment 
and income into a composite human development index, the HDI.” See 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi/. 
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serious force in many Central Asian states, with further ammunition against regional 
leaders and openings to establish influential support networks” (ICG 2011). 
 
I agree with this assessment of ICG. As I showed in part I of this study, Is-
lamists take up social and economic problems in their political debates. 
 
 
6.3. POLITICAL SYSTEM AND GOVERNMENT BODIES 
 
I will now take a closer look at the government bodies and political institu-
tions of the independent Central Asian states.  
 
6.3.1. Political Systems and Presidents 
 
All Central Asian states started in the early 1990s with a presidential sys-
tem. Since the second regime change in 2009 and the coming into force of 
the new constitution in 2010 making it a parliamentary republic, Kyrgyz-
stan has been the only exception. In all Central Asian countries the presi-
dent is elected directly by the people. Initially, the former first secretaries of 
the Communist Party in the Central Asian republics became the presidents 
of the newly independent republics. Since there was no other elite in these 
countries than the one established by the Soviets this is not surprising 
(Khazanov 2005: 21). The first presidents in Central Asia were Nursultan 
Nazarbaev in Kazakhstan, Askar Akaev in Kyrgyzstan, Rahmon Nabiev in 
Tajikistan and Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan. 
Nazarbaev and Karimov are still in power today. The last presidential 
elections they won were held in 2011 Kazakhstan and in 2007 in Uzbeki-
stan yet neither Nazarbaev, nor Karimov have ever won an election that 
was regarded as free by international observers. Both presidents are ac-
cused of fabricating the election results and amending the constitutions to 
prolong their terms of presidency. In the 2007 Kazakh constitution, for ex-
ample, the following was introduced into Article 42 (5): “One and the same 
person may not be elected the President of the Republic more than two 
times in a row. The present restriction shall not extend to the First Presi-
dent of the Republic of Kazakhstan [accentuation by the author]”. During 
the early presidential elections held in Kazakhstan in 2011, positive and 
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negative incentives for voters were given to ensure a high level of participa-
tion in the elections and to secure the re-election of Nazarbaev: 
 
“Early voters and 18-year-olds casting their ballot for the first time were rewarded 
with household goods such as food blenders and electric kettles, according to the 
Associated Press. […] There were several reports that students were forced to vote 
by threats of expulsion from university” (BBC 2011a) 
 
Surprisingly, the governmental attempts which present Nazarbaev as the 
‘father of the nation’ have been successful. I met students in Almaty who 
were totally loyal to the president. They praised him for his efforts to im-
prove the situation of the people and unquestioningly participated in the 
cult of personality surrounding him.5 The next presidential elections in Ka-
zakhstan are scheduled for 2015 (Freedom House 2013d). 
Compared to Kazakhstan, neither do reports on the election of Uzbek 
president Karimov read any more optimistically: 
 
“[…] a 1995 referendum extended his first term by five years. In 2000 Karimov won 
a second term with nearly 92 percent of the vote, but another referendum two years 
later extended that presidential stretch from five years to seven” (RFE/RL 2007). 
 
In summary, the authoritarian presidents of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan not 
only amend their countries’ constitutions arbitrarily in order to consolidate 
their power but they also try to ‘democratically’ legitimate their power with 
high voter turnouts and other means. To this effect, for example, the Uzbek 
constitution was amended in 2011, giving more power to the parliament 
and political parties. President Islam Karimov introduced these changes 
with the aim of “further deepening democratisation and constructing a civil 
society” (OSW 2011). However, the public reaction to this was either scep-
ticism or unawareness of the change (IWPR 2011). And analysts agree with 
this opinion: “These amendments do not limit the prerogatives of the Presi-
dent, who retains full authority over the country […]” (OSW 2011). I can 
                                                   
5  For example, they put their hands in Nazarbaev’s golden handprint in Baiterek 
Tower during a visit in Astana – an act seeming totally absurd to a western ob-
server. 
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conclude therefore, that despite their strong legal positions, these presidents 
regard a certain amount of ‘legitimacy’ as instrumental to staying in power. 
Contrary to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the first presidents of Kyrgyz-
stan and Tajikistan have not been able to stay in power since independence. 
This is the case in Kyrgyzstan although Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev ex-
tended presidential powers at the beginning of 1996 and gradually restricted 
the political space from the mid-1990s onwards (Anderson 1999: 23). 
However, in 2005, nationwide demonstrations led to the Tulip Revolution 
which resulted in his dismissal and brought Kurmanbek Bakiyev to power. 
He soon became as autocratic as his predecessor and dissolved the parlia-
ment in 2007 (Pannier 2007a). He “manipulated the parliament to accrue 
new powers for himself” and was re-elected in flawed elections in 2009 
(ARDA: KG). Under his rule opposition politicians and independent jour-
nalists were “arrested, prosecuted, attacked and even killed” (Levy 2009). 
In spring 2010 nationwide protests broke out again. Bakiyev was over-
thrown and an interim government was proclaimed under the leadership of 
Roza Otunbayeva in 2010. She called for new elections and finally, Almaz-
bek Atambayev was elected as new president in 2011. It is interesting to 
note that despite these violent overthrows, Kyrgyzstan is often cited as the 
‘democratic beacon’ in the region (Kilner 2012). 
 
“Kyrgyzstan has maintained the image as the most democratic of the Central Asian 
states because of the participation of genuine opposition parties in government, a 
strong civil society, and the lack of a ruling party” (Pannier 2007a). 
 
These preconditions finally led to the 2011 competitive presidential elec-
tions which were “Central Asia’s first voluntary transfer of power, with in-
terim president Roza Otunbayeva standing down as scheduled” (Freedom 
House 2012b). Whether the political overthrows have functioned as a kind 
of check on political power, interfering just before a president with auto-
cratic aspirations became too powerful, is a matter for debate. Yet Ander-
son might still be right to conclude that although Kyrgyzstan is not a liberal 
democracy, it “retains a considerable degree of social pluralism and a more 
open political space than any of its Central Asian neighbours” (Anderson 
1999: 23). Whether Kyrgyzstan indeed deserves special status in regard of 
its religious policies, as well, will be discussed in 9.2. 
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As for Tajikistan, in September 1991, shortly before independence, Rah-
mon Nabiev (himself first secretary of the Communist party of the Republic 
in the early 1980s but removed after a scandal) became the first elected 
president and was confirmed in the November 1991 election. The opposi-
tion regarded the election as rigged and a conflict between Nabievs sup-
porters and a coalition consisting of the IRPT and democrats broke out 
which finally led to the civil war in spring 1992. In September 1992 Nabiev 
was forced to resign by Communist hard-liners and “was replaced by 
Emomali Rakhmonov, a senior member of the Communist Party” (Freedom 
House 2013c). In December of the same year, the Kulyab-Leninabad-
Hissar clans, led by Rahmon, defeated the Islamists and Democrats (Naum-
kin 2005: 202). The Islamists subsequently fled to Afghanistan, where they 
allied themselves with the Northern Front of Ahmad Shah Massoud. The 
United Tajik Opposition (UTO) now opposed the new government and the 
IRPT was outlawed in spring 1993. Only with the peace accord in 1997 did 
it regain legality: “Former IRPT fighters were incorporated in to the army 
and law enforcement structures and the IRPT itself was legitimized and 
participated in the general election of 2000” (Taarnby 2012: 16). Addition-
ally to the integration of IRPT fighters in the regular army, the peace accord 
promised the IRPT 30% of the parliamentary seats. Despite this, Rahmon 
has steadily expanded his power at the expense of the opposition over the 
last few years. In November 2013, Rahmon was confirmed in office again 
and a 2003 constitutional referendum allows him to remain there until 2020 
(Freedom House 2013c). Given that the IRPT is still legal I discuss whether 
this has an impact on religious freedom in Tajikistan in section 9.2.  
 
Table 12: Political Systems and Presidents 
 Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
Political 
System 
Presidential 
Republic 
Parliamentary 
Republic 
(since 2010) 
Presidential 
Republic 
Presidential 
Republic 
Sysetm of 
Presidential 
Election 
direct 
election 
direct 
election 
direct 
election 
direct 
election 
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Presidential 
elections6 
1999 
2005 
2011 
Next : 2016 
2000 
2005 
2009 
2011 
1999 
2006 
2013 
1999/20007 
2005 
2007 
Next: 2014 
President 
 
In office  
Nursultan 
Nazarbaev: 
since 1990 
Almazbek 
Atambayev: 
since 20118 
Emomali 
Rahmon: 
since 1992 
Islam 
Karimov:  
since 1990 
 
If we discuss the political systems of the Central Asian countries, it is easy 
to conclude that they do not meet western standards of democracy. Howev-
er, I do not want to put political legitimacy in Central Asia on a level with 
free and fair elections. As we learnt in section 1.1.2, legitimacy can have 
diverse sources, as Weber explained. When western ovservers describe 
Central Asian presidents simply as autocratic rulers, they forget that in ad-
dition to democratic criterions of legitimacy they could meet other forms of 
legitimacy:  
 
• Rational-legal legitimacy: the public’s trust that the government will 
provide stability (especially in Tajikistan) and economic development 
(especially in Kazakhstan) is a rational consideration that can lead to 
the legitimacy of the government.  
• Traditional legitimacy: tribalism and Soviet history can be understood 
as a habituation of the influence of clans in politics as well as of author-
itarianism and a cult of personality that legitimizes the strong positions 
of the presidents in all Central Asian countries. 
• Charismatic legitimacy: the belief that a ‘strong man’ is needed to lead 
the nation is essential in all Central Asian states. In this context, it is 
clear why, for example, the succession of the president will pose a prob-
lem in each respective country (see ICG 2013). 
                                                   
6  According to http://www.electionguide.org/. 
7  1999 first round and 2000 second round. 
8  Previous Kyrgyz Presidents since independence were: Askar Akayev (October 
1990 - March 2005), Kurmanbek Bakiyev (July 2005 - April 2010), Roza Otun-
bayeva (head of interim government: April 2010 – Nov. 2011). 
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As we can see in the following table, a clear preference for democracy over 
a powerful leader is only expressed in Tajikistan. In Kazakhstan there is 
more or less equal support for both views while in Kyrgyzstan the majority 
of people would prefer a strong leader over democracy. This might be a 
temporary phenomenon; the events in Osh and the considerable turmoil 
during recent years might explain the more conservative public opinion 
here. However, it is revealing that the country which has by far the best in-
ternational reputation with regards to democratic values is the one with the 
lowest percentage of people who prefer a democracy over a powerful lead-
er. (There are no data available for Uzbekistan.) 
 
Figure 10: Preference for Democracy or a Powerful Leader 
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Source: PEW 2013 
 
6.3.2. Parliaments and Govermental Parties 
 
All Central Asian parliaments are bicameral, except in Kyrgyzstan, where a 
unicameral parliament is in power. In Kyrgyzstan, constitutional reforms 
took place between 1993 and 1995 which replaced the unicameral parlia-
ment with a bicameral one. However, this was reversed in 2005 to 2006, 
when a new constitutional reform weakened parliament’s position and re-
introduced the unicameral parliament (Murzakulova and Schoeberlein 
2010: 158). The Uzbek parliament had been unicameral as well until 2005 
when it became bicameral. As Ilgizar Sobirov, Chairman of the Senate of 
the Republic of Uzbekistan, explains, the parliamentary reforms laid the 
foundations of civil society in the country, supported the division of power 
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and helped the transformation towards a market economy (Sobirov 2005). 
However, a quick look at the parties represented in the Uzbek parliament 
calls such claims into question. Indeed, whether the four parties represented 
in the legislative chamber are able to “observe the universal principles of 
rule of law” and democracy, as Sobirov declares (Sobirov 2005) is more 
than disputable due to their loyalty towards Karimov.  The same is the case 
in Kazakhstan, where during the legislative election (Majilis) in January 
2012, for example, “even the presidential administration has stated that 
both of the minor parties that entered the Majilis are pro-Nazarbayev par-
ties.” (Nichol 2013a: 4). Moreover, at the time of the presidential elections 
in Kazakhstan, “all of the presidential candidates proclaimed that they 
wanted Nazarbayev to win” (Nichol 2013a: 3).  
Among the Central Asian parliaments, the number of parties varies 
from three to five. Yet in Kazakhstan, “the election law prohibits political 
parties based upon ethnicity, gender, or religious affiliation” (StateDept a: 
5). Similarly, in Uzbekistan, “the government prohibits religious groups 
from forming political parties and social movements” (StateDept 2012d: 2). 
The same is true for Kyrgyzstan, although here the story is slightly different 
since parliamentary seats are more or less equally distributed among the 
parties. Moreover, Murzakulova and Schoeberlein scrutinized the Kyrgyz 
ideological space very thoroughly and came to the conclusion that it, 
 
“[…] is characterised by a diversity of positions as well as actors. This is in contrast 
to what existed during Soviet times, when ideology was produced and disseminated 
by a set of central institutions under the control of the Communist Party of the Sovi-
et Union” (Murzakulova and Schoeberlein 2010: 148). 
 
Despite these positive findings, political parties based on religion are pro-
hibited even in Kyrgyzstan. As the state department makes clear: “the con-
stitution prohibits the establishment of religious political parties and the 
pursuit of political goals by religious groups” (StateDept 2012b: 2). Indeed, 
Kyrgyz political parties mainly represent the regional provenance rather 
than the ideological differences of their members.  
As has already been mentioned, Tajikistan is the only Central Asian coun-
try with a legal political party based on Islam which is represented in the 
parliament. This might lead one to assume that a broader spectrum of ideas 
are represented than in the other Central Asian parliaments. However, in 
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Tajikistan the parliamentary power also belongs invariably to the presiden-
tial party: the IRPT gained only two seats during the last parliamentary 
elections in 2010, a result that the party members contest.  
 
Table 13: Structure and Composition of Parliaments 
 Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
Structure of 
Parliament 
Bicameral Unicameral Bicameral Bicameral 
(since 2005, 
previously 
unicameral) 
Name of  
Parliament  
 
Parlament Jogorku 
Kenesh 
Majlisi Oli Oliy Majlis  
Chamber  
names 
Mazhilis 
(House of 
Representati-
ves) 
 
Senate (Sena-
te) 
 Majlisi 
namoyando-
gon (House of 
Representati-
ves);  
Majlisi milli  
(National As-
sembly) 
Qonunchilik 
palatasi 
(Legislative 
Chamber);  
Senat 
(Senate) 
Number of 
Parties  
in Parliament 
3 5 5 4 
Source: PARLINE (2013) 
 
The following parties are (with the number of seats in brackets) part of the 
first chamber of the parliament (PARLINE 2013): 
 
Kazakhstan:  
• People’s Democratic Party Nur Otan (83) 
• Democratic Party of Kazakhstan Ak Zhol (8) 
•  Communist People’s Party of Kazakhstan (7) 
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Kyrgyzstan: 
• Ata-Jurt (28) 
• Social Democratic Party (26) 
• Ar-Namys (25) 
• Respublika (23) 
• Ata-Merken (18) 
 
Tajikistan 
• People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan (PDPT) (55) 
• Communist Party of Tajikistan (CPT) (2) 
• Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) (2) 
• Agrarian Party of Tajikistan (2) 
• Party of Economic Reforms of Tajikistan (2) 
 
Uzbekistan 
• Liberal Democratic Party (UzLiDeP) (20) 
• People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (10) 
• Democratic Party of Uzbekistan Milliy ti-klanish (6) 
• Social Democratic Party of Uzbekistan Adolat (3) 
 
6.3.3. Freedom and Democracy Indices 
 
To get an overview of how the Central Asian regimes are governed, it is 
useful to have a look at freedom indices and classifications elaborated by 
different non-governmental organizations. With these indices it is possible 
to begin to compare the different ways in which these governments deal 
with civil liberties, political rights, political participation and elections in 
general. Later on, I will scrutinize each country’s specific attitudes, laws 
and law enforcement strategies towards religious organizations and indi-
viduals. 
Although the description of Kyrgyzstan as a ‘Central Asian democracy’ 
is greatly exaggerated, democracy and freedom indices distinguish this 
country from its neighbours. The Freedom House Index measures civil lib-
erties and political rights on a scale from 1 to 7 with 1 meaning perfectly 
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free. It assesses Kyrgyzstan as at least partly free,9 giving it 5 points for 
both political rights and civil liberties. By comparison, Kazakhstan also 
gets 5 points for civil liberties but only 6 points for political rights while 
Tajikistan is rated 6 in both categories. Uzbekistan receives the worst pos-
sible rating with 7 for both political rights and civil liberties, which has 
made it one of the nine most repressive regimes in the world for a number 
of years (Freedom House 2013e: 6). The situation in Kazakhstan and Tajik-
istan has deteriorated over the last year in the following way: (Freedom 
2013: 2): 
 
• “Kazakhstan received a downward trend arrow due to the banning of 
several media outlets following a violent crackdown on labor unrest” 
(Freedom House 2013e). 
• “Tajikistan’s civil liberties rating declined from 5 to 6 due to a ban on 
students attending international seminars and a military operation in 
Gorno-Badakhshan that resulted in scores of deaths, extrajudicial kill-
ings, and a media crackdown” (Freedom House 2013e). 
 
Whereas Kazakhstan was for many years regarded as rather democratic in 
comparison with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, recent events show how heavy-
handed the country’s government can be (I will go into further details on 
this when discussing the countries’ religious policies). In the case of Tajiki-
stan, some analysts suggest that among other factors, western assistance in 
the security sector is responsible for President Rahmon’s undemocratic 
consolidation of power (Matveeva 2005). 
The Democracy Index of The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) is 
based on the assumption that “Freedom is an essential component of de-
mocracy, but not sufficient” (EIU 2013: 26). It not only takes into consider-
                                                   
9  A Free country is one where there is broad scope for open political competition, 
a climate of respect for civil liberties, significant independent civic life, and in-
dependent media. Partly Free countries are characterized by some restrictions 
on political rights and civil liberties, often in a context of corruption, weak rule 
of law, ethnic strife, or civil war. A Not Free country is one where basic politi-
cal rights are absent, and basic civil liberties are widely and systematically de-
nied. See: www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Map%20of%20Freedom  
%202013%2C%20final.pdf. 
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ation the electoral process and pluralism, but also civil liberties, the effi-
ciency of governments, political participation and the political culture of a 
country (EIU 2013: 26). As with the Freedom House Index, the Democracy 
Index also ranks Kyrgyzstan as the most democratic of the Central Asian 
states, describing it as a “hybrid” between autocracy and democracy where-
as its Central Asian neighbours are all clearly “authoritarian”. Furthermore, 
according to this index, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan are again almost on an 
equal footing while Uzbekistan is again regarded as the country with the 
worst situation with regards to freedom and democracy. This index also 
considers potential sources of instability in Central Asia, such as the 
“young and restless population,” especially in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 
(EIU 2013: 22). As for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, whose presidents have 
been able to cling to power since the early 1990s, and are now more than 70 
years old, the EIU sees succession as a possible threat to stability: “No clear 
successors have been lined up, which increases the potential for intra-elite 
in-fighting, and possibly public unrest when the incumbent dies or becomes 
incapacitated” (EIU 2013: 22). This opinion is shared by other analysts, 
such as the International Crisis Group (ICG) (ICG 2013). 
The Human Security Report considers procedures for political partici-
pation and freedom in the election of the chief executive. It describes Kyr-
gyzstan and Tajikistan as ‘anocracies’, which is a term describing neither 
fully democratic nor fully autocratic states, as well as states “in transition 
from one to the other” (Human Security Report, 2006: 54ff, Notes on Ter-
minology). Conversely, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are described as ‘au-
tocracies’. All four countries lack “well-established procedures for political 
participation” and a freely elected chief executive necessary to be consid-
ered democracies. 
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Table 14: Freedom and Democracy Indices 
 Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
Freedom House Index (2013) (1 – 7; 1 = free) 
Freedom  
Status 
Not Free Partly Free Not Free Not Free 
Political 
Rights 
6 5 6 7 
Civil Liber-
ties 
5 5 6 7 
Regime Type 
Democracy 
Index (EIU 
2013) (0-10; 
10 =  
democratic) 
Authoritarian 
 
2.95 
Hybrid 
 
4.69 
Authoritarian  
 
2.51 
Authoritarian  
 
1.72 
Human 
Security 
Report 2012 
Autocracy Anocracy Anocracy Autocracy 
Freedom of the press 
Country 
ranking by 
Reporter 
ohne Gren-
zen (2013) 
160/179 106/179 123/179 164/179 
Corruption 
Assessment 
by Freedom 
house (2013) 
Corruption is 
widespread  
Corruption 
is pervasive 
Corruption is 
pervasive 
Corruption is-
pervasive 
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Country  
ranking by 
Transparency 
International 
(2012) 
133/176 154/176 157/176 170/176 
 
All four countries are extremely corrupt as Transparency International’s 
country rankings show and how Freedom House explains: In Kazakhstan, 
corruption is “widespread” and in the other three countries “pervasive” 
(Transparency International 2012). 
 
6.3.4. Nations and Ethnicity, Clans and Tribes in Politics 
 
When the former Soviet republics suddenly became independent ‘nation 
states’, they had to forge some kind of national ideology (see Murzakulova 
and Schoeberlein 2010; also Cummings 2010, Pelkmans 2006). Due to the 
fact that the break-up of the Soviet Union also meant the falling away of the 
previously very prominent communist ideology, the new states had to find 
another ideological reference system. The ideological nation-building sub-
sequently combined the Soviet understanding of the nation with pre-Soviet 
traditions. On the one hand they relied on ancient traditions and social 
structures and on the other hand on religious history to ideologically hold 
their countries together. Even during Soviet times, political institutions 
were influenced by pre-Soviet traditions and customs. After independence 
this influence became even more apparent due to the nation-building pro-
cess.  
When the Central Asian territories became Soviet Republics, they sud-
denly became constrained to a fixed territory where beforehand fluid 
boundaries existed (Petric 2011). The name-giving titular-nations at once 
conceived of their history as 
 
“[…] a series of distinct developments independent of and without respect to devel-
opments in other ethno-national groups even though these populations lived for cen-
turies in a shared social space without thinking of themselves as living in separate 
worlds” (Petric 2011: 167). 
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One example of this is the aforementioned depiction of Timur as an Uzbek 
ancestor although he was actually a Turkish speaking Mongol. The Central 
Asian governments appeal “to the legacy of ancient and medieval Central 
Eurasian empires and khanates, the succession to which the present states 
pretend to be […]” (Morozova 2004: 16). The contemporary Uzbek state is 
built on the territory of the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khorezm and Khiva 
Khanates. Thus, what is now understood as a nation often has no common 
history. Similarly, the Kazakh people, “a mix of Turkic and Mongol no-
madic tribes who migrated into the region in the 13th century, were rarely 
united as a single nation” (ARDA: KZ). Although the artificiality of these 
nations is often stressed in the literature, I will not judge here whether the 
Central Asian nations are more or less ‘authentic’ than other nations. What 
concerns me more is the fact that the territorial fixation of the Central Asian 
regions took place when they became Soviet Republics.  
In addition to historical and territorial factors, the ethno-national 
boundaries established between the new countries were to a great degree 
the product of the national politics under Stalin (Petric 2011). Since then, 
because of differences in the ethnic composition of the republics, different 
policies have been developed concerning the titular nation. Uzbeks, for ex-
ample, “usually occupy contiguous areas and share a common pre-Soviet 
history and regional identity” (Finke 2011: 68). Finke argues that in Uzbek-
istan “the titular group” therefore “seems sufficient to ensure an unambigu-
ous sense of national identity” (Finke 2011: 68). In Kazakhstan, by con-
trast, the titular nation did not even constitute 50% of the overall population 
when the Republic became independent. As a consequence, the government 
implemented a program to bring ethnic Kazakhs living in neighbouring 
countries ‘back’ to Kazakhstan. Incentives were given to reward those who 
complied with the state social engineering plan. This resulted in some Ka-
zakh villages in Uzbekistan being left totally empty when their inhabitants 
all moved to Kazakhstan. 
It is a commonality of those states with a smaller percentage of the titu-
lar nation to “appeal to the rich multi-ethnic heritage of the Soviet Union” 
(Finke 2011: 68). Despite its attempts to increase numbers of those with 
eponymous ethnicity, this is especially true for Kazakhstan: 
 
“In contrast to its counterparts to the south, the Kazakhstani leadership did not try to 
battle Sovietism, but absorbed it. […] the leadership used exactly this [ethnic] diver-
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sity as a basis for state identity. In this new myth, the regime acts as a guarantor of 
the preservation of multi-ethnic diversity, and actively promotes the idea of ‘Ka-
zakhstan – our common home’ in the public sphere” (Matveeva 2010: 22). 
 
Language-politics can exemplify this: in Kazkahstan and Kyrgyzstan Rus-
sian still enjoys the status of an official language. In Tajikistan and Uzbeki-
stan, where around 90% of the population ethnically belong to the titular 
nation, only the language of the titular nation has official status – in Uzbek-
istan the kyrillic alphabet was even exchanged for the latin alphabet in 
1995.  
When I speak of Soviet institutions and traditional customs that have an 
impact on the contemporary nation-states, it is important to note that some 
pre-Soviet features which are evident today were also relevant during Sovi-
et times. One of these features is the clan or tribal structure of Central 
Asian societies (I use here tribe and clan as umbrella terms, although some-
times traditional structures are rather structures of regional origin, as I 
show). Although this was not intended by Soviet politics, we know today 
that clan structures survived the Soviet era, as Ostrowski makes clear: “It 
has been argued that the Soviet project did not eradicate these traditional 
social structures, but rather forced them to adapt to the formal institutions” 
(Ostrowski 2010: 18).10 In fact, far from eradicating clan structures, the dis-
solution of the Soviet Union has dramatically increased their role in society, 
politics and among the elite in all Central Asian states (Matveeva 1999: 
26). 
Though it is clear that clan structures have survived the Soviet era, Cen-
tral Asian governments’ policies toward the reintegration of these structures 
into politics differs and is sometimes contradictory. For example, despite 
the fact that Nazarbaev would likely be able to strengthen his power by re-
lying on his own zhuz (tribe), which is the Elder zhuz (Ostrowski 2010: 17), 
the advisor to the President Yermukhamet Yertysbayev explains that Ka-
zakhs should not think anymore in terms of “the categories of the Mongol-
Tatar invasion era”, and realize instead that they live in the twenty first cen-
tury (TengriNews 2012). Although the Kazakh government does not offi-
cially appreciate the impact of tribal origins and group affinities in politics, 
                                                   
10  For example, the Kholkhozes often functioned along tribal lines (Ostrowski 
2010: 18). 
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Nazarbaev’s strength “lies in his ability to ensure that all three zhuz receive 
equal representation in the top levels of government” (Ostrowski 2010: 17). 
He takes on the role of an arbiter in case of inter zhuz-struggles and thereby 
helps consolidate his power (Ostrowski 2010: 17). But tribal affiliations are 
not just important in the realm of politics, as Morozova makes clear, “In 
Kazakhstan, strategic industries and the most profitable sectors of the econ-
omy belong to, or are controlled by members of the presidential family and 
their relatives” (Morozova 2004: 16). Clan allegiances therefore also im-
pact the economy.  
In Kyrgyzstan political parties emerged along tribal lines and the gov-
ernmental overthrows had a lot to do with clan politics. Indeed, tribal affili-
ations are the unique source of Kyrgyz political loyalties, and are crucial 
for the distribution of key political posts: “Having an important role in dis-
tributing political power, tribal affiliations […] continue their dominancy 
over the political leaders in political processes of state-building” (TengriN-
ews 2012). Because of the immense importance of regional origins and 
tribal heritage, since 2012 Kyrgyz officials have been obliged to reveal 
their tribal affinities (TengriNews 2012). 
In Tajikistan the struggle between the clans led to the civil war (Moro-
zova 2004: 16). Clans from Leninabad and Kulyab were both concerned 
that their positions would be contested by the success of the opposition Pa-
mir and Garm regional clans. Additionally to this, a religious aspect was 
evident in the civil war, but the importance of the regional and clan origins 
is indisputable. 
In regard of its understanding of ethnicity, Uzbekistan distinguishes it-
self from its neighbours, as it is “not so much based on primordial concepts 
of genealogies and blood relationships but linked with local and regional at-
tachment to the nation state as the largest extension of the same principle” 
(Finke 2011: 71). In the very beginning, Karimov was a weak political fig-
ure due to his lack of relationships to the strong Tashkent and Ferghana 
clans. Instead, he was regarded as only half Uzbek and half Tajik; having a 
Slav wife also did little for his reputation (Naumkin 2005: 69). However, it 
seems that Karimov found a way to deal with what Petric describes as the 
factional patterns that pervade Uzbek society (Petric 2011: 171). When fill-
ing political positions, Karimov attaches importance to regional origins 
(Morozova 2004: 16; Petric 2011: 170). However, even in the imposition of 
political posts, some Soviet heritage can be found:  
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“During the Soviet era the running of a kolkhoze (a faction, or even a ministry) was 
entrusted to an Uzbek while the second-in-command was a ‘European’ (for example, 
Russian, Ukrainian) in charge of controlling the local official. Nowadays, this policy 
remains but the second-in-command is no longer a European: he is now a reliable 
member of the President’s faction (Sambuh)” (Petric 2011: 171). 
 
This strategy has no doubt played an important role in consolidating Kari-
mov’s power.  
In addition to the regional origins, solidarity networks are, according to 
Petric, key entities in Uzbek politics, functioning not only on the local, but 
also on the national level: 
 
“The nominations for positions and the dismissal resemble the patterns of gift and 
counter-gift exchange since these actions are based on personal affiliations. In this 
society, a position within the administration is similar to a gift exchange because it 
implies obligations for the beneficiary” (Petric 2011: 172). 
 
The government makes cautious use not only of regional origins and tradi-
tions to ensure its control of the country, but also mahalla (community 
networks), which are used to promote its policies: “Open and free private 
discussion is limited by the mahalla committees, traditional neighborhood 
organizations that the government has turned into an official system for 
public surveillance and control” (Freedom House 2013d). This has a rein-
forcing effect on patriarchal and patronal structures in the Uzbek society in 
general (Khazanov 2005).  
Other traditional norms, which have no direct political influence, are 
playing a growing role in the society, as Kehl-Bodrogi points out with ref-
erence to Uzbekistan: “religiously tinged norms and values, particularity 
with regard to gender relations and the family, are widely propagated in the 
mass media and supported by popular literature” (Kehl-Bodrogi 2006: 238). 
Similarly, in Kazakhstan the newly introduced post-indepedence national-
ism has brought about more patriarchal traditions than during Soviet times 
(Wilson Center 2011). In southern Kazakhstan as well as in Kyrgyzstan, for 
example, bride kidnapping is once again becoming very common, after the 
practice had previously all but become obsolete during the communist era. 
As a result, Kyrgyzstan has introduced stricter punishments for bride kid-
nappers and in early 2014 such a regulation was also discussed in the Ka-
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zakh parliament (EurasiaNet 2014). Indeed, the parliamentarian debate 
helps illustrate the conflicting views on the issue: “One outraged lawmaker 
urged the death penalty for the crime; another vehemently defended the ab-
duction and forced marriage of young women as a national tradition” (Eur-
asiaNet 2014). 
As this example indicates, the politics of the Central Asian states differ 
in how they deal with such ‘apolitical’ traditions. Tajikistan, for example, 
has introduced a Law on Observing National Traditions and Rituals which, 
 
“Regulates private celebration and funeral services, including weddings, funerals, 
and Mavludi Payghambar (the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday). The law limits the 
number of guests, eliminates engagement parties, and controls ceremonial gift 
presentations and other rituals. The religion law reiterates these principles, mandat-
ing that ‘mass worship, religious traditions, and ceremonies should be carried out 
according to the procedure of holding meetings, rallies, demonstrations, and peace-
ful processions prescribed by law of the Republic of Tajikistan’ ” (StateDept 2012c: 
4). 
 
In Tajikistan, then, the law dictates how tradition and religion should be ob-
served. Here we see how much Central Asian states interfere with folk Is-
lam although they argue that they accept ‘traditional’ Islam and only op-
pose ‘foreign Islam’ in order to fight terrorism. I will go into further details 
of this issue in the next chapters.  

 
 
7. Comparison of the Contemporary Role 
of Religion in Politics 
 
 
 
I am interested in the repression of religious groups in Central Asia, and the 
theoretical framework that the Central Asian states have adopted towards 
religion is important in this regard. However, the practical measures taken 
by state bodies to suppress religious groups and individuals are at the centre 
of my attention. First, I discuss whether or not the countries’ constitutions 
guarantee religious freedom and then I move to the religious laws these 
countries have adopted in order to minimize extremist influences on Islam. 
After scrutinizing this theoretical framework I will turn to the implementa-
tion of these religious laws. In the second section, I consider which state 
bodies are involved in countering terrorism and extremism. My interest 
then turns to considerations of whether detentions are conducted in accord-
ance with the law or take place arbitrarily; whether trials are fair or extorted 
evidence is used and, finally, whether conditions of imprisonment meet 
human rights standards. 
First I will answer the following questions which focus on the theoreti-
cal background: 
 
• Constitutions: do they tend to guarantee freedom of belief? Are they 
secular? 
• Religious laws: do they guarantee freedom of belief? 
 
Then I will turn to the following questions concerning the practical imple-
mentation of legal regulations: 
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• Pre-trial: do arbitrary arrests take place? Do extrajudicial killings take 
place? 
• Trial: are trials fair? Is evidence extorted? 
• Prison regime: are basic human rights respected during arrest? Are po-
litical and religious prison inmates discriminated against? What are the 
conditions of imprisonment like? 
 
Resolving these questions requires me to make a comparison of the differ-
ent countries according to when and how they respect or disregard human 
rights in the fight against religious extremism. In both sections I will also 
present the state institutions which are involved with the main issues of my 
study: religion and security. Finally, in chapter 9 I will elaborate a typology 
of the state regulation of religion. 
 
 
7.1. FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND 
THE CONCEPT OF RECOGNITION 
 
What does Freedom of Religion mean exactly? The Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights considers the freedom of religion or belief under Article 
18: 
 
“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right in-
cludes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in 
teaching, practice, worship and observance” (The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, Art. 18). 
 
As we see, in order to fully enjoy the freedom of religion or belief, individ-
uals have the right to practice their religion either alone or with others. Fur-
thermore, it is important to note that: 
 
“Respect for freedom of religion or belief as a human right does not depend on ad-
ministrative registration procedures, as it has the status of a human right, prior to and 
independent of any acts of State approval” (Bielefeldt 2011: 1) 
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However, this freedom of religion is not always stringently adhered to by 
each state’s processes of recognition for religious groups. Heiner Bielefeldt, 
Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief for the United Nations, 
clears up “misunderstandings concerning the meaning of ‘recognition’ and 
the role of the State in this respect” in a special report (Bielefeldt 2011: 1). 
This report will help us to gain a more in-depth understanding of the regis-
tration processes of religious groups in the Central Asian states. Bielefeldt 
distinguishes the following definitions of recognition of religion by a state: 
 
“a) Recognition in the sense of the due respect of the status of all human beings as 
right holders by virtue of their inherited dignity, b) Recognition in terms of States 
providing for the possibility of obtaining the status of legal personality, which reli-
gious or belief groups may need for the exercise of important communitarian aspects 
of their freedom of religion or belief c) Recognition in the sense of States according 
a specific privileged status position to some religious or belief communities” (Biele-
feldt 2011: 1; author’s emphases). 
 
Bielefeldt explains that the confounding of these different meanings can 
“negatively affect the implementation of freedom of religion or belief, or 
even undermine its status as a universal human right” (Bielefeldt 2011: 1). I 
will here refer to these categorizations in order to understand and classify 
the attitudes of the Central Asian states towards religion. As we will see be-
low, all four states recognize the human right of religious freedom in their 
constitutions as a). However, registration processes for religious organiza-
tion in order to obtain legal status fall under b), whereas the declaration of a 
‘special status’ to the Hanafi madhab by the Tajik government and the 
recognition of ‘traditional religions’ in Kazakhstan fall under c).  
 
 
7.2. SECULARITY IN THE CONSTITUTION 
 
7.2.1. The Human Right to Freedom of Religion 
 
The preamble of the Swiss constitution reads as follows: “In the name of 
God, the almighty!” which is not explicitly secular. By contrast, the pream-
bles of the Central Asian states do not include any sort of religiosity with 
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the slight exception of Kyrgyzstan which aspires to: “root the […] spiritual 
development of the people; […]”.  
In fact, the constitutions of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
prominently declare secularity in their constitutions in the very first article. 
They read as follows: 
 
• Kazakh Constitution, Article 1, para.1: “The Republic of Kazakhstan 
proclaims itself a democratic, secular, legal and social state whose 
highest values are an individual, his life, rights and freedoms.” 
• Kyrgyz Constitution, Article 1, para.1: “The Kyrgyz Republic (Kyrgyz-
stan) is a sovereign, democratic, secular, unitary and social state gov-
erned by the rule of law.” 
• Tajik Constitution, Article 1: “The Republic of Tajikistan is a sover-
eign, democratic, law-governed, secular, and unitary state. […]” 
 
The first article of the Uzbek Constitution states only that “Uzbekistan is a 
sovereign democratic republic,” but does declare the following with regards 
to the separation of state and religion in Article 61: “Religious organiza-
tions and associations shall be separated from the state and equal before 
law. The state shall not interfere with the activity of religious associations.” 
This is similar to the Soviet constitutions.  
Surprisingly in light of Soviet religious policies, the 1936 Soviet consti-
tution mentions the freedom of conscience (and the right to atheistic propa-
ganda) only omitting this article in the 1977 constitution.1 Today, except in 
the Tajik constitution, where the freedom of conscience is not mentioned, it 
is explicitly confirmed in all Central Asian constitutions: 
 
• Kazakh Constitution, Article 22, para. 1: “Everyone shall have the right 
to freedom of conscience.” 
• Kyrgyz Constitution, Article 32, para. 1: “1. Everyone shall be guaran-
teed freedom of conscience and belief.” 
                                                   
1  1936 Soviet constitution, Article 52 “Citizens of the USSR are guaranteed free-
dom of conscience, that is, the right to profess or not to profess any religion, and 
to conduct religious worship or atheistic propaganda. Incitement of hostility or 
hatred on religious grounds is prohibited.” 
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• Uzbek Constitution Article 31: “Freedom of conscience is guaranteed to 
all. Everyone shall have the right to profess or not to profess any reli-
gion. Any compulsory imposition of religion shall be impermissible.” 
 
However, there are some constraints that can be imposed upon these rights. 
For example, article 22 of the Kazakh constitution continues in para. 2: 
“The right to freedom of conscience must not specify or limit universal 
human and civil rights and responsibilities before the state.” Furthermore, 
as the following analysis by the Berkley Center shows, the rights declared 
in the Uzbek constitution are only guaranteed in so far as they are not at 
odds with other more important ‘interests of the state’, which are defined in 
Article 20 of the constitution: 
 
“Citing Article 20, Karimov has sanctioned his government’s crackdown on Mus-
lims by declaring that their ‘Wahhabi’ ideology conflicts with state security. By mo-
nopolizing constitutional interpretation, the Uzbek president is effectively ensuring 
that state policy cannot be limited through constitutional precepts” (Berkley Cen-
ter e). 
 
Indeed the maintenance of presidential hegemony takes priority over hu-
man rights concerns in all Central Asian states. The US State Department’s 
International Religious Freedom Reports of these countries more or less 
come to the same conclusion regarding freedom of religion: “The constitu-
tion provides for religious freedom; however, other laws and policies re-
strict religious freedom and, in practice, the government generally enforced 
these restrictions” (StateDept 2012a: 1). 
 
7.2.2. Religion as a Means of Ideological Nation-Building 
 
Whereas the above mentioned freedom of religion referred to the human 
right of the individual, now I turn to what Bielefeldt classifies “a specific 
privileged status position to some religious or belief communities” given by 
the state (Bielefeldt 2011: 1). 
Besides the explicit articles in Central Asian constitutions on secular-
ism, these constitutions also declare that no state ideology or state religion 
can be established. For example, the Kyrgyz constitution, “[…] prohibits 
the establishment of any religion as a state or mandatory religion. Further-
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more, the government prohibits religious groups and clergy from interfering 
in the activities of government institutions” (StateDept 2012b: 2). However, 
such stipulations do not hinder governments from according a special status 
to some religious organizations. For example, Article 8 of the Tajik consti-
tution explains that: 
 
“In Tajikistan public life is to develop on the basis of political and ideological diver-
sity. No ideology, including religious ideology, is granted the status of state ideolo-
gy. […]” 
 
Despite this, it recognizes the special status of the Hanafi school (StateDept 
2012c: 2). This has led to some confusion among authors, who have wrong-
ly stated that the Hanafi school is the official state religion of Tajikistan 
(see as an example Yuldoshev 2009a). Special status is also given to the 
following religious groups in Kazakhstan, which are considered ‘tradition-
al’ and therefore privileged: Islam (represented by SAMK), Russian Ortho-
doxy, Roman Catholicism, Lutheranism, Judaism (StateDept 2012a: 10). 
With “a recently adopted law regulating religious relations […] the state 
acknowledges the place and the role of Hanafiyah in the spiritual life of our 
people”, says Nazarbaev (Nazarbaev in TengriNews 2013).  
The Muslim Board of Uzbekistan (MBU) – an institution presented in 
more detail in the next section – runs the shrine complex of Ulli Pir in 
Khorezm; the museum and a guesthouse near the site are administered by 
the state-run Centre for Morals and Enlightenment (Ma’naviyat va Ma’rifat 
Markazi) (Kehl-Bodrogi 2006: 243). In Kyrgyzstan, holy places such as 
Manas Ordo and the Throne of Suleiman are called national, historical or 
cultural sites by state authorities (Toktogulova 2007: 509). By what means 
did secular regimes come to maintain such holy places? One explanation 
might be ideological nation-building. Another could be the state’s desire to 
have more control over the religious sites. 
I already introduced the need of the newly independent started for a 
new national ideology above: they started to fuse together historical figures, 
nationalistic and religious ideologies in order to build an ideological base 
for their nation states. The results of their efforts, as well as the measures 
taken to implement their respective ideologies, vary distinctly from state to 
state. The former Turkmen leader Saparmurat Niyazov was an exceptional 
case in this regard. He authored the book Rukhnama, which he raised to the 
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level of the Quran, and decreed that it had to be read and recited by the 
Turkmen citizens at many different occasions (Pelkmans 2006). The other 
Central Asian governments did not go to such lengths to foster the cult of 
personality but rather capitalized on the cultural symbolism of Islam. As 
Schoeberlein explains, they “[…] promote historical figures and cultural 
practices associated with Islam as part of their revival of national culture 
more broadly” (Schoeberlein 2009: 105). In particular, states’ attitudes to-
wards popular religious traditions have changed since independence. Kehl-
Bodrogi shows this citing Uzbekistan as an example: 
 
“In a clear break with the official interpretation of Islam in the Soviet Union, the 
state now acknowledges popular religious traditions as legitimate expressions of 
faith and part of the ‘golden heritage’ (altin meros) of the Uzbek people” (Kehl-
Bodrogi 2006: 238). 
 
Indeed, the shift from an interpretation of Islam which relied mainly on 
scholarly Sunni Islam also occurred in the other newly independent Central 
Asian states. Contrary to the policy of the Soviet Union, the newly inde-
pendent Central Asian states “preferred to recruit among relatively unedu-
cated parallel ex-mullahs rather than among the élite who had been educat-
ed in the Arab countries during the Soviet era” (Roy 2000: 158). This was 
partly due to the fact that after independence, the number of worshippers 
increased too rapidly for educated imams to meet the new demand (Sal-
morbekova and Yemelianova 2010: 227). This shortage of educated imams 
and the acceptance of former parallel mullahs by the Central Asian gov-
ernments as well as the large scale reopening of village or mahalla mosques 
(which were closed during the Soviet Union) might also have served to 
strengthen traditional Islam. 
Whereas differences between contemporary state Islam and official So-
viet Islam can be observed, there are also similarities regarding the under-
standing of religion and the role of Islam in state politics. The Soviet under-
standing of culture and identity as well as their ‘nationalization of religion’ 
played an important role in the formation of national identities of the con-
temporary states (Khalid 2007: 3; Pelkmans 2006). And just as the Soviets 
understood religion to be more a symbol of national identity than a matter 
of spirituality so too do the political leaders of the Central Asian states. 
They “maintain the Soviet modernist antipathy for religion and would like 
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to see Islam play only a symbolic role and no political role in their coun-
tries” (Schoeberlein 2009: 104). For this end they use Islamic symbols on 
national flags or banknotes, celebrate Muslim holidays and ceremonies and 
often use religious expressions (Roy 2000: 159). Indeed, political leaders 
make conscious use of Islamic symbols in order to strengthen their legiti-
macy and their rule (Roy 2000: 159; Karagiannis 2010: 15; Yemelianova 
2010: 27). Furthermore, all Central Asian countries currently belong to the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference.  
The Central Asian governments today refer to ‘traditional Islam’ as be-
ing officially accepted and mention the Hanafi School and Sufi Islam in this 
context. In fact, Sufi Islam, persecuted during the Soviet Union, was reha-
bilitated by the newly independent states, as Kehl-Bodrogi points out: 
 
“The [Uzbek] government is equally supportive of the literary reconstruction of the 
Sufi tradition […], and has made the celebration of the lives of medieval Sufi awliya 
(avliyo) a centrepiece of its nation-building agenda.” (Kehl-Bodrogi 2006: 238). 
 
The main purpose of this rehabilitation should by now be clear; as Fathi as-
serts, national leaders have been “building a national Islam to reinforce 
their policies of national consolidation. Since declaring independence, they 
have encouraged re-Islamization ‘from the top’” (Fathi 2011: 174). For ex-
ample, “Uzbekistan laid on a major commemoration of Bahauddin 
Naqshband in Bukhara, and used the fact that both the Ysawiyah and the 
Naqshbandiyah originated in Central Asia” (Roy 2000: 159), while in Ka-
zakhstan, Ahmet Yasawi, the founder of the Sufi Yasawiy tariqa, was de-
clared a “figure of national importance” (Khalid 2007: 132). 
As Kariagiannis points out, the state celebration of Ahmet Yasawi in 
Kazakhstan shows how attitudes towards Sufism have changed since tradi-
tional Islam is now regarded as a useful means of opposing radical Islam: 
“[…] a few regional governments have attempted to integrate elements of 
Sufi Islam into their state ideology and have promoted Sufism as an alterna-
tive to political Islam” (Karagiannis 2010: 15). However, equating ‘tradi-
tional Islam’ with Sufi practice suggests a very superficial understanding of 
religiosity. Precisely in Kazakhstan, for example, Sufism is not officially 
recognized (Berkley Center a) despite its veneration of Sufi leaders. In fact, 
just recently a prominent Sufi – incidentally a follower of Ahmed Yasawi – 
was sentenced to fourteen years in prison (RFE/RL 2013).  
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As for what ‘traditional Islam’ means exactly: this is open to discussion. 
While common people seem to understand this term to mean merely Is-
lamo-national life-cycle rituals, imams refer to the typical Central Asian in-
terpretation of the Quran (Salmorbekova and Yemelianova 2010: 230f). In 
any case, the main political function of the introduction of this term seems 
to be that today foreign influence on Islam is unwanted: official ‘tradition-
al’ Islam has been used to contrast ‘foreign’ extremism. In the local ‘War 
on Terror’ the authorities’ main argument is that foreign influences contra-
dict traditional Islam, and thereby disunite society.2 In this sense, traditional 
Islam is put forward as the main ideological solution to foreign-influenced 
Islamist movements (Roy 2000: 159). In addition, contemporary regimes 
have used their definition of Sufism as ‘traditional’ Islam for their own 
ends, namely to provide a counterweight to the ‘radical’ Islam which leads 
to terrorism. For example, there is no doubt that the Uzbek state’s “benevo-
lence towards popular religiosity is guided not least by the notion that it is 
less of a potential threat than scripturalist variants of the faith” (Kehl-
Bodrogi 2006: 238). Schoeberlein advances the same view and also implic-
itly cautions against dangerous ‘foreign’ branches of Islam: 
To summarize, all of the four states try to control religion as tightly as 
possible and “take for granted the right to regulate religious life through 
formal bureaucratic channels” and “resolutely oppose the wrong kind of Is-
lam” (Khalid 2007: 132). On the one hand the contemporary Central Asian 
regimes take advantage of and even fear the revival of Islam as an opposi-
tion force but on the other, they support it for their own advantage.  
 
 
7.3. CONTENT OF RELIGIOUS LAWS 
 
At first sight it appears strange that countries with predominantly Muslim 
populations enact laws forbidding the wearing of headscarves at schools – 
an issue broadly discussed in Europe. However, as we will see in this sec-
tion, all four Central Asian states consider schoolgirls’ headdresses an is-
sue. Religious laws not only determine which specific religious groups are 
allowed to practice in the country, where they might worship, and even 
                                                   
2  See “Osh officials hear concerns about uncertified imams”: www.centralasia 
online.com/en_GB/articles/caii/newsbriefs/2012/05/10/newsbrief-16 (15.5.12). 
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what content their literature and materials can comprise, but also limit reli-
gious instruction. 
The toughening of policies towards Islam started in the mid-1990s. 
Khalid attributes this to external factors – the civil war in Tajikistan and the 
gaining of power of the Taliban in Afghanistan (Khalid 2007: 132). General 
statements on the religious laws, which have become increasingly restric-
tive over the last few years, have become widespread in the literature on 
Central Asia. Indeed, since no specific comparison of the diverse religious 
issues has been conducted yet, I will attempt to do so here. However, this 
comparison is only cursory in part because I do not have a juristic back-
ground and the laws and regulations are changing on a regular basis. At any 
rate, I will be able to identify and compare the most important means used 
to control religious practice in the Central Asian states and get an idea of 
the degree of formally or legally sanctioned restrictions on religion. In addi-
tion to the countries’ laws on religion, the fatwas of the Council of Ulama 
or the Muftiate have a binding character (more on these institutions in the 
next section).  
The current law on ‘Religious Activity and Religious Associations’ was 
approved in Kazakhstan on October 11, 2011. Nazarbaev explained that the 
law was necessary in order to protect the country from religious extremism 
and that “interfaith accord is one of the fundamentals of the unity of the 
[Kazakh] nation” (Nazarbaev in TengriNews 2011b). In addition to the re-
ligious law, the “State Program to Counter Religious Extremism and Ter-
rorism” applies for the period 2013 to 2017. It introduces preventive means, 
such as a compulsory school subject which provides instruction on “tradi-
tional religions” (Corley 2013). 
Kyrgyzstan adopted the law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious 
Organizations” in 2009. Amendments were made to it in 2012, integrating 
an article on religious materials. Other amendments discussed in the uni-
cameral parliament concerned the sending of students to foreign religious 
colleges, stipulating a minimum of 200 citizens for officially sanctioned re-
ligious communities and the licencing of foreigners who conduct religious 
activities (Corley 2012). 
The Tajik “Law on freedom of conscience and religious associations” 
came into force on 26 March 2009. It restricts worship to four locations: 
mosques, cemeteries, homes, and holy shrines. In addition, it distinguishes 
itself from the religious laws of the other countries with regards to the tight 
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control of the religious content of sermons: “[…] government censors now 
monitor Friday sermons, stepping in when muftis stray from the govern-
ment line” (Schwirtz 2011). Amendments to the Code of Administrative 
Offences show how the Tajik government ascribes extremism to ‘foreign’ 
Islam. These amendments define the punishment for “those violating the re-
ligion law’s tight restrictions on sending Tajik citizens abroad for religious 
education, preaching and teaching religious doctrines, and establishing ties 
with religious groups abroad” (StateDept 2012c: 3). Here too we can ob-
serve the aforementioned policy of traditionalization of religion. In addi-
tion, in 2004 the Tajik Council of Ulema published a fatwa against women 
attending mosques, arguing that they should pray at home (StateDept 2011: 
1). 
Uzbekistan was the first Central Asian state to declare Islamic extrem-
ism a major threat to national security when it introduced a new law on re-
ligion in 1998. With the law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious 
Organizations” the “[…] state policy towards Islam has in fact become in-
creasingly repressive” (Kehl-Bodrogi 2006: 238). Also in Uzbekistan the 
state “exercises strict control over Islamic worship, including the content of 
sermons” (Freedom House 2013d). Already in the 1990s and especially af-
ter he Andijan events in 2005, Uzbekistan was regarded as the most repres-
sive regime in Central Asia (apart from Turkmenistan) by western observ-
ers and human rights organizations. However, Uzbekistan was only the 
forerunner and the other Central Asian states soon followed up as I can 
show in the next sections. 
 
7.3.1. Religious Clothing, Hijab and Beard 
 
In their policies towards Islam, the Central Asian states have relied to a 
great extent on Soviet practice (see for example McGlinchey 2006: 128). If 
we bear in mind the Soviets’ campaign against the hijab, the contemporary 
banning of the hijab (Muslim headscarf) is easier to understand.  
Also in the context of this issue, the ‘traditionalization of religion’ and 
the special status for ‘traditional’ Islam can be observed. In Kazakhstan and 
in Tajikistan the national headdress for women is permitted (and even pro-
moted) by each respective government, but ‘foreign’ fashions of wearing 
the hijab are partially prohibited. Absattar Derbissali, Kazakh Supreme 
Mufti until February 2013 explained this in the following way:  
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“Concerning our country’s girls, women: Kazakhs have beautiful national clothes, 
but it is not hijab. We should not wear Afghanistan’s national clothes. Our people, 
our women have to dress according to traditions of our ethnicity” (TengriNews 
2011a). 
 
We see in this quote again how the Central Asian governments fear foreign 
influences on Islam and contrast them with their own traditions. The wear-
ing of hijabs is not forbidden in Kazakhstan, but the Head of the Agency of 
Religious Affairs (ARA) explains that it is not necessary to wear a hijab to 
show one’s religiosity (TengriNews 2011b). Indeed, it was reported that the 
education department of Aktobe oblast keeps a list of school students who 
wear a hijab. Although the Department explains that this is just “done to 
know their exact number” (TengriNews 2011c), in the context of the politi-
cal persecution of devout individuals, this might raise concerns.  
In Kyrgyzstan the situation seems similarly unclear, which shows that 
this is a delicate topic. On the one hand, Freedom House reports that two 
months after the 2009 religious law came into effect, the wearing of head-
scarves was prohibited in Kyrgyz schools (Freedom House KG 2012). On 
the other hand, the State Department Report on Religious Freedom of the 
same year says that so far the Kyrgyz government has banned neither hijabs 
nor religious clothing in schools (StateDept 2012b: 4). Officially at least, 
there is no ban: 
 
“Ministry [of Education and Science] officials have adamantly denied a ban, saying 
the only reason headscarves might not be allowed by some teachers or administra-
tors is because they are not a part of the official public-school uniform for female 
students” (Schenkkan 2011b). 
 
Nevertheless, some parents have complained about “harassment by teachers 
and school administrators toward hijab-wearing students” (Schenkkan 
2011b). What makes the situation in Kyrgyzstan unique, and distinguishes 
it from the one in Kazakhstan, is how the Muftiate reacted to this dispute. 
The Muftiate supported Muslim groups who argued that a ban would vio-
late the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom and “posted a hotline 
for complaints on its website” (Schenkkan 2011b). By contrast, in Tajiki-
stan the Tajik Ministry of Education (MOE) clearly banned the hijab from 
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schools and universities in 2005, arguing that this was necessary to safe-
guard the secular education system (Freedom House 2013c, StateDept 
2012: 1). Here, “the Council of Ulemo members have not disputed the 
MOE dress code banning the hijab in schools and have promoted official 
government policies, saying that the national head covering may substitute 
for the hijab” (StateDept 2011: 5). As in Kazakhstan, here too a distinction 
is made between the hijab and the traditionally tied headscarf: “Women 
wearing a traditional local head covering, a scarf which covers the hair but 
not the neck, were allowed to study in schools and universities” (StateDept 
2011: 1). Besides the issue of hijab at school, the Tajik MOE prohibits 
teachers under the age of 50 from wearing beards (StateDept 2012c: 3). 
More generally, “there were reports that men were not able to obtain a 
passport if photographed with a beard, and women were not permitted to be 
photographed while wearing a hijab, unless traveling for the hajj” 
(StateDept 2011). In Uzbekistan, as usual, the situation is more extreme 
with religious clothing banned not only from schools but even from public 
places in general with the exception of those serving in religious organiza-
tions (StateDept 2012d: 4). 
Another issue newly raised in Kazakhstan is the following: It is report-
ed that at Al-Farabi Univeristy in Almaty the names of students who read 
namaz are collected and that they are interrogated – preventively, in order 
to be able to control who potentially could leave for Syria to execute jihad 
there.3 
 
7.3.2. Religious Instruction 
 
As I have shown in section 7.1, the right to religious instruction is included 
in the freedom of religion in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. I use here the terms ‘religious instruction’ and ‘religious 
education’ interchangeably, although sometimes the first term tends to be 
used for the teaching of one particular religion and the second for teaching 
about religions in general. In the Central Asian context, several different 
school levels are discussed under the umbrella term ‘Muslim religious edu-
cation’: 
                                                   
3  See http://rus.azattyk.org/content/spisok-chitayuschikh-namaz-studentov/25173 
602.html (8.2.2014). 
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• maktabs provide primary religious education for children at mosques;4 
• madrasas operate at the secondary school level and qualify students for 
university by teaching them diverse subjects in addition to giving them 
a Muslim education; 
• Islamic Universities which teach Muslim theology; 
• private homes where children and adults can receive Quran lessons, 
where Surahs are recited, Arab scripture and grammar learnt and indi-
vidual guidance about religion takes place between teacher and student.  
 
Bearing the human right to religious instruction in mind, the question of 
where children and students today receive religious instruction today pre-
sents itself. More specifically:  
 
• Are private religious classes allowed and under what conditions? 
• What is the status of religion in public schools?  
• What are the officially recognized religious institutes?  
• Are students allowed to travel abroad to follow a course of religious in-
struction at the higher education level?  
 
I will start with the similarities among the Central Asian states before going 
on to discuss exceptional cases. I will then provide more detailed infor-
mation regarding the specific countries. 
Religious instruction currently tends to be restricted to registered reli-
gious communities (see section 7.5.1 for registration processes). For higher 
Islamic education, the permission of the Ministry of Education (MOE) is 
needed, which means that tertiary level religious instruction is restricted to 
government-approved institutions. 
Although private religious tutoring for children is prohibited in all four 
countries, it has a long tradition in Central Asia (Stephan 2010: 471): 
 
“They provide an elementary Islamic education, with the aim of turning young boys 
and girls into genuine believers and good Muslims […]. As a result of their connec-
tion to the local mosque, their proximity to the households and the local background 
of the teaching staff, the maktab were embedded in urban and rural neighbourhoods, 
                                                   
4  The use of the name ‘maktab’ is unclear, as it seems that it is sometimes also 
used to refer to secular primary education. 
COMPARISON OF THE CONTEMPORARY ROLE OF RELIGION IN POLITICS | 191 
and guaranteed the reproduction of local knowledge and local religious authority” 
(Stephan 2010: 471). 
 
Today, it is common for children to be sent to private religious classes by 
parents who find themselves in difficult economic and social situations in 
order to help raise their children as ethical individuals (interview with Kyr-
gyz expert in Islamic studies; Stephan 2010). This is also true (perhaps 
even more so) for the many grandparents who look after the grandchildren 
of parents working abroad as migrant labourers (interview with Kyrgyz ex-
pert in Islamic studies). 
During Soviet times, besides strengthening the character of children, 
learning in private homes had an additional purpose: it was one of the pri-
mary means by which popular Islam was able to survive. Especially in are-
as where few or no official mosques existed, an informal system of spiritual 
education came into being (Naumkin 2005: 21) by means of clandestine 
prayer houses, which were set upin the homes of Sufi shaykhs. These also 
became meeting places for general believers and/or for Sufi adepts (Ben-
nigsen and Wimbush 1985: 86f; Salmorbekova and Yemelianova 2010: 
216).  Private houses furthermore preserved small private libraries; these 
helped propagate religious knowledge although Central Asia was cut off 
from the rest of the Islamic world (Roy 2000: 145). Private underground 
teaching courses were called hujra, which is originally the name for a stu-
dent-room at a madrasa (Naumkin 2005: 21).  
Today in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan religious tutoring for children 
mainly takes place during summer holidays when they visit the local 
mosque a few hours a day to study the Quran. At the official Almaty Cen-
tral mosque, children are taught the following subjects: Arabic alphabet, 
Tajwid (the reading of Quran), Quran, Akida (the basics of Islamic creed), 
Arabic language, Hadith (the sentences of the Prophet), and Fiqh (aware-
ness; the system of knowledge of right behaviour for Muslims) (Ming-
isheva: 2011). 
In Kazakhstan, religious home-schooling is prohibited except in cases 
of non-religious necessity (StateDept 2012a). There are seven official mad-
rasas in Kazakhstan and one Islamic University, which is in Almaty. Some 
Kazakhs study theology in Egypt or Pakistan (Mingisheva 2011). However, 
Kazakh students who want to study theology in Saudi Arabia need permis-
sion from the Kazakh government (Lillis 2013). At Kazakh public schools, 
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courses on religion were proscribed until 2013; but in 2014 ‘traditional re-
ligions’ will become an obligatory subject (Corley 2013: 2).  
Kyrgyzstan allows public schools to teach lessons on ‘mainstream’ reli-
gions (StateDept 2012: 3). Here, many different madrasas operate which 
are not particularly closely monitored government bodies, and education at 
madrasas is considered of equal value to that provided at secular secondary 
schools (interview with a sympathizer of the Gülen movement). Seven offi-
cial institutes in the country provide higher Islamic education (ARDA KG). 
 Source: Lisa Harand 
I observed a private religious class in Bishkek led by a woman who herself 
was a student at the Islamic University in Bishkek. Her illegal Quran class 
comprised around fifteen women who all stem from the same village in 
South Kyrgyzstan. These women meet once a week in order to discuss reli-
gious issues and to learn Islamic subjects such as Arab grammar, reading of 
Surahs and so on. Their meetings last for several hours with many interrup-
tions for prayers. The teacher has a personal relationship to each of her stu-
dents and radiates authority. It is interesting to note that the children and 
husbands of the women in the class meet in their own circles and are in-
structed by the husband of the woman teacher. The teaching is conserva-
tive-Sunni and anti-folk Islam but the women were very open to their west-
Image 10: Private Religious Class in Bishkek 
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ern guests. They said that they do not have any problems with governmen-
tal restrictions on religious instruction. 
The Tajik government recently closed private religious schools, as “re-
ligious home-schooling outside the immediate family was forbidden” 
(StateDept: 2010 7f). Yet even within the family, religious beliefs can only 
be taught, “provided the child expresses a desire to learn” (StateDept 2011: 
4). Additionally, the “Law on parental responsibility” banned minors from 
attending regular religious services in mosques (Freedom House 2013c) 
although registered mosques are allowed to teach children. Despite this, 
transportation problems sometimes hinder them from participating in these 
lessons (StateDept: 2010: 8). Further evidence of Tajikistan’s restriction of 
religious freedoms include the fact that while ‘Friday mosques’ are allowed 
to operate madrasas (StateDept 2012c: 3),5 teachers on all levels of Islamic 
education are vetted by the government (Nabiyeva 2013). As for students 
who wish to study abroad: they need the permission of the MOE, the 
Committee on Religious Affairs (CRA) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(StateDept 2012c: 1). In 2010 around 1,500 students were recalled from 
abroad – even from the reputable al-Azhar University in Cairo for fear that 
they could be trained as extremists and terrorists (StateDept 2011: 7; Free-
dom House 2013c). Subsequently, the limited capabilities of the Tajik reli-
gious institutions have failed to integrate them and “some have faced pros-
ecution” (Freedom House 2013c). Obviously fearing foreign influences in 
all fields now, “in October 2012, the government banned all university stu-
dents from attending events or conferences organized by international or 
foreign organizations” (Freedom House 2013c). This appears almost para-
noid. 
In Uzbekistan, religious classes are permitted neither at homes nor at 
public schools (StateDept2012d: 2, 4). Meetings of women who teach Islam 
to children in their homes “were jeopardized as a result of the toughening 
of official control over any Islam-related gatherings, especially in Uzbeki-
stan’s part of the [Ferghana] valley” (Salmorbekova and Yemelianova 
2010: 228). The Uzbek religious law “[…] limits religious instruction to of-
ficially sanctioned religious schools and state-approved instructors” 
(StateDept 2012d: 4). Apart from the eleven madrasas and two (University) 
5  See the section on registration for the special categorisation of mosques in Ta-
jikistan. 
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institutes in Tashkent which provide state approved secondary education, 
the most populous of the Central Asian countries has “[…] no other offi-
cially sanctioned religious instruction for individuals interested in learning 
about Islam” (StateDept 2012: 4). Graduates of the madrasas are allowed to 
study at University, because they “provide secondary education on a full 
range of secular subjects“ (State Dept 2012d: 4). The Islamic University in 
Tashkent is funded by the government (StateDept 2012d: 2). 
Traditional religions are allowed or even form part of the compulsory 
curriculum in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. While universities and madrasas 
are under strict state control in all Central Asian countries, Kyrgyzstan is 
the exception, where a certain diversity of madrasas seems to exist and pri-
vate religious classes are attended – despite being prohibited – without fear 
of state reprisals. All of the Central Asian states closely monitor Islamic 
students abroad, but the Tajik government went furthest on this issue when 
it recalled hundreds of students. However, as Uzbeks cannot leave their 
country without an exit visa, such incidents obviously do not occur there. 
In conclusion, restrictions on religious education can be criticized from a 
human rights perspective. However, Naumkin’s comment remains true: 
what began in Soviet times still continues to this day – parallel Islam and 
political Islamic groups spread their ideology by means of private tutoring. 
Indeed, as far back as the 1970s, Salafis started recruiting disciples and 
teaching them privately, as Naumkin explains (Naumkin 2005: 37): “[…] 
Salafis began to address ‘trusted’ audiences and distribute tapes of sermons 
and lessons to them. They did not, however, call for jihad or direct struggle 
against the Soviet regime” (Naumkin 2005: 37). Karagiannis also underli-
nes the importance that informal networks play stating that men-groups 
which gather for tea or lunch at chaykhanas (traditional teahouses) or in 
private houses are important for recruiting HT-members (Karagiannis 2010. 
80). In addition, members of the Gülen movement meet once a week to dis-
cuss and pray together as well. All this serves to demonstrate that there is 
some basis for Central Asian governments’ assertion that private religious 
classes undermine secularity and spread Salafi worldviews (Stephan 2010: 
474). 
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7.3.3. Islamic Literature 
 
The Central Asian states regulate the production, import, export, distribu-
tion and content of religious literature to different extents. There are official 
Muslim publications in all countries. In Kazakhstan, for example, maga-
zines such as ‘Iman’ and ‘Shapaghat-Nur’, as well as a monthly journal ‘Is-
lam and Civilization’ or the Islamic TV channel ‘Assyl-Arna’ operate in a 
way acceptable to the government (Mingisheva 2011). Furthermore, there 
are official websites, such as www.muftyat.kz (Muftiat), www.meshet.kz 
which provide officially accepted information about Islamic issues. 
In Kyrgyzstan religious groups are permitted to “produce, import, ex-
port, and distribute religious literature and materials in accordance with es-
tablished procedures” (StateDept 2012b: 2). However, all religious litera-
ture has to be submitted to state experts from the State Committee on Reli-
gious Affairs (SCRA). Additionally, “[…] distribution […] in public loca-
tions or by visiting individual household, schools, or other institutions” is 
prohibited (StateDept 2012b: 2). 
The import of religious literature is theoretically allowed in Tajikistan, 
but religious groups wishing to do so have to hand in copies to the Ministry 
of Culture in advance (StateDept 2012c: 4). Officials monitor bookstores, 
newsstands, kiosks and places in front of mosques as well as markets and 
confiscate unregistered literature (StateDept TJ: 8). The selling of Shia lit-
erature, non-hanafi texts and “disks featuring prominent Tajik imams” is 
impeded (StateDept TJ: 8). 
Also in Uzbekistan, law enforcement agencies control bookshops, pub-
lishing houses, and border checkpoints in order to detect extremist literature 
(USDOS). The Uzbek government motivates Uzbek citizens to read only 
official religious literature: 
 
“One of Uzbekistan’s state-run television channels aired a program that urged citi-
zens to read only state-authorized religious books, noting that there are two govern-
ment authorized publishers of religious literature in Uzbekistan” (USDOS). 
 
Here, the government even maintains a monopoly over religious publica-
tions (USDOS). No other Central Asian country goes to such lengths in the 
control of religious literature.  
 
196 | SECURITIZATION OF ISLAM IN CENTRAL ASIA
7.4. INSTITUTIONS INVOLVED WITH RELIGION 
7.4.1. Religious Committees 
Theoretically, the official state institutions which deal with religious issues 
are the state Commissions, Departments and Agencies on Religious Affairs. 
They prepare religious laws and oversee their implementation. They also 
analyze religious materials and literature and are responsible for banning 
them if necessary. In Uzbekistan and Tajikistan the state furthermore dis-
tributes official certificates not only to mullahs and dignitaries but also to 
otin-oyi and bibi-khalife, female leaders who teach children and other 
women in their homes about Islam (Fathi 2011: 181).  
Table 15: Religious Committees 
Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
Name of 
Religious 
Committee 
Agency for 
Religious 
Affairs 
(ARA) 
State Com-
mission for 
Religious 
Affairs 
(SCRA) 
Committee on 
Religious 
Affairs (CRA) 
Council on 
Religious 
Affairs (CRA) 
(and Council 
for Confessi-
ons) 
7.4.2. Muftiates 
In addition to the state agencies and commissions, the independent Central 
Asian states also adopted the Soviet system of the Muftiate. The Soviet Re-
publics were represented in the SADUM by a qadi (except in Uzbekistan, 
because the SADUM and the Mufti were located there). After independ-
ence, each state established its own succession-institution of the SADUM 
with its own Mufti (chief legal scholar) (Atkin 2009: 308). The SADUM 
was “tasked with administering mosques, training ulema, and overseeing 
other Islamic activities within the Central Asian Republics” (Berkley Cen-
tre h), and the new institutions inherited these tasks. The internal structure 
with the election of the Mufti by a council of Islamic clerics (Berkley Cen-
tre h) was also adapted from the internal structure of Soviet institutions. 
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The Kyrgyz Muftiate, for example, consists of 30 clerics and scholars, a 
Council of Ulema, and its elected head, the Mufit (Berkley Centre g). All 
Central Asian states issue fatwas about the correct Islamic practices (for 
example how to wash before reading namaz and how to wear hijab)6 as 
well as about religious and marriage celebrations.7 They for example also 
inform if hajj has to be delayed because of cases of avian flue in Saudi 
Arabia.8 Fatwas furthermore deal with general issues such as homosexuali-
ty, corruption or inform about illegal groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir.9 
Theoretically, the Muftiates are not state institutions but independent. 
However, the contemporary Muftiates are closely controlled by the reli-
gious agencies of the independent states, as were the activities of the 
SADUM by the Soviet Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults. Further-
more, as Roy observes, they are closely controlled and directly subordinat-
ed to the Council of Ministers or the presidency (Roy 2000: 158). The Ka-
zakh President Nazarbaev explains the role of the Muftiate as follows: 
“The spiritual management that joins together 2,228 mosques became the center of 
cohesion of Muslims. The conditions were created for consolidation of our people 
around spiritual values and goals” (Nazarbaev in TengriNews 2013). 
Actually, one of the main tasks of the Muftiate is the supervision and coor-
dination of Muslim groups including the individual mosques. Not surpris-
ingly then, mosques have to be constructed under the supervision of the 
Muftiate. 
6  http://azan.kz/article/show/id/2419.html. 
7  http://www.fergananews.com/articles/1424. 
8  www.regnum.ru/news/1205674.html. 
9  See www.muftyat.kz/ru/fatwa/view?id=18 (homosexuality), www.interfax-
religion.ru/?act=news&div=45473 (corruption), www.muftyat.kz/ru/fatwa/view 
?id=16 (Hizb ut-Tahrir). 
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 Source: Lisa Harand 
As in Soviet times, religious leaders are used by the government to promote 
state policies among the population. In this regard, Nazarbaev informed re-
ligious leaders of the State Strategy 2050 and explained: “the religious offi-
cials have to tell the people about the necessity of further work in the best 
interests of our country” (Nazarbaev in TengriNews 2013). In 2002, the 
Kazakh government even attempted to make the Muftiate a quasi-official 
institution “determining which Muslims groups should be allowed to regis-
ter with the authorities and by approving the construction of new mosques” 
(Rotar 2004b). This failed because the Kazakh Consitituional Coucil judged 
the amendment as unconstitutional. Despite this the Muftiate de facto fulfils 
exactly these tasks. 
Furthermore, although imams are theoretically elected by their congre-
gations, the Muftiate appoints them and administers the examinations and 
background checks for aspiring imams (StateDept 2012a), as is exemplified 
here with the case of Kyrgyzstan:  
“[In Kyrgyzstan] Some 90 percent of imams are appointed by the government, by 
local government [officials] and offices of the security agency. […] Even the law 
says that imams are supposed to be appointed by worshippers at the mosques with 
the approval of the government. But it is actually the government that selects who 
Image 11: Kazakh Muftiate in Almaty 
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the imams will be, and when they appoint imams it is clear [the government] con-
trols the mosque through these protégés” (Turajonzoda in Pannier 2010). 
 
Since foreign Islamic funds are banned and governments fear the involve-
ment of foreign fundamentalists, the imams lack independent financial and 
material resources and are therefore also very dependent on the state in this 
regard.  
Furthermore, the political importance of the Muftiate can have many ef-
fects. In Kyrgyzstan, for example, the Chief Mufti has been changed sever-
al times since the revolution against Bakiev:  
 
“Former Kyrgyz mufti Murataaly-Hajji Juman-Uulu stepped down after the ouster 
of Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiev in early April. Abdushukur Narmatov, who 
was elected to succeed Juman-Uulu, resigned soon afterwards. Suyun-Hajji Kuluev, 
who was named as a temporary successor to Narmatov, was severely beaten by un-
known assailants during a religious gathering on June 6. The press service of the 
Muftiat, the country’s highest religious authority, told RFE/RL that the attackers 
shouted that Kuluev must resign.” (RFE/RL 2010). 
 
The implication here is that the government only wants to appoint pro-
government muftis. Finally, Ruslanbek Jumagulov was elected new Mufti 
in June 2010, but after only one month he was replaced by Chubak 
Zhalilov. Zhalilov resigned after being in office for two years, because of 
accusations of corruption and organized crime.10 His “period saw the big-
gest number of scandals within the muftiate” (Interfax 2012). Since then, 
Rahmatilla Egemberdiev has been the new grand Mufti. 
The Kyrgyz Muftiate, however, is a special case because it is more het-
erogeneous than the muftiates of the neighbouring countries. For example, 
the proselytizing group Tablighi Jama’at, which is allowed to operate legal-
ly only in Kyrgyzstan, is represented in the Muftiate. Schenkkan describes 
that the Office of Davaat is the representative organization of the Jama’at 
Tablighi and carries out regulating tasks for the daavachis (the name used 
for members of Tablighi Jama’at in Kyrgyzstan): 
 
                                                   
10  www.rferl.org/content/kyrgyz-grand-mufti-chubak-hajji-jalilov/24647660.html 
(13.9.2014). 
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“The Office of Daavat, operating within the Muftiate, […] oversees [the daavtchis] 
missionary practices. In order to go on a 40-day mission, men must bring three sig-
natures to the Muftiate – one from their families, one from their local imam, and one 
from their local police precinct. They also must prove they have sufficient funds to 
support their families while away” (Schenkkan 2011a). 
By incorporating them into its structure, the Muftiate can control the daa-
vatchis’ activities. The situation in Kyrgyzstan is also unique since even a 
conflict between the Muftiate and the State Commission on Religious Af-
fairs is possible, something which is unthinkable in the other countries. 
That is to say that the State Commission and the State Committee on Na-
tional Security (GKNB), do indeed regard Tablighi Jama’at as fomenting 
terrorism and compare it to Hizb ut-Tahrir (Schenkkan 2011a). 
The history of the Tajik Muftiate is another special case among the 
Central Asian countries due to the civil war. The career of Turajonzoda 
serves well to explain this story. He started off as Tajik qazi under Soviet 
rule, then became second-in-command leader of the opposition during the 
civil war, and finally deputy prime minister under Rahmon: 
“When Tajikistan became independent in late 1991, Turajonzoda was the qazi qalon, 
the highest spiritual authority for Tajikistan’s Muslims. […] Within a year he was 
forced to flee the country after becoming an opposition leader” (Pannier 2007b). 
Turajonzoda was a member of the IRPT and together with Nuri he led the 
Tajik opposition (UTO). Because the official clergy supported the opposi-
tion, the authorities tried to weaken its influence and established the new 
Council of Ulama. Only when “they had become convinced that the Coun-
cil of Ulama would subserviently do as they wished, [did] the authorities 
[give] it the de facto authority once wielded by the Spiritual Administra-
tion” (Rotar 2004b). The person who became the first Mufti of Tajikistan 
when Turajonzoda fled the country supported Rahmon’s winning party but 
was killed under unclear circumstances in 1996 (Atkin 2009: 308). Tura-
jonzoda only  returned to Tajikistan in 1998, after receiving a government 
post earned in the peace deal and surprisingly resigned from the IRPT in 
1999 (Pannier 2007b). However, he still often takes opposing positions to-
wards the government. 
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In Tajikistan, for example, unsuitable imams would rapidly be replaced 
(Rotar 2004b). Here I see that just as in the Soviet period, the authorities 
prevent independent religious leadership (Khazanov 2005: 32). In this way 
the government hopes to rid itself of ‘uneducated imams’ who are regarded 
as a ‘national security issue’ by the authorities since it argues that the ter-
rorists mainly recruit those with little or no schooling (Karabayev 2011). 
Perhaps, though, we should talk not of ‘uneducated imams’ but rather of 
‘wrongly educated’ imams since the government replaces imams which are 
not pro-government enough (Salmorbekova and Yemelianova 2010: 236).  
The Uzbek MBU is also known to have “denounced and removed Mus-
lim clerics who have allegedly criticized Uzbekistan’s regime” (Berkley 
Center d). As in other domains, with regards to the dependence of the 
muftiate on the state, in Uzbekistan the situation is most severe. Already 
when SADUM was replaced with the Muslim Board of Uzbekistan (MBU) 
immediately following independence, the former Mufti Shamsuddin Ba-
bakhanov was replaced with Muhammad Sadiq Muhammad Yusuf. In 
1993, however, Yusuf was again replaced with a more loyal person – 
Mukhtar Abdullaev (Naumkin 2005: 70). In this way Salafis were excluded 
from the Muftiate because the officers feared their influence (Naumkin 
2005: 68). Yusuf, for example, was forced out of the country because: 
 
“[…] he was accussed of selling copies of the Quran given as a gift by Saudi Arabia. 
A bomb was even thrown into his home, though he was not injured in the attack. In-
dependent analysts think he was driven out because the authorities feared his influ-
ence and regarded him as a potential rival for power” (Bukharbaeva 2005). 
 
Yusuf returned in 1999 after receiving an official invitation from the gov-
ernment, which was eager to refute allegations of intolerance to Islam (Bu-
kharbaeva 2005). Despite this, Yusuf still lives in Saudi Arabia today. 
These frequent changes of leadership serve to demonstrate the im-
portance of the Muftiate; an organization which has far-reaching responsi-
bilities: 
 
“In Uzbekistan the Spiritual Administration of Muslims has virtually become a state 
agency which strictly controls all mosques functioning in the country and even ap-
proves the text of Friday addresses” (Rotar 2003). 
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A clear hierarchy helps to control the content of individual sermons in Uz-
bekistan, as the following quote makes clear: “The government controls the 
muftiate, which in turn controls the Muslim hierarchy, the content of imams 
sermons, and the volume and substance of published Islamic materials” 
(StateDept 2012d: 3). Similarly, in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan “the content 
of the Friday sermons is monitored by the authorities […]” (Atkin 2009: 
308). However, this seems not to have been the case in Kyrgyzstan thus far. 
Additionally, the governments’ hope of controlling every single word ut-
tered by the imams in the official mosques also seems to have been far from 
realistic. As McGlinchey exemplifies, Uzbek imams’ hold on society is 
strong enough to make even the government considerate of them 
(McGlinchey 2006). In McGlinchey’s view, independent imams still exist 
and are even capable of challenging the government’s power in the most 
repressive country in Central Asian. 
Table 16: Muftiates and Muftis 
Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
Name of 
Muftiate 
The Spiritual 
Administration 
of Muslims in 
Kazakhstan 
(SAMK) 
Spiritual 
Administrati-
on of Muslims 
of Kyrgyzstan 
(SAMK) 
Council of 
Ulema 
(StateDept 
2012c: 2) 
Muslim 
Board of 
Uzbekistan 
(MBU) 
Name of 
Mufti 
Mayamerov 
Erzhan 
Malgahaevich 
Rahmatulla 
Azhy 
Egemberdiev 
Saidmukarram 
Abdukodizora 
Usmonhon 
Alimov 
Source: Berkeley Centre and research of Aijamal Huonker 
7.5. PROCEDURES CONCERNING RELIGION 
In this section I will take a closer look at two important political processes 
which directly determine which religious groups are allowed to operate le-
gally in the Central Asian states and who is permitted to practice the Islam-
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ic faith freely. One issue is the registration process of religious organiza-
tions and groups. The other is the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, the hajj. 
 
7.5.1. Registration 
 
All religious associations in Central Asia have to register with the state. In 
the words of Bielefeldt, this means that the state provides “for the possibil-
ity of obtaining the status of legal personality, which religious or belief 
groups may need for the exercise of important communitarian aspects of 
their freedom of religion or belief” (Bielefeldt 2011: 1). In the course of re-
registration processes carried out in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, this has 
limited the possibilities for religious groups to gain such a legal status and 
has even involved the banning of organizations. In Kazakhstan, religious 
associations are only allowed to practice religion if they are registered with 
the Ministry of Justice. The definition of a religious association by the Ka-
zakh Agency of Religious Affairs (ARA) is the following: 
 
“A voluntary association of citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan, foreigners and 
stateless persons in accordance with the legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
united on the basis of their common interests to meet their spiritual needs” (ARA 11) 
 
Every single mosque falls under this definition and therefore all have to 
register. No other legal entities other than “theological (religious) educa-
tional institutions” (ARA) are allowed to engage in religious activities. The 
registration process in Kazakhstan takes place on three levels (local, re-
gional and national) with a minimum of members on each level (StateDept 
2012a: 2). “These requirements make it very difficult for smaller religious 
groups to register and impossible for any group other than the SAMK 
[Muftiate] and the Russian Orthodox Church to register at the national lev-
el” (StateDep 2012a: 2). The ‘association on the basis of common inter-
ests’, therefore, is not really voluntary and discourages heterogeneity in re-
ligious worship. 
In the re-registration process carried out in Kazakhstan in 2012, around 
600 of formerly almost 3,000 religious organizations were not re-registered. 
Either they did not try to re-register, no longer existed or were denied regis-
                                                   
11  www.din.gov.kz/eng/religioznye_obedineniya/?cid=0&rid=693 (13.9.2014). 
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tration due to lack of members or other reasons. Among the 2,229 regis-
tered Muslim ‘organizations’, the majority are mosques which are affiliated 
with the SAMK (ARDA: KZ). “Those not affiliated with the SAMK, such 
as the Ahamdiyya Muslim Community, are denied registration” 
(StateDepta 2012: 3). In 2002 in Kazakhstan, attempts were made to allow 
only those mosques to register that had been recommended by the Muftiate. 
(Rotar 2004b). Although this legal proposition failed, the new registration 
process resulted in the affiliation of 90% of the legal Muslim religious or-
ganizations with the SAMK in 2011 (Berkley Center a). This means that in 
90% of the Kazakh mosques, liturgical orthodoxy is ensured. This coordi-
nation has developed only in the last ten years. In the late 1990s only 12% 
of the mosques were affiliated with SAMK (Berkley Center a) and in 2004, 
mosques in South Kazakhstan still “successfully fought off state pressure to 
submit to the jurisdiction of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims in Ka-
zakhstan” (Rotar 2004b). 
As in Kazakhstan, in Kyrgyzstan every single religious community has 
to register. Yet they can only complete the registration process with the 
Ministry of Justice after applying to the SCRA: 
 
“SCRA recommends rejection when a religious group does not comply with the law 
or is considered a threat to national security, social stability, interethnic and interde-
nominational harmony, public order, health or morality” (StateDept 2012b: 3). 
 
Registration can be therefore be denied for a whole variety of reasons. In-
deed, the registration process is cumbersome and foreign religious organi-
zations have to register every year anew (StateDept 2012b: 3). In case of 
denial of registration, the religious group can reapply or turn to the courts. 
It is worth pointing out that in Kyrgyzstan unregistered groups often con-
duct religious ceremonies without government interference, although theo-
retically they are not allowed to rent a space or hold services (StateDept 
2012b: 3).  
Tajikistan’s religious law of 2009 allows it to regulate the number of 
mosques in accordance with the number of inhabitants of a place. The law 
“regulates registration, size, and location of mosques, limiting the number 
of mosques that may be registered within a given population area” 
(Yuldoshev 2009b). One central ‘Friday mosque’ per district or city super-
ordinates the other mosques (StateDept 2012c: 3). Should a mosque not be 
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registered, “local authorities can force a place of worship to close and fine 
its members” (StateDept 2012c: 2). If religious groups do not register, they 
cannot operate legally in Tajikistan. However, as in Kyrgyzstan, some un-
registered places of worship still persist untroubled by the authorities 
(StateDept 2012c: 2). 
In Uzbekistan, not only mosques but also Muslim educational institu-
tions and Islamic centres have to register with the Ministry of Justice and 
account for 2,048 of the total 2,228 religious congregations (ARDA: UZ). 
The prerequisite for registration is a minimum of 100 members, and the law 
“provides strict and burdensome criteria for registration” (StateDept 2012c: 
3). 
I regard the registration process for mosques and religious communities 
as one of the most influential tools of the Central Asian governments to 
control religious practice. The most influential tool, however, are lists of 
banned groups due to their classification as ‘extremist’ or ‘terrorist’. A 
comparison of these lists will be presented in chapter 9 together with my 
typology of the Central Asian states’ restrictions on religious groups. 
 
7.5.2. Hajj 
 
The Central Asian states not only supervise Muslim practices on their own 
territory but also regulate pilgrimages to Mecca. The annual pilgrimage to 
the holy sites in Saudi Arabia is an issue which theoretically concerns all 
Muslim believers because the fifth pillar of Islam obliges every Muslim to 
travel to Mecca once in their lifetime if he or she can afford this. 
Pilgrimages are restricted by the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Hajj which 
allocates contingents to every country, so that only a limited number of per-
sons can obtain a visa to the holy places. In 2012, for example, only 5,000 
out of the 8,000 Kyrgyz pilgrims who wanted to go to Mecca could do so 
due to the contingent. In fact, many pilgrims wait several years to be select-
ed (Nazarov 2012) which has led to scandals. In Kyrgyzstan, for example, 
the Muftiate has faced accusations of fraud when organizing the hajj. In or-
der to improve transparency, in 2012 the SAMK revised the rules for par-
ticipation (Nazarov 2012). Since then, it has been requested that the pil-
grims “must owe no debts and perform the five daily prayers”, information 
which is provided to the authorities by inquiring local imams (Nazarov 
2012). Furthermore, fees have to be paid to a bank account (cash is no 
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longer accepted) and SAMK is now solely responsible for organizing the 
hajj free from the involvement of parliamentary and community members 
(Nazarov 2012). The costs for pilgrimage regularly rise. For a Kazakh pil-
grim it increased in one year by USD 300. In 2011 Kazakhs paid USD 
3,700 for the hajj-trip: 
“The amount includes the flight, hotel, transfer (trips to Medina, Kaaba sacred place 
in the Masjid al-Haram mosque and Arafat valley), accommodation in a tent camp, 
food two times a day, purchase of a sacrifice animal, medical insurance, and special 
blue vests distinguishing Kazakhstan from other countries” (Seisenbekova 2011a). 
These pilgrim expenses are very high for common people. In addition, 
women can go to Mecca only if they are accompanied by a man and “there 
are certain sanitary-medical requirements to pilgrims, as well as age limita-
tions” (Seisenbekova 2011a).  
According to CRA restrictions, since 2010 only Tajiks between 18 and 
80 have been allowed to perform hajj (Asia-Plus 2013). The CRA decides 
together with the Council of Ulama who can go to Mecca (Atkin 2009). 
The CRA furthermore collects the “fees for participation in the hajj and 
makes all flight and hotel arrangements in Saudi Arabia” (StateDept 2012c: 
4). Of those Tajiks who apply for hajj usually most can go, although here 
too some cases of corruption have been reported in the selection of candi-
dates (StateDept 2012c: 4). In Uzbekistan it is also the government which 
selects those who can participate in the hajj and provides logistical support 
and, among other things, charter flights (StateDept 2012d: 3). In 2009, hajj 
pilgrims from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were also obliged to 
get a swine flu vaccination.12 
There are many obstacles that can prevent pilgrims from undertaking 
the pilgrimage: in addition to the financial constraints and the Saudi Arabi-
an Ministry of Hajj contingents, Central Asian intelligence services are in-
volved with the selection of pilgrims. With the exception of Kyrgyzstan, 
the intelligence services of all Central Asian countries check the credentials 
of those applying for pilgrimage (TAZ 6.2.2006).  
12  http://www.rferl.org/content/Kazakhs_To_Make_Hajj_While_Turkmen_Will_ 
Stay_Home__/1873451.html (13.9.2014). 
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The Central Asian states’ religious laws affect all religious communities 
and individuals on their territory. I concentrated only on Islam here, but of 
course also other religions are affected by these state policies. The registra-
tion process and regulations concerning religious instruction and religious 
literature particularly affect religious communities. Other statutory provi-
sions affect the freedom to religious practice of individuals (for example re-
strictions on clothing and regulations on where one is allowed to pray). 

 
 
8. Comparison of Law Enforcement 
 
 
 
How do the Central Asian states deal with alleged terrorists and religious 
extremists? Since independence, the Central Asian states have been devel-
oping their own national security and counter-terrorism strategies. They 
have elaborated new national security concepts, adopted laws dealing with 
terrorism and ratified international treaties in this domain. It would require 
a great deal of time and effort to scrutinize all these primary sources in de-
tail. For this reason and also because Marat, Omelicheva and Matveeva 
have written excellent summaries on these issues I mostly rely here on their 
studies. Erica Marat has written about how the Central Asian military forc-
es have evolved from the Red Army (Marat 2010) and has compared the 
Central Asian security sector reforms of recent years for the Geneva Centre 
for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) (Marat 2012) while 
Mariya Omelicheva (2011) has scrutinized the counterterrorism policies of 
the Central Asian states in general and of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in 
more detail. Anna Matveeva has written several studies primarily on the 
developments in the Tajik security sector (Matveeva 2005). 
Furthermore, I rely on the Military Balance (2012) country profiles for 
data about military and paramilitary forces. General data and primary re-
sources on security issues are even more difficult to obtain than information 
about religious regulations in Central Asia. This is not surprising, given the 
states’ high level of authoritarianism. The most difficult deal in this regard 
is Uzbekistan. There is especially little information about the Uzbek secret 
police and its internal forces. Some more data is obtainable about the coun-
try’s military – probably due to the higher degree of international coopera-
tion in this section. 
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In my view, it is clear that the purpose of security forces should be to pro-
tect citizens from violence – in our case terrorism – and to bring perpetra-
tors to justice. However, this has to be done in accordance with the rule of 
law. This means that a balance has to be struck between the benefit for the 
community as a whole and the protection of the human rights of those indi-
viduals suspected of terrorism. Important issues in this context are arbitrary 
arrest, unfair trials, torture by security forces and extrajudicial killings. Re-
cently, a great deal of scientific research has been conducted in this area, 
and the international community has already tackled the issue on many oc-
casions. However, let us not go into the details of the legal debate. Under 
the pressure of the international community and in order to fulfil their own 
responsibilities as signees of United Nations convention against torture, the 
Central Asian governments have at least taken some measures to prevent 
the use of torture by their security forces. Furthermore, some progress has 
been made in improving the situation of detainees in prisons and pre-trial 
facilities. In spite of these efforts, torture and other ill-treatment are still 
widespread or even systemic in the Central Asian countries and individuals 
suspected of being religious extremists are particularly at risk.  
In this chapter I will only briefly introduce the counter-terrorism strate-
gies and laws on combating terrorism. I then give an overview of the differ-
ent security forces dealing with terrorism, and mention their resources and 
their involvement in international cooperation. Afterwards I will turn to the 
judiciary, where I look at the general system, the application of penalties, 
the occurrence of torture and the conditions of imprisonment. Only on this 
basis will it be possible to judge to what extent the practical repression of 
religious groups as a precondition for (further) radicalization of individual 
members takes place in the different countries.  
8.1. SECURITY STRATEGIES AND
COUNTER-TERRORISM LAWS 
In the 2011 military doctrine of Kazakhstan, the countering of modern mili-
tary security threats (such as terrorism and religious extremism) is defined 
not only as the responsibility of the military but also of other forces and 
military formations  (Marat 2012: 13). As we will see, the main responsibil-
ity for fighting terrorism in Kazakhstan falls on the shoulders of the Na-
COMPARISON OF LAW ENFORCEMENT | 211 
tional Security Committee while the most important legal sources for deal-
ing with terrorism are the Law on Combating Terrorism and the Criminal 
Code (Chapter 9, Article 233 on “Crimes Against Public Safety and Public 
Order”) of Kazakhstan. In January 2013 Nursultan Nazarbayev signed a 
new law “On amendments and additions to some legislative acts of the Re-
public of Kazakhstan on counter-terrorism”.1 The law “represents clear ef-
forts to modernize the country’s approach to defining and combating terror-
ism” and is built on the SCO Convention on Terrorism (2009) and a “model 
law discussed by the inter-parliamentary assembly of the CIS” in 2009 
(McDermott 2013). The law ensures the protection of human rights in the 
fight against terrorism and combines the latter with confidence-building in 
civil society. However, the problem remains that 
 
“[…] the state’s counter-terrorism capability remains in the hands of an unreformed 
National Security Committee (KNB) and security structures that have struggled to 
respond adequately to the explosion of domestic political violence since 2011” 
(McDermott 2013). 
 
As we will see, there are significant discrepancies between the counter-
terrorism laws and their implementation in all four countries. One general 
problem of the legislation is that it does not define the differences “between 
terrorist or violent extremist groups and criminal groups” (USDOS 2012). 
Kazakhstan recently pursues a very broad anti-terrorist strategy:  
 
“As part of the government’s plan to conduct a large-scale campaign to counter radi-
calization in society, new legislation requires all media outlets in Kazakhstan to as-
sist state bodies in counterterrorism efforts; one consequence of this legislation is 
that several legitimate opposition media outlets were declared ‘extremist’ by Ka-
zakhstani courts and ordered to stop operations” (USDOS 2012). 
 
Another far-reaching legal means is the new “State Programme to Counter 
Religious Extremism and Terrorism”. For this five-year program from 2013 
to 2017 the Kazakh government allocated $1.3 billion. The program not on-
ly bolsters “existing policies, such as restrictions on religious literature and 
close monitoring of religious groups and missionary activity”, but also in-
                                                   
1  http://en.trend.az/regions/casia/kazakhstan/2105362.html (13.9.2014). 
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troduces new means, “including installing video surveillance in places of 
worship and monitoring students studying theology abroad” (Lillis 2013). 
Additionally to the laws and programs focusing on surveillance of religious 
groups and persecution of alleged extremists and terrorists, the country also 
takes preventive means. A new law, signed in January 2013 by the Presi-
dent, should introduce “co-operation with religious authorities, anti-
terrorism education in schools and public information campaigns”. Fur-
thermore, measures are being taken in order to “minimize collateral damage 
and casualties from counter-terrorism operations” (Central Asia Online 
2013). 
In addition, the state launched a website (www.counter-terror.kz/ru) 
which reports on terrorism worldwide, in order to improve contact with civ-
il society. The website is supposed to help citizens to gain access to and re-
port to the security services. Another preventive measure, taken in 2013, 
was the establishment of an “Institute for the Study of Terrorism and Reli-
gious Extremism”, which is supposed to “bring together sociologists, psy-
chologists and other scholars to study trends in society and to study the in-
fluence that films, video games, unemployment, public discontent and lack 
of youth programmes have on sowing the seeds of extremism” (Isakova 
2013). With these far-reaching measures, Kazakhstan is taking a leading 
role in the region. 
The Kyrgyz legal framework for combating terrorism mainly consists 
of the Law ‘On Combating Terrorism’ (2006), of the Penal Code and of the 
Criminal Procedure Code of the Kyrgyz Republic. As is the case in Ka-
zakhstan, in Kyrgyzstan the main counterterrorism bodies are the internal 
intelligence service and the police under the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
(MVD) (USDOS KG 2012). As we shall see in the next section, the Central 
Asian governments cooperate with western states in the military domain. In 
collaboration with OSCE the Central Asian countries are trying to establish 
better relations between civil society and security forces as well as govern-
ment institutions in general. In this regard, Kyrgyzstan has taken the lead 
by establishing special Public Advisory Councils (PACs) which oversee all 
Ministerial activities. Amongst others, the new National Security Concept 
from 2012 was elaborated by “government representatives with military 
and civilian backgrounds along with elected representatives and members 
of the Public Advisory Council (PAC)” (Axyonova et al. 2013: 9). The in-
volvement of PACs should ensure better civilian oversight of security is-
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sues, which is reinforced by the parliamentary system adopted by Kyrgyz-
stan with the new constitution in 2010. However, Axyonova et al. come to 
the conclusion that, “the decentralisation of political power has only served 
to slow the pace of SSR [Security Sector Reform]” (Axyonova et al. 2013: 
9). Additionally to this, “Kyrgyzstan’s modest SSR attempts were stalled 
due to two violent regime changes in the past six years” (Axyonova et al. 
2013: 8). With regards to combating terrorism and respect for human rights 
in the security sector I have to mention that nonetheless, already in 2009 the 
Kyrgyz National Security Concept had noted “that respecting human rights 
and democratic principles is an important part of national security” (Marat 
2012: 31).  
Whereas Kazakhstan is the most advanced in the transformation of its 
security sectors according to western standards, “Tajikistan became the last 
Central Asian country to adopt a post-Soviet military doctrine”, doing so 
only in 2005 (Axyonova et al. 2013: 9). This was due in large part to the 
long lasting civil war but the difficult process of integrating UTO-forces in-
to the military might also have played a role. Finally, in 2010, 
 
“Tajikistan’s legislature was updated to grant parliament rights and responsibilities 
to sustain the country’s defence. In reality, however, neither parliament nor the 
broader public has access to the security decision-making process, while the new 
doctrine is mostly symbolic” (Axyonova et al. 2013: 9). 
 
Furthermore, the security reform efforts (also spurred on by western states) 
to a great extent “have focused on strengthening the country’s military and 
law enforcement structures, often to the detriment of transparency and pub-
lic oversight” (Axyonova et al. 2013: 10). Rahmon showed, for example, 
that he can send troops to conflict affected areas without consulting parlia-
ment. As Axyonova et al. have noted, “Rakhmon’s ability to act without 
scrutiny demonstrates how the better-trained and equipped special forces 
are loyal to the president and stand ready to protect his regime” (Axyonova 
et al. 2013: 10). Despite these facts, the US Department of State comes to 
the conclusion that under the Law on Combating Terrorism “there have 
been successful prosecutions of terrorists” (USDOS 2012). It gives cause 
for serious concern, however, that “a corrupt judicial system and misuse of 
counterterrorism statutes to suppress legitimate political opposition ham-
pered the effectiveness of the government’s counterterrorism efforts” 
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(USDOS 2012). In 2012, the Tajik parliament adopted amendments to the 
“Law on the Fight Against Terrorism” that were then signed by the presi-
dent (USDOS 2012). 
Article 8 of the Uzbek law on “Combat of Terrorism” of 2000 states 
that the National Security Service coordinates the other state bodies’ activi-
ties for combating terrorism. Other government bodies involved in fighting 
terrorism are – like in the other countries – internal troops, border guards 
and the military. The country started with a new program to train ‘anti-
terrorism specialists’ in 2013. Just like the other countries, Uzbekistan re-
cently does not focus on repressive means alone, but aims at enhancing 
“prevention and at increasing the skills of terrorism-prevention inspectors” 
(Yeniseyev 2013). 
 
 
8.2. SECURITY FORCES 
 
8.2.1. Secret Police: (G)KNB 
 
In all countries the main coordinating body for countering terrorism is the 
internal intelligence service: the former Soviet Committee for State Securi-
ty (KGB), today called National Security Committee or National Security 
Service, which is in all cases directly subordinate to the president. In Ka-
zakhstan, the National Security Committee (KNB) Chairman is “appointed 
by the President with the consent of the Senate (upper chamber of the Par-
liament)” (Marat 2012: 10). One of the main tasks of the KNB is the “de-
tection, prevention, and suppression of terrorism” (Marat 2012: 10). To aid 
them in this task, the KNB has its own Anti-Terror Centre. Moreover, the 
KNB has its own mobile rapid response unit, ‘Arystan’ Service, which car-
ries out special operations, including dealing with terrorism.2 In fact, KNB 
specifically targets unregistered and banned Islamic groups (AI 2013). 
Countering terrorism is regarded by Kazakh authorities as crucial to secur-
ing national and regional stability. Apart from the KNB secret police, the 
ordinary police of the Interior Ministry, the Syrbar Foreign Intelligence 
Service, the Agency of Religious Affairs (ARA), the Foreign Ministry, the 
Education Ministry, the Culture Ministry, the General Prosecutor’s Office 
                                                   
2  http://en.trend.az/regions/casia/kazakhstan/2109212.html (13.9.2014). 
COMPARISON OF LAW ENFORCEMENT | 215 
and local Akims (administration chiefs) are all involved in implementing 
the new “State Programme to Counter Religious Extremism and Terrorism 
for 2013-2017” (Corley 2013: 2). 
In Kyrgyzstan, the State Security Service was disbanded by the interim 
government of Rosa Otunbaeva and replaced by the State National Security 
Service (GKNB). The reason for this was that under Bakiyev’s presidency, 
“the agency was often used to spy on opposition leaders and civil society 
activists” (Axyonova et al. 2013: 8). Even today in the south of the country, 
“the situation remains bleak with local law enforcement agencies’ continu-
ous surveillance of activists dealing with the post-conflict human rights sit-
uation in the Osh region” (Axyonova et al. 2013: 8). As in the other other 
countries, the Kyrgyz GKNB has far-reaching competences and is legally 
authorized to, 
 
“[…] trace the activity of public associations, religious organisations, businesses, in-
stitutions, as well as the media (regardless of ownership) and individuals suspected 
of planning, organizing, preparing and/or attempting to violently change the consti-
tutional system, criticise state security operations, seize or usurp state authority, cre-
ate illegal armed groups, take part in terrorist activities, incite racial, ethnic or reli-
gious strife and social discord, and damage the dignity of the country” (Marat 2012: 
26). 
 
In order to fulfil these tasks, the GKNB established its own Anti-Terror 
Centre (ATC) in 2011 (Sultanov 2013b). The Kyrgyz Anti-Terror Center 
even has its own website: http://www.atc.kg/ With this effort, the GKNB 
aims to prevent extremist activities by means of information campaigns 
about its activities in addition to repressive means (Marat 2012: 27).  
Generally, information about the security forces of Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan is quite easily available online to the public. By contrast, only 
limited aspects of Tajik and Uzbek legislature are in the public domain. In 
Tajikistan, the Ministry of Security was the successor institution to the 
KGB “but does not enjoy the same standing as its much feared predeces-
sor” […] (Matveeva 2005: 5). According to Axyonova et al. in Tajikistan: 
 
“The Ministry of Security is still considered to be the main intelligence agency. The 
legal basis for its functions has either not been amended since 2002 or the revised 
versions are not publicly available” (Axyonova et al. 2013: 8). 
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This quote shows how difficult it is to obtain correct information about the 
Tajik (and Uzbek) security forces – although Axyonova and Marat belong 
to those international scientists best informed about the issue discussed 
here, they obviously were not aware that the Ministry of Security was re-
named in 2005: Today, the Ministry of Security is called the State Commit-
tee on National Security GKNB (WikiLeaks 2007) in Tajikistan as well. 
Together with the Ministry for Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Defence 
and other state bodies it is responsible for maintaining security. 
Marat provides no further information about the intelligence services of 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Marat 2012: 1), neither was I able to find more 
information by my own research. What can be said, though, is that also 
these countries mainly combat terrorism by means of the State Committee 
for National Security (Tajikistan) and the National Security Service (Uz-
bekistan). As I do not have information to the contrary, I will here act on 
the assumption that these institutions still work in a similar way to those in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, as this is also the case with other institutions. 
 
8.2.2. Internal Troops: MVD 
 
The mission of the Kazakh Ministry of Internal Affairs is to “maintain pub-
lic order and social security, including during emergency situation and un-
der martial law” (Marat 2012: 7). In Kazakhstan, the dispersion of mass 
demonstrations, strikes or meetings are the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs. Furthermore, it is tasked with “preventing terrorism, and 
rescuing hostages. It may perform some of the functions of the Defence 
Ministry during emergencies, and it may assist fire-fighters” (Marat 2012: 
8). 
The Kyrgyz Ministry of the Interior is based on the Georgian model of 
police reform, which aims to convert Soviet-style militsia into street police 
(Marat 2012: 24). In order to realize this goal “[…] the OSCE trains and 
helps the Ministry of Interior to develop a community-based system that 
would meet international standards of policing” (Marat 2012: 4). However, 
the Kyrgyz police is not only “deeply corrupt”, but the whole Ministry is 
“still heavily militarized and is authorized to carry out some functions of 
the Ministry of Defence during emergencies” (Axyonova et al. 2013: 9). 
The Ministry maintains a special rapid response unit (Trend 2011). 
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In 2010, the OSCE office in Dushanbe completed a project “aimed at de-
veloping new, or strengthening current relationships between community 
members, local government officials, and police” (Marat 2012: 35). In the 
framework of these reforms, the former Tajik militsia was renamed ‘po-
lice’. The tasks of the riot police under the supervision of the Ministry of 
Interior are amongst others “to fight terrorism, extremism, drug trafficking 
and other crimes” (TJ MVD). 
 
Table 17: Paramilitary Resources 
 Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
Total 
paramilita-
ry forces  
31,500 9,500 7,500 up to 20,000 
Paramilita-
ry units 
• Govern-
ment Guard 
500 
• Internal 
Security 
Troops 
20,000, 
(Ministry of 
Interior) 
• Presidential 
Guard 
2,000 
• State Bor-
der Protec-
tion Forces 
9,000  
(Ministry of 
Interior) 
• Border 
Guards 
5,0003 
• Interior 
Troops 
3,500 
• National 
Guard 
1,000 
• Interior 
Troops 
3,800 
• National 
Guard 
1,200 
• Emergen-
cies  
Ministry 
2,500 
• Border 
Guards 
• Internal 
Security 
Troops up 
to 19,000 
(Ministry 
of Interior) 
• National  
Guard 
1,000 
(Ministry 
of 
Defence) 
Source: Military Balance (2012) 
                                                   
3  KGZ conscripts and RUS officers. 
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8.2.3. Military 
The military capabilities of the Central Asian states are not great, especially 
those of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Much of the Central Asian states’ mili-
tary equipment comprises leftovers of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, Ka-
zakhstan is building up its own armaments industry as “Nursultan Nazarba-
yev, has decided he wants to build a world-class armaments industry” 
(Kucera 2012). This is in line with his plan both to diversify Kazakhstan’s 
economy and with his multi-vector policy (Kucera 2012). For example, the 
Turkish president, as well as the defence ministers of Iran and China, par-
ticipated in the Kazakh biennial defence exposition KADEX (Kucera 
2010). In spite of these efforts and although Kazakhstan maintains a quite 
well-trained rapid-reaction force, the country’s armed forces do not meet 
western training standards (Military Balance 2012: 255). The Military Bal-
ance annual report concludes that even in Kazakhstan, the army’s Soviet or-
igins are still evident (Military Balance 2012: 255). At any rate, “with a 
growing focus on counter-terrorist operations, the country is making efforts 
to develop its Special Forces” (Military Balance 2012: 255). Moreover, it 
has made “more progress with SSR [Security Sector Reform] than the other 
Central Asian states” (Axyonova et al. 2013: 6). It is not true, though, that 
the Kazakh army is totally contract-based, as Axyonova et al. (2013) sup-
pose. However, in 2013 the country started to recruit on a contract basis 
and plans for 99 percent of the army to consist of contract soldiers by 2016 
(KZ Strategy 2050). The engagement in low-intensity conflicts within the 
state’s territory and the prevention as well as combating of terrorist acts are 
some of the main obligations of the Kazakh military during peacetime (Ma-
rat 2012: 13, 16f). In order to complete these tasks, Kazakh armed forces 
are “deployed in a number of strategic locations, while troops in the strate-
gic western areas are currently being strengthened, according to the doc-
trine” (Marat 2012: 13). 
Kyrgyzstan’s military capabilities are limited, although it tries to “pro-
gress towards improving national capabilities” by international cooperation 
(Military Balance 2012: 262). A lack of resources has led to problems in 
the upkeep of their equipment. For example “a larger number of armed and 
transport helicopters are in the inventory, but maintenance problems proba-
bly mean most of these are not operationally ready” (Military Balance 
2012: 262). The violent regime changes in the last years have stalled Kyr-
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gyzstan’s modest SSR attempts (Axyonova et al. 2013: 8). In addition to 
the conscript-based army, Kyrgyzstan maintains 
 
“[…] several contract-based special forces units destined to protect the president, 
engage in anti-terrorism campaigns and combat drug-trafficking. All special forces 
have undergone some training abroad, including in Russia, Turkey and the U.S.” 
(Axyonova et al. 2013: 8). 
 
The number of such contract-based military personnel is especially im-
portant for assessing the country’s military capacity to counter terrorism as 
conscripts are not useful for being commited for this task. According to the 
current National Security Concept from 2009, the Kyrgyz military bears re-
sponsibility for participating in counter-terrorism efforts and carrying out 
anti-terrorist operations (Marat 2012: 28f). 
With regards to SSR one major problem in Kyrgyzstan is that even now 
there are many security officials who have a Soviet background and oppose 
radical changes to the sector (Axyonova et al. 2013: 8). For the same rea-
son, patronage networks and a high level of corruption prevail. Problems 
include the security forces’ role in drug smuggling and their cover ups for 
organized criminal groups especially in Southern Kyrgyzstan (Axyonova et 
al. 2013: 10). The same problems persist among the Tajik security forces 
(Axyonova et al. 2013: 10). 
Like its northern neighbour, Tajikistan’s armed forces are very weak. 
The Military Balance report describes the military as “token forces” and 
says that “the conscript-based land force is hampered by lack of adequate 
training” (Military Balance 2012: 285). Unlike its northern neighbour, 
though the Tajik military mainly comprises conscripts. Indeed, “only a few 
units of the special forces loyal to the president have an arrangement re-
sembling a contract-based service” (Axyonova et al. 2013: 10). The condi-
tions for conscripts serving in the military are extremely bad as they face 
“hunger, unheated barracks, beatings and regular outbreaks of disease” 
(EurasiaNet 2012a). For these reasons, the Tajik military not only lacks fi-
nancial and infrastructural resources but also manpower. Many young men 
try to evade military service. “Many draftees emigrate, while those that 
have the means enter university because students are exempt until the end 
of their studies” (Rahimova in EurasiaNet 2012a). In order to deal with the 
shortfall of draftees, recruitment officers sometimes “resort to impressment, 
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or the quasi-legal kidnapping of military-age men” (EurasiaNet 2012a). 
This as well as the occurrence of ‘devoshchina’ – first year conscripts har-
assed by second year conscripts – are problems inherited from Soviet times; 
they prevail in the Russian military as well (see for example the regular re-
ports of the NGO ‘Soldiers Mothers of St. Peterburg’). 
By contrast, the Uzbek military does not suffer from a shortage of 
draftees willing to serve. On the contrary, especially military service at of-
ficer’s rank is quite favoured among young men (EurasiaNet 2012b) since 
they receive high salaries: “military officers enjoy salaries roughly four-
times the national average and also receive generous housing subsidies” 
(EurasiaNet 2012b). Uzbekistan is the only country where the military ser-
vice lasts only one year – thereby it avoids the problem of ‘devoshchina’, a 
fact that might further improve the conscripts’ willingness to serve in the 
military. Furthermore, Uzbek conscripts have the possibility to serve for a 
period of only one month. To do so, they have to pay around $600 and sub-
sequently become part of the reserve, and “can be called up until they are 
27 if the situation requires it” (IWPR 2013b). Around seven out of ten con-
scripts choose this option, thereby acquiring: 
 
“[…] advantages that come with serving in the military – a direct route into jobs in 
the police and the tax and customs services. In this authoritarian state, such jobs of-
fer good pay and influence” (IWPR 2013b). 
 
These incentives for Uzbek servicemen are available due to Uzbekistan’s 
high military expenditure. As we see from Table 18, Uzbekistan has (after 
Kazkahstan) the second highest military expenditure per capita. The Mili-
tary Balance report states that compared to the other Central Asian coun-
tries, Uzbekistan’s armed forces are “significantly better equipped than 
those of its immediate neighbours” (Military Balance 2012: 290). Addition-
ally, “the army is attempting to improve its mobility in order to manage in-
ternal security challenges” (Military Balance 2012: 291).  
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Table 18: Military Resources 
 Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
Total  
paramilitary 
forces 
(Military 
Balance 2012) 
49,000 10,900 8,800 67,000 
Terms of 
service 
conscription 
(Military  
Balance 2012) 
24 months 18 months 24 months 12 months 
Military 
expenditures 
per capita in 
US $4 
155  67 35 126 
 
It is not surprising that the two most populous Central Asian countries, 
which are at the same time those with the best economic situation and the 
highest GDP, are those with the highest military capacities. Kazakhstan’s 
and Uzbekistan’s military forces are more numerous and better equipped 
than those of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 
 
 
8.3. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE  
SECURITY SECTOR 
 
International cooperation in the military domain is important to all Central 
Asian countries. Russia has been one of the region’s main partners since 
independence. Other partners include members of the Russian-led Collec-
                                                   
4  Calculated from military expenditures in % of GDP and GDP (CIA World Fact-
book 2010). 
222 | SECURITIZATION OF ISLAM IN CENTRAL ASIA
tive Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The CSTO is a collective secu-
rity organization, which means that if the territorial integrity or sovereignty 
of one of its member states is threatened, the collective will take action. 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were founding partners of the or-
ganization in 1991, together with Russia, Belarus and Armenia (CSTO). 
Uzbekistan has an ambivalent relationship to the collective treaty organiza-
tion, athough it is a member of it. For example, in 2012 Uzbekistan tried to 
withdraw from its membership but was not able to do so due to CSTO gui-
gelines (Litovkin 2012). 
At a CSTO summit in 2009, the organization “set up a collective rapid 
reaction force to protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the 
CSTO member states, and to provide security and respond to crisis situa-
tions […]” (RT 2009). Due to the developments in Afghanistan between 
1996 and 1998, “the potential of the Treaty was applied to prevent extrem-
ists’ attempts to destabilize the situation in the region” (CSTO).  
Whereas the CSTO integrated non-traditional threats into its security 
objective, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), another regional 
security organization, has been dealing with internal security threats since 
its inception: It was founded by the Central Asian states together with Rus-
sia and China in the late 1990s. The SCO’s main purpose is to fight the 
“three evils” of terrorism, extremism and separatism, and “is best character-
ized as a regional organization concerned with non-traditional security” 
(Aris 2009). Since 2004, years before the CSTO started to do so, it has 
maintained a Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS), located in Tash-
kent. RATS holds counterterrorism trainings and organizes conferences and 
seminars about terrorism.5 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan became members of the 
NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1994, while Tajikistan joined in 2002 
(NATO PfP).6 Since 9/11, western powers have become increasingly inter-
ested in the region. Indeed, what Matveeva says of Tajikistan is true for the 
whole region: 
“The War on Terror brought new players into security field in a country, previously 
viewed as a Russia’s domain. Since 2001 the US and its allies in the Coalition of the 
5  See the RATS’ website: http://ecrats.org/en/ (13.9.2014). 
6  http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_82584.htm (13.9.2014). 
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Willing paid increased attention to security issues in the states bordering Afghani-
stan […]” (Matveeva 2005: 16). 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in particular have become indis-
pensable partners in the ISAF’s war in Afghanistan. Counter-terrorism is a 
key area of NATO’s cooperation with these countries. Furthermore, this 
cooperation includes support for “political, military and security-sector re-
forms” (NATO) with additional assistance for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in 
the domains of “border security, crisis management, and civil emergency 
planning” (NATO). After presenting the different security treaty organiza-
tions in the region, I will now turn to the single countries’ relationship with 
them. 
Kazakhstan emphasizes in its 2011 military doctrine that its “chief pri-
ority is to strengthen collective and national security through international 
joint peacekeeping activities” (Marat 2012: 18). Moreover, Kazakhstan 
“aspires to be a key regional leader in counterterrorism cooperation” 
(USDOS KZ 2012). In 2012, for example, it undertook the following activi-
ties (USDOS KZ 2012): 
 
• Meeting of regional representatives in Almaty to discuss a joint plan of 
action for the implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy in Central Asia 
• Meeting of expert consultants from the Shanghai Cooperation Organi-
zation in Almaty to discuss upcoming joint activities 
• Execution of joint counterterrorism drills by Kazakh security forces 
with counterparts from Russia and Ukraine. 
 
As we will see, apart from the military cooperation with collective security 
organizations, the Central Asian states host foreign military forces on their 
territory and/ or cooperate bilaterally with other countries, accepting for-
eign troops on their territory. Additionally to this, bilateral exercises take 
place as we can see in the example of the US and Kazakhstan: 
 
“The United States and Kazakhstan affirm their continued collaboration in support 
of stability in the region, including through our joint efforts on counterterrorism. Our 
commitment to security cooperation is demonstrated by activities such as U.S. sup-
port for Kazakhstan’s peacekeeping brigade and the annual military exercise Steppe 
Eagle” (USDOS 2012). 
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Furthermore, the US cooperate with Kazakh police forces in the domain of 
training and by providing “logistical support in the form of body armor, 
special helmets, binoculars, masks and other equipment” as the Kazakh 
Ministry of Internal Affairs explains (KZ MIA 2013). The importance of 
international cooperation for the Central Asian states is unlikely to diminish 
in the near future. For example, the Kazakh military doctrine of 2007 advo-
cates “intensified cooperation with the Russia-led Collective Security Trea-
ty Organization (CSTO) as well as with China, the United States, and 
NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme” (Marat 2012: 12). As 
mandated by the CSTO in 2009, Kazakhstan has already established its 
Collective Rapid Reaction Forces units.  
Kyrgyzstan also avails itself of diverse networks in the security domain. 
The new Kyrgyz National Security Concept of 2009 states that “to fit inter-
national terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism […] the country 
collaborates with the CIS; CSTO, SCO, OSCE, EU, etc.” (Marat 2012: 31). 
For example, the Kyrgyz State Committee for National Security (GKNB) 
Anti-Terrorist Centre (ATC) works together with the OSCE and SCO (Sul-
tanov 2013a). In the framework of these organizations, the country also 
participates in military exercises: 
“Despite their weakness, Kyrgyzstan’s armed forces participate in Shanghai Coop-
eration Organisation exercises, such as the SCO’s counter-terrorism exercises, and 
has hosted SCO exercises within its training areas, indicating the ability to offer 
command and control facilities to disparate military units” (Military Balance 2012: 
262). 
After 9/11, the US expanded its Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATA) 
to Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The US has rented Manas-
airport in Kyrgyzstan since 2001. In 2009, the Kyrgyz parliament decided 
to close the base but later revised this decision (RT 2009a). Today, the air-
port is still important for the transit of troops and supplies to Afghanistan 
(RT 2009a). In fact, Kyrgyzstan is the only country in the world that hosts 
both US and Russian troops. The latter are stationed at Kant airport, near 
Bishkek and in the south of the country (RT 2009b).  
Like the Kyrgyz armed forces, the relatively weak Tajik military is also 
a member of regional security organizations although “there is little capaci-
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ty to deploy other than token forces […] the Tajik military is an active par-
ticipant in CSTO and SCO military exercises” (Military Balance 2012: 
285). Despite the fact that in the event of terrorist threats, the Tajik Military 
would act theoretically as a CSTO-member, “the understanding is that in 
case of a serious attack by ‘international terrorists’ it will be the Russian 
Armed Forces based in Tajikistan who would resist it” (Mateveeva 2005: 
9). To this end the Russian 201st Motor-Rifle Division is based in three dif-
ferent locations (Dushanbe, Qurgon Teppa and Kulob) in Tajikistan and 
“Russia reached a deal to keep troops […] through 2042” (Freedom House 
2013c, Yuldoshev 2013). Tajikistan also plays an especially important role 
in supporting Allied operations in Afghanistan through the hosting of 
French military aircraft at Dushanbe Airport (NATO). Additionally to Rus-
sia and France, India maintains an airbase in Tajikistan (Military Balance 
2012: 285). The US have air-space rights and refuelling privileges at Tajik 
airfields (Beehner 2005).  
Axyonova et al. argue that international military aid to Tajikistan helps 
the president to maintain his rigid control over the country and the West has 
accepted this compromise for fear of spill-over effects from Afghanistan. 
Thus short term stability takes precedence over the need to address corrup-
tion and establish good governance: 
 
“This risks undermining Tajikistan’s political and economic development by further 
strengthening the president’s political control over the security sector at the expense 
of democratic development” (Matveeva 2005). 
 
In addition to military assistance, in the domain of intelligence, “according 
to Tajikistan’s Ministry of Justice, the country collaborates with ODIHR, 
the U.S. Helsinki Committee, and the U.S. Embassy on intelligence” (Ma-
rat 2012: 36). Because of its immediate neighbourhood and the mountain-
eous border it shares with Afghanistan, Tajikistan is of great strategic im-
portance for the West. The international community therefore seems to rank 
stability over human rights concerns – a similar situation is observable in 
Uzbekistan. 
Military cooperation between the US and Uzbekistan also originated 
from pragmatic military strategic considerations. From 9/11 until 2005 the 
US spent $150 million in annual aid packages to Uzbekistan (Beehner 
2005). However, the cooperation of Uzbekistan with the US in specific and 
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with NATO in general has experienced even more ups and downs than the 
renting of Manas-airport by the US. For example, because of the events in 
Andijan, the cooperation between NATO and Uzbekistan was interrupted 
between 2005 to 2010, but was reaffirmed afterwards (NATO). Similarly, 
in 2005 US forces were recalled from the Karshi and Khanabad (K2) air-
base, which they had used for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. 
The reasons for the withdrawal might have been due to US criticism of the 
Uzbek government’s behaviour in Andijan combined with the US airlifting 
of Uzbek refugees in the course of this event as well as the newly demand-
ed loans for the airport which were initially provided for free by Uzbeki-
stan. However, the vitally important geographical location of the country 
for the war in Afghanistan provided a strong incentive to overcome all 
these problems: 
 
“Uzbekistan has largely repaired relations with the EU and United States in recent 
years, in part by agreeing to the overland transportation of NATO supplies to, and 
increasingly from, Afghanistan. The rapprochement continued in 2012, as the United 
States again approved waivers for Uzbekistan on some human rights–related sanc-
tions, and high-level visits between U.S., European, and Uzbek officials increased. 
Nevertheless, Tashkent continued to resist public diplomacy efforts and educational 
exchanges, and to carefully restrict Uzbeks’ access to the outside world” (Freedom 
House 2013d). 
 
In addition, Germany has now put itself on good terms with the authoritari-
an regime and still uses the airfield at Termez in Uzbekistan. “According to 
some German reports, the country has paid an average of 11 million euros 
since 2002 for basing privileges” (Nichol 2013b: 22). Despite its often 
changing foreign policies, Uzbekistan also participates in the joint exercises 
of SCO and CSTO (Military Balance 2012: 291). Despite the fact that Uz-
bekistan’s international security politics are changing on a regular basis, the 
country is still an ally of the West as well as of Russia and China because 
of its rather good military and transports infrastructures (especially im-
portant for the withdrawl of US-forces from Afghanistan in 2014) and its 
strategic location. 
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8.4. COMPARISON OF THE JUDICIARY:  
TRIALS AND TORTURE 
 
The enforcement of religious laws has a lot to do with the general practice 
of the security forces and their lack of respect for human rights. Detainees 
suspected of belonging to a banned religious or extremist group are espe-
cially prone to maltreatment when arrested and during interrogation pro-
cesses. For example in Kazakhstan, “the process of reregistration was used 
to cull around one-third of the country’s religious organizations, exposing 
unregistered believers to arrest and prosecution” (Freedom House 2013a). 
Similarly, the Tajik state treats “unregistered religious activity as a criminal 
offense” (Freedom House 2013c). Indeed, the United Nations Committee 
against Torture found that in Tajikistan ”members of banned Islamic groups 
[…] are reportedly held in incommunicado detention and solitary confine-
ment, and [are] subjected to torture and/or ill-treatment by law enforcement 
officials” (AI 2013: 51). Regarding the crueller treatment of members of re-
ligious groups, Amnesty International is especially concerned about the sit-
uation in Uzbekistan, where “thousands of devout Muslims sentenced […] 
after unfair trials for alleged membership of banned Islamist organizations 
are being held in conditions which amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment” (AI 2013: 55). This seems a rather harsh penalty for not register-
ing religious activity and is indistinguishable from religious persecution: 
 
“(The Uzbek government) treats unregistered religious activity as a criminal offense. 
[…] Suspected members of banned Muslim organizations and their relatives have 
been subjected to arrest, interrogation, and torture.” (Freedom House 2013d). 
 
The fact that not only members of banned groups but also their relatives 
have to fear arrest, interrogation and torture means that collective responsi-
bility or even clan custody is aplied. This is a law enforcement strategy that 
terrorizes the population. On top of this, law enforcement authorities also 
“routinely justify the arrest of suspected Islamic extremists or political op-
ponents by planting contraband or filing dubious charges of financial 
wrongdoing” (FH 2013). I show in this chapter that the already theoretical-
ly discriminating religious laws are accompanied by the even crueller prac-
tices of security forces. 
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8.4.1. Judicial System: Independence and Penalties 
 
The judicial systems of the Central Asian states are problematic due to cor-
ruption, subservience to their respective presidents and a lack of independ-
ence. Freedom House summarizes the situations in the different countries 
as follows: 
 
• Kazakhstan: “The constitution makes the judiciary subservient to the 
executive branch. Judges are subject to political bias, and corruption is 
evident throughout the judicial system” (Freedom House 2013a). 
• Kyrgyzstan: “[…] serious flaws remained in the treatment of national 
minorities, due process, prevention of and accountability for torture, 
and judicial independence” (Freedom House 2012b) 
• Tajikistan: “The judiciary lacks independence. Many judges are poorly 
trained and inexperienced, and bribery is reportedly widespread” (Free-
dom House 2013c). 
• Uzbekistan: “The judiciary is subservient to the president, who appoints 
all judges and can remove them at any time. The creation in 2008 of a 
Lawyers’ Chamber with compulsory membership increased state con-
trol over the legal profession” (FH 2013d).  
 
Convicted members of banned and extremist groups face trials which differ 
according to the extent to which the judiciary depends on the government 
and president. In this regard, Uzbekistan seems to fare the worst: according 
to the constitution, the Uzbek president is authorized to approve and dis-
miss judges as well as to declare state emergencies (Berklery Center d). 
“Since independence, Karimov has used his authority over the judicial sys-
tem to persecute political dissenters in the name of ‘state emergencies’” 
(Berkley Center e). I already introduced in section 7.2 how Karimov misus-
es his constitutional power to crack down on his opponents.  
Apart from such abuses of power, it is insightful to look at the legal 
sentences for detained terrorists. Today, Kazakhstan is the last of the four 
countries in my study where the death penalty is still reserved for crimes 
“committed in exceptional circumstances” or under military law. This 
means that “Terrorism with loss of life is the only Article in the Criminal 
Code which provides for the death penalty in peacetime” (AI 2013: 47). In 
Tajikistan the death penalty theoretically still exists for all crimes, but the 
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country’s last execution took place in 2004 and therefore is classified by 
Amnesty International as “abolitionist in practice”. Until recently, around 
100 persons were executed every year in Uzbekistan, but the country aban-
doned the death penalty in 2008 for all crimes. The last execution in Uzbek-
istan is reported by Amnesty International to have taken place in 2005. In 
Kyrgyzstan, the death penalty has also been abolished for all crimes. 
In addition to state executions, suspected terrorists are often killed in 
extrajudicial killings in Kazakhstan. Kazakh parliamentarians criticized 
“law enforcement bodies for their tendency to kill all suspected terrorists in 
shootouts, rather than capture them alive for questioning” (USDOS 2012). 
This might also be the case in the other countries. In Tajikistan for exam-
ple, such incidents are reported, as well. However, so far I have not found 
enough reliable data regarding this issue to make a country comparison. 
 
8.4.2. Torture, Ill-Treatment and Conditions of Imprisonment 
 
The Political Terror Scale is an aggregated index that measures the “levels 
of political violence and terror” that a country experiences in a particular 
year based on a 5-level “terror scale originally developed by Freedom 
House” (PTS). It points to the range of state violence and to the dimension 
of the population that is affected by abuses of physical integrity rights. The 
index is based on Amnesty International and US State Department annual 
reports. In 2012, all Central Asian Countries were assigned ‘level 3’, which 
means,  
 
“There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. 
Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited de-
tention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted” (PTS). 
 
To be rated as level 3, torture and beatings must be more than exceptional 
and political murder more than rare (rare = level 2). However, with such a 
rating, murders, disappearances and torture have not yet become a common 
part of life (common part of life = level 4). As the index is very much de-
pendent on annual reports and therefore on current events, the measure 
mostly reflects violent incidents. For example, the index shows the very 
bad rating of 4 for Uzbekistan in the year of the Andijan events (2005) and 
for Kyrgyzstan in 2010 in the year of governmental overthrow. Because I 
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am more interested in the general situation in the countries and the latent 
prevalence of state violence rather than in current political incidents, I pre-
sent the average numbers of the index in Table 20. 
 
Table 19: Political Terror Scale 
 Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
Political Terror Scale (PTS) (1 – 5, lower means fewer human rights abuses) 
Average  
PTS values 
1993-2012 
2.40 2.38 2.75 2.83 
 
Comparing the average values of the Central Asian states, we see that in 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan political violence by state bodies is least 
spread, whereas it is more common in Tajikistan and especially in Uzbeki-
stan. In order to illustrate what ‘state violence’ means more concretely, I 
will now go into some details. 
The protest of oil-workers in Zhanaozen (see section 6.2.1) illustrates 
how law is enforced in Kazakhstan: “at least 15 people were killed and 
more than 100 seriously injured” (AI 2013: 48). Lethal force even was 
commanded: 
 
“Kazakhstan’s Interior Minister […] has admitted that during the riots police forces 
were ordered to shoot and kill the protesters and said that any further riots organised 
by armed protesters will be countered with similar means” (see Marat 2012: 3). 
 
In the wake of the Zhanaozen protest, the torture of detainees held incom-
municado in police custody was reported, however, independent monitors 
had no access to the detainees and therefore could not verify these allega-
tions (AI 2013: 48). “At least one man was alleged to have died as a result 
of the torture he was subjected to in police custody” (AI 2013: 48). Bad 
conditions of imprisonment lead to prison-riots which erupt on a regular 
basis in Kazakhstan. In the city of Balkash in southern Kazakhstan, even 
“sixteen prisoners died when they blew themselves up after an abortive at-
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tempt to break out of a jail” in 2011 (NewsOK 2011). Such attempts have 
harsh consequences for those involved in the riots: 
 
“Relatives of inmates say those involved in the unrest were subsequently badly beat-
en by prison officials. In August 2010, two inmates were killed after police inter-
vened at another prison in Kazakhstan's north to quell a mass brawl” (NewsOK 
2011) 
 
Not only physical violence poses a problems in Central Asian prisons – 
more general conditions in penitentiary institutions are very harsh in all 
four countries, as well. Whereas physical conditions such as poor food sup-
ply and the overcrowding of cells seem to be more severe in Uzbekistan 
and Tajikistan, denial of contacts with the outside world and a whole sys-
tem geared more towards punishment than reintegration into the society is a 
problem in all four countries (see UN reports on torture).  
In order to gain a better understanding of the Kyrgyz judicial system it 
is informative to look at the aftermath of the Osh 2010 events. “Since mid-
2011, lawyers defending ethnic Uzbeks accused of participation in the June 
2010 events have been threatened and physically attacked, even in the 
courtroom” (AI, 2013: 49). Torture of detainees is routine: “while people 
are being apprehended in the street, or on their way to detention centres, 
while their houses are searched, during interrogation, and in pre-charge de-
tention facilities” (AI 2013: 49). Ethnic Uzbeks from the south are particu-
larly prone to torture and ill-treatment by police officers working for the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs (AI 2013: 49). Theoretically, Kyrgyzstan has 
adopted a policy of zero tolerance towards torture, which “is intended to 
serve as model to end impunity for torture in the region as well” (Moreno 
2012). However, a significant gap persists between the theoretical frame-
work and the implementation of the new strategy. 
Similarly, Tajikistan introduced “a new article in the criminal code 
criminalizing torture” in 2012 (AI 2013: 51). However, also here, torture 
and ill-treatment still often take place “during the first hours of interroga-
tion in police custody as well as in temporary and pre-trial detention facili-
ties run by the State Committee of National Security [SCNS] and the De-
partment for the Fight against Organized Crime” (AI 2013: 51). Especially 
members of the IRPT are confronted with violence: in 2013, the deputy 
head of the party was heavily beaten by unknown men on the street and in 
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2014 a member of party died in police custody in Isfara under unclear cir-
cumstances (Asia Plus 2014). 
According to the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, in Uzbekistan, tor-
ture is systematically used. For this reason, the European Court of Human 
Rights has prohibited the return of individuals to Uzbekistan, “especially 
those accused of membership of Islamist parties or groups that are banned 
in the country, on the basis that they would be at risk of torture and other 
ill-treatment if returned” (AI 2013: 55). 
9. Typology of Religious and Counter-
Terrorism Politics
9.1. TYPOLOGY OF STATE REGULATION OF 
FOLK ISLAM 
Keeping the dire (and since independence even deteriorating) social-
economic situation in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in mind, it is not surpris-
ing that in these two countries the percentage of those who regard attacks 
against civilians in the defence of Islam as justified is highest (see sections 
1.2 and 6.2.5 as well as Figure 7 for explanation). 
Despite this, the PEW data on Uzbekistan should be interpreted careful-
ly. Taking the whole political and religious context into consideration, it 
seems logical to conclude that the low percentage of Muslims who say that 
violence against civilians in order to defend Islam can be justified is a re-
flection of the reluctance of respondents to give a positive answer to this 
question, which is most likely a result of the strong state surveillance and 
repression of Muslims. People here even fear to practice the officially ac-
cepted Islam. Although Uzbekistan used to be a beacon of Islam in Central 
Asia nowadays Uzbeks rarely visit mosques or read namaz. I can only as-
sume that this country, which was traditionally regarded as the most devout 
of the Central Asian nations, has such a low number of everyday practising 
Muslims and such a large discrepancy between every day praying Muslims 
and mosque attendance because of the restrictive religious policies (see Fi-
gure 11). 
234 | SECURITIZATION OF ISLAM IN CENTRAL ASIA
Figure 11: Frequency of Prayers and Visitation of Religious Services 
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My assumption that a discrepancy between every day praying Muslims and 
mosque attendance is an indicator of tight restrictions on religion in each 
respective country is confirmed by data concerning the perception of reli-
gious freedom in these countries. In Tajikistan and Uzbekistan where the 
discrepancy between praying and mosque attendance is the greatest, up to 
10% of the Muslim population feel either not very free or not at all free to 
practice religion (see Figure 12). 
Figure 12: Perception of Religious Policies by Central Asian Muslims 
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Furthermore, the countries where Muslims feel least free to practice reli-
gion – Tajikistan and Uzbekistan – are those with the highest percentage of 
Muslims (both around 90% as was shown in Table 5). They were also the 
first two to introduce restrictive religious policies and the countries which 
went furthest in their attempts to control traditional Islam: Uzbekistan exer-
cises total control over all religious activities while Tajikistan has ascribed 
a ‘special’ status to Hanafi madhab. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are also 
those two countries which officially prohibited the wearing of hijab at 
schools (there are reports of such restrictions in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
as well but only from school administrations which do not constitute legal 
prohibitions on a national level). In order to protect their countries from ter-
rorism Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have even introduced travel restrictions. 
Indeed, Uzbekistan is “the only former Soviet administration to still require 
exit visas for its citizens to leave the country” (Blua 2013) while in the case 
of Tajikistan hundreds of students were recalled from abroad as I showed in 
7.3.2. Kazakhstan has closed the gap on these two countries on the legal 
level just recently with its new “State Programme to Counter Religious Ex-
tremism and Terrorism for 2013-2017”. So far, however, around two thirds 
of both Kazakh and Kyrgyz Muslims still feel free to practice religion. 
Nevertheless, Figure 12 not only has something to say about the religious 
policies Central Asian states but also about the acceptance of religious poli-
cies in the population. As Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are still presumed to 
be the least religious Central Asian countries, it is no surprise that govern-
mental restrictions on religion there are a cause for concern for fewer peo-
ple.  
To sum up, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan’s legislation is most restrictive 
with regards to religious issues. But despite these differences among the 
Central Asian countries, it is worth remarking that all of them interfere with 
traditional Islam to a great extent as it is the only interpretation of Islam 
that is officially sanctioned. The Uzbek Muftiate, for example, oversees 
important holy sites which exclude non-official muftis and shayks. Fur-
thermore the Uzbek security forces arrested the regional leader of the 
Naqshbandiyah tariqa in 1999 under the accusation of Wahhabism – after a 
two-year sentence he received amnesty and immigrated to Kazakhstan (in-
terview with Ponomarev). In Kazakhstan, however, new Sufi orders are 
unwelcome and incidents of detained Sufis have been reported as well, 
even though the country has appropriated historical Sufi figures such as 
236 | SECURITIZATION OF ISLAM IN CENTRAL ASIA
Ahmad Yasawi for its own ends. In regard of folk Islam, all Central Asian 
states prohibit private religious classes. Such instruction, which can even be 
considered the traditional method of religious education in the region, has 
been criminalized throughout Central Asia due to the impossibility of con-
trolling its content.  
I therefore conclude that state restrictions on Islam not only pertain to 
non-traditional but also to traditional Islam. Private religious classes, for 
example, are a typical Central Asian form of religious education and prac-
tice and are held by many of the traditional and non-traditional groups, but 
they are prohibited in all Central Asian states. 
Finally, the Central Asian governments can also be identified as actors 
contributing to the revival of Islam as they use the term traditional Islam in 
order to build a national ideology and maintain tight control over religion. 
9.2. TYPOLOGY OF STATE REGULATION OF 
NON-TRADITIONAL GROUPS 
I now give a final overview of the ‘non-traditional’ groups that have been 
banned in the Central Asian countries and how security forces and judiciary 
deal with members of these groups. In Table 20, a cross indicates that a 
group has been banned by a country while a tick indicates that the group is 
legal and has even established itself in state institutions to some extent 
(Tablighi Jama’at in the Kyrgyz Muftiate and the Islamic Revival Party in 
the Tajik parliament). 
Table 20: Legal Status of Non-Traditional Islamic Groups in Central Asia 
( = legal; x = illegal) 
Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
Modernists: FG    x 
Fundamentalists: TJ x  x x 
Islamists: IRP x x  x 
Islamists: HT x x x x 
Jihadists: IMU x x x x 
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I now summarize the situation in each country and then summarize the le-
gal situation of all groups in the different countries. 
 
Country-Comparison: 
 
• Kazakhstan has become the second most repressive country in terms of 
religious freedom since it banned Tablighi Jama’at in early 2013. (Up 
until this point this apolitical fundamentalist movement had not been 
registered but was tacitly accepted). The only non-traditional group in-
cluded in this study that is so far still legal in Kazakhstan is the Gülen 
movement. There is evidence that Gülen schools are even welcomed by 
Kazakh and Kyrgyz governments and only feared because of pan-
Turkish tendencies in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. 
• Kyrgyzstan is the only country that tolerates apolitical Salafis, whereas 
it outlaws all Islamist groups – whether they are violent or non-violent. 
• Tajikistan’s religious politics are less consistent than those of Kyrgyz-
stan. Among the Islamists, Tajikistan tolerates the former civil-war par-
ty IRPT but has banned the pacifist HT. And despite the partial ac-
ceptance of political Islam, apolitical Salafis such as the Tablighi Ja-
ma’at are persecuted. 
• Uzbekistan was the first Central Asian state to refer to radical Islam as a 
national security threat as early as the 1990s. It still holds a leading po-
sition in the suppression of all Salafi movements. Not only Islamists but 
also all fundamentalist and modernist groups are persecuted: even 
members of Nurcu and Gülen movements have spent many years in 
prison. Nonetheless, Uzbekistan has made some attempts to improve its 
human-rights image among the international community following the 
2005 Andijan events though this did not bring any real changes for reli-
gious Muslims.  
 
Group-Comparison: 
 
• The jihadist Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and its successor 
organizations such as the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) are banned in all 
states. This is not surprising and from a human security point of view 
must be considered as necessary since they are openly hostile towards 
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the contemporary regimes and overtly apply violence against civilians 
in order to reach their goals. 
• Islamist groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) and Islamic Revival Party 
(IRP) face different situations among the Central Asian countries.  
HT today is persecuted throughout Central Asia. However, in Kazakh-
stan and Kyrgyzstan the Islamist party was not banned up until the early 
2000s. In Kyrgyzstan, the group was only banned in 2003 and treated 
quite moderately until the regime change in 2005 (Taji-Farouki 2009: 
423). In Tajikistan and Uzbekistan members of the group are harshly 
persecuted and arrested even for the possession of leaflets: Rotar esti-
mates that in 2004 150 members were detained in Tajikistan and 5,000 
in Uzbekistan (Rotar 2004b; see also Khalid 2007: 161).   
The Islamic Revival Party (IRP) is banned in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Uzbekistan. Although the IRPT is legal in Tajikistan it is subject to 
severe state control. The parliamentary party has to report the names of 
its members to the government and according to the party it often hap-
pens that state officers and imams who are members of the party subse-
quently lose their jobs (interviews with IRPT members). The persecu-
tion that party members face can be even more severe as examples of 
beaten and even killed party members show.  
• Fundamentalist Tablighi Jama’at was banned in Uzbekistan in 2004, in 
Tajikistan in 2006 and Kazakhstan in 2013. For example, in Tajikistan 
mass arrests of Tablighi members took place in 2009 when 124 people 
were arrested in one single raid on a mosque in Dushanbe: “Although 
most were soon released, four alleged members of Tablighi Jamaat […] 
face trial on charges of inciting religious, national and ethnic hatred” 
(Hamrabaeva 2009). In Uzbekistan and Tajikistan the practice of 
Tablighi Jama’at “is strictly prohibited and persecuted” (Nasritdinov 
2012: 162). In Kazakhstan, the group is still very active and popular de-
spite being illegal and censored (Nasritdinov 2012: 163). Nasritdinov 
estimates that at a meeting in India where he was present around 70% 
of all Tablighis from CIS countries were Kazakhs (Nasritdinov 2012: 
163). Unlike in the other Central Asian countries in Kyrgyzstan, the 
group is even represented in the Muftiate. 
• Modernist movements such as Nurcu and the Fetullah Gülen move-
ments are not prohibited in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 
However, the movement is under close government control in Tajiki-
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stan. Only in Uzbekistan has the movement had to close its schools – as 
early as the 1990s – and only here are members of the movement regu-
larly arrested and convicted. For example, in 2009, three people were 
sentenced to eight years in prison for their membership in the Nur 
movement while an imam of Namangan province was sentenced to 
twelve years (Yadgarova 2009). 
 
To sum up, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are more open to moderate Salafis 
with providing legal status to the Islamic Revival Party (Tajikistan) and 
Tablighi Jama’at (Kyrgyzstan), respectively. These two countries as well as 
Kazakhstan furthermore accept Nurucs and the Fetullah Gülen movement. 
The most restrictive country is Uzbekistan, where none of the here men-
tioned Salafi groups are tolerated 
Not only do the Central Asian countries differ in their views regarding 
which religious groups to ban or tolerate, but their views also differ regard-
ing the extent to which the religious laws should be implemented: this 
seems to be due to the different means that governments have at their dis-
posal for implementing their policies. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are best 
equipped to put their restrictive laws into action which can probably ex-
plain their higher ARDA Religious Persecution Index (see Table 21):1 With 
regards to religious issues, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan show a much lower 
level of persecution (1.0) than Kazakhstan (3.0) while Uzbekistan witnesses 
the highest persecution on religious grounds with an index of 6.0. 
 
Table 21: Religious Persecution Index 
 Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
Religious Persecution Index (ARDA) (0-10, lower means less persecution) 
Value 2013 3.0 1.0 1.0 6.0 
                                                   
1  The Religious Persecution Index is devised by the Association of Religion Data 
Archives (ARDA) and describes persecution on religious grounds more precise-
ly than the general Political Terror Scale. It measures the “average number of 
people physically abused or displaced due to their religion” and is based on re-
cent U.S. State Department’s International Religious Freedom reports (ARDA). 
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In addition to the Religious Persecution Index, the following estimations 
indicate that in Kazakhstan radical Isalm has become a security issue and 
that the country has closed up to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Whereas in 
Uzbekistan still by far the most persons are detained on religious grounds, 
there is a high number of detainees in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, as well, 
and only Kyrgyzstan has a significantly low number of around 50 deten-
tions due to religious affiliation.  
Table 22: Detainees on Religious Grounds 
Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
number of per-
sons detained on 
religious grounds 
300-400 50 300-400 7,000 
Source: Interview with Ponomarev. 
To conclude, I can say that Kazakhstan is the least religious country in Cen-
tral Asia, and religious policies have only just recently become harsher – 
especially with the re-registration process of 2011/2012. By contrast, Kyr-
gyzstan’s religious policies are most open with regards to religious laws 
and the acceptance of religious diversity. As for Tajikistan; its laws are far-
reaching but the country does not seem to be able to fully put them into ac-
tion. After the peace agreement the IRPT was legalized but its real potential 
as an Islamist opposition force has been reduced to absurdity by a very tight 
state control and repression against its members. Uzbekistan has the most 
‘totalitarian’ situation as it is the country with the most restrictive laws and 
at the same time has the necessary resources to exercise a great deal of con-
trol over devout Muslims.
 
 
PART III  
SECURITIZATION:  
THEORY AND SIMULATION MODEL 

 
 
10. Securitization Theory: 
Legitimacy in Security Politics 
 
 
10.1. LEGITIMACY IN SECURITIZATION THEORY 
 
Directly and in the short term repression against terrorist groups can only 
diminish their resources – therefore its counter-intended effect can only 
take place in the long run. Furthermore, the counter-intended effect of re-
pression is only conceivable in connection with the security discourse of 
the terrorist groups’ opponents. In order to understand this counter-intended 
effect I present securitization theory which deals with the question of how 
actors develop legitimacy for the imposition of extraordinary means. With 
my simulation-analysis I am subsequently able to analyze the feedback 
loops of intended and counter-intended effects of state repression. 
 
10.1.1. Legitimacy and Audience in Security Politics 
 
Securitization Theory belongs to the wider branch of Critical Security Stud-
ies which itself is a constructivist approach in the studies of International 
Relations. The theory is built on the assumption that security is not an ob-
jective fact. It explains how security is socially constructed by ‘securitiz-
ing’ issues: 
 
“A security issue is posited (by a securitising actor) as a threat to the survival of 
some referent object (nation, state, the liberal international economic order, the rain 
forests), which is claimed to have a right to survive. Since a question of survival 
necessarily involves a point of no return at which it will be too late to act, it is not 
defensible to leave this issue to normal politics. The securitising actor therefore 
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claims a right to break normal rules, for reasons of security” (Buzan & Waever 
2003: 71). 
 
Securitization theory explains how security actors mobilize their audience 
by leading a security discourse in order to become capable of implementing 
extraordinary means. With the focus on this approach the hitherto cursory 
vicious-circle hypothesis is enriched by a constructivist theory specialized 
in discursive preparation for the implementation of security policies. Secu-
ritization theory explains the deployment of extraordinary means in security 
politics by framing security issues: “The social design of a security problem 
conditions and legitimates the kind of means used to stop it.” (Balzacq 
2011: xiii). The theory can be used to study persuasion, legitimization, and 
social mobilization (Vuori 2011: 186). I use the work of Thierry Balzacq 
(2011) who developed a sociological approach to securitization theory as a 
basis, which is more useful to my research purpose than the initial approach 
of the Copen Hagen School developed by Ole Waever, Barry Buazan and 
Jaap de Wilde.1 In particular, the more clearly defined concept of audience 
(or even several audiences) by Balzacq speaks for this approach because 
audiences are crucial for understanding legitimacy. This approach is fur-
thermore more suitable to my cases since it defines practices and performa-
tives (in addition to speech acts) as securitizing acts.  
The three core assumptions for understanding the discourse which 
makes an issue a security issue and thereby justifies the imposition of vio-
lent means are (Balzacq 2011: 3): 
 
• Centrality of audience 
• Co-dependency of agency and context 
• The dispositif and the structuring force of practices 
 
I will go into further details regarding these concepts in the following sec-
tions. 
 
                                                   
1  The Copenhagen School pays only little attention to clearly defining the role of 
the audience and, for my purpose, treats securitization too exclusively as a 
speech act. 
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10.1.2. One Theory for Analysing Both Conflict Parties 
 
As we have seen, Schlichte states that the need for legitimacy is a precondi-
tion for state as well as for non-state actors to participate in a conflict. Se-
curitization theory allows us to analyze state as well as non-state actors 
with the same theoretical framework. This theory can explain whether a 
group is capable of legitimizing its violent behaviour and to what extent. 
Vuori, for example, analyzes the impact of securitization for the mobiliza-
tion and suppression of social movements. But even though he acknowl-
edges that securitization studies traditionally centre on legitimization from 
the side of the authorities, he also criticizes the fact that protest studies (and 
social movement theories) capitalize on the mobilization of social move-
ments, and he shows that “both literatures often overlook the interaction be-
tween the authorities and protestors: both sides of the struggle may take the 
other’s moves into account” (Vuori 2011: 189). Vuori highlights that the 
theory of securitization provides a single framework that enables us to ex-
plain the behaviour of both (state and non-state) sides involved in a con-
flict. In my view this is very useful for the sake of complexity-reduction 
and for an understanding of the vicious circle. In addition, it helps us to bet-
ter understand the mutual constitution of securitizing actors and audiences. 
It is furthermore interesting to use only one framework for state as well 
as non-state behaviour as it is observable that both sides behave very simi-
larly, namely in an essentialist way: on the one hand, the behaviour of Mus-
lims is solely explained by their religion. Such an essentialist argumenta-
tion leads to the negligence of historical and social factors and sees Islam as 
the only and all explaining essence (Khalid 2007: 5). For these reasons, the 
securitization of Islam has been analyzed in different settings from Europe 
(Cesari 2009) to Pakistan (Sheikh 2009). Moreover, Meyer explains that the 
fundamentalist identity politics of religious groups has the same goal as the 
apparently reactive western identity politics à la Huntington – both of them 
use cultural differences as a means of legitimating their power (Meyer 
2002: 9).2 Therefore, I find it interesting to apply the theory to both sides in 
the conflict. 
                                                   
2  Authors such as Bernard Lewis (2003), Zbigniew Brzezinski (2004) and Samuel 
Huntington (2002) are responsible for creating this new dualist narrative and en-
title their books Crisis of Islam, The Great Chessboard and Clash of Civiliza-
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10.2. VOCABULARY AND UNITS OF ANALYSIS 
 
Securitization theory gives us a theoretical framework for analysing how 
new security issues evolve, how such threats are framed and who is in-
volved in the securitization process. The main elements (of the sociological 
approach according to Balzacq) of securitization theory are introduced in 
the following sections. Following this, securitization theory provides my 
simulation analysis with a specified vocabulary, the units of analysis and 
the assumptions about the mechanism of securitization. 
 
10.2.1. Securitizing Actors 
 
As has already been mentioned, Vuori underpins the possibility of using the 
same theory for both sides in the conflict, for state as well as non-state ac-
tors (Vuori 2011: 189). As a result, both parties assume the role of securit-
izing actors. As with state actors so too can non-state actors declare states 
of exception (Salter 2011: 118). Yet what makes an actor a securitizing ac-
tor? Events can have different meanings to different actors. A securitizing 
actor is one who interprets an event in a securitizing way, which means that 
he declares the existence of a referent object to be endangered by the secu-
ritized issue. By his argument the securitizing actor calls for extraordinary 
means to stop this danger. If a securitizing actor defines something as an 
existential threat to some referent object, this is called a securitizing move 
(see next section). 
In my study, securitization theory explains that extraordinary means 
(here: repressive or radical means) have to be legitimized by every actor 
and this is done by securitizing a referent object, which is claimed to be en-
dangered by a threatening object. This means: 
                                                   
tions. These authors are essentialists as they explain the behaviour of Muslims 
solely by their religion. This new dualism therefore has many critics: „[…] in 
public discourse and also among academics who had not worked on non-western 
regions, state failure, new wars, organized crime, and transnational terrorism 
were meshed together into a legitimizing discourse for a new wave of securitiza-
tion and militarization“ (Schlichte 2009: 9). Analysts blame the aforementioned 
authors for essentialism, because they reduce all conflicts to the differences 
among cultures (Cesari 2009; Khalid 2007: 5; Meyer: 2002; Schlichte 2009). 
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• State actors claim that the secular state is threatened by terrorist Islam-
ists who want to establish sharia – therefore they enforce restrictive re-
ligious policies and ban religious groups. 
• Non-state actors claim that the just Islamic society is threatened by re-
pressive corrupt leaders who constrain religious freedom – and there-
fore they wage jihad against them. 
 
Referring to the protests in Kyrgyzstan in October 2005, Wilkinson ex-
plains how even a single (conflict-)event can be securitized in different 
ways by different actors: 
 
“The protester’s common narrative centred on portraying Kyrgyzstan (the land, ra-
ther than the state) and/or its people as being subjected to an existential threat – from 
corruption, criminalisation, worsening economic conditions – and a demand for im-
mediate action from the government to address the threats. Simultaneously, howev-
er, there was a counter-securitizing narrative being presented by other groups (such 
as the governments of neighboring republics) that portrayed protests themselves as a 
visible sign of Kyrgyzstan’s continued instability and insecurity and therefore as a 
threat to the republic’s existence as a state” (Wilkinson 2011: 104). 
 
In our case the state refers to the nation state as the referent object, non-
state actors on the other hand refer to free religious practice as the referent 
object. Both securitize Islam (securitizing issue) for their means: state ac-
tors say foreign Islamic influences threaten the national security and sover-
eignty of their countries. Non-state actors see the ‘secular’ contemporary 
regimes as threatening the good life of devout Muslims. Both are right from 
their point of view – therefore a security dilemma exists. 
 
10.2.2. Securitizing Moves 
 
The securitization takes place through a securitizing move. A securitizing 
move refers to a referent object, which is the good that a securitizing ac-
tor’s ultimate goal is to protect.3 The original securitization theory intro-
                                                   
3  The referent object can for example be the liberal international economic order, 
the planetary ecosystem, a community or a state (Buzan and Waever 2003: 12). 
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duced by Barry Buzan’s and Ole Waever’s Copenhagen School (CS), fo-
cused on securitizing acts as speech acts. Their main idea was that by defin-
ing something as a security problem the first step had been taken to imple-
ment extraordinary means. Persons with a great deal of influence in society 
can promote securitizing speech acts. The speeches of politicians and others 
who have an influence on security politics as well as publications of institu-
tions and scientists are analyzed in this context (see for example Hagmann 
2009). 
In the understanding of the Copenhagen School a speech act does more 
than describe reality – it is a means of power and realizes a specific action 
(Balzacq 2011: 1). Contrary to this view, Balzacq considers that the power 
of words depends on (2011: 25): 
 
• the context and the power position of the agent that utters them, 
• the relative validity of statements for which the acquiescence of the au-
dience is requested; and  
• the manner in which the securitizing actor makes the case for an issue, 
that is, the discursive strategy displayed. 
 
As a result, the sociological approach on securitization of Balzacq and oth-
ers, “talk about securitization primarily in terms of practices, context, and 
power relations that characterize the construction of threat images” (Bal-
zacq 2011: 1). This is especially important in a non-democratic setting 
where the implied assumption that speech acts are desirable and possible is 
not given because of restrictions on the freedom of expression (Wilkinson 
2007: 12). Therefore, Wilkinson (2007), Vuori (2008: 71) and others (Bal-
zacq 2011, McDonalds 2008: 570, Salter 2011) recommend including writ-
ten sources such as political programs and laws when analysing securitiza-
tion in an authoritarian setting. In my study I refer to religious laws as writ-
ten sources of securitization, and undifferentiated repression of the popula-
tion through restrictions on the practice of religion as securitizing practices 
by state authorities. Non-state actors exercise a securitizing move with 
pamphlets, with their own fatwas, and word-of-mouth propaganda at regu-
lar group-meetings and in prisons. 
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10.2.3. Audience 
 
Securitization does not take place by the securitizing move of the securitiz-
ing actor alone. The securitizing move, conducted by a securitizing actor, is 
always addressed to an audience (or to several audiences).4 The success of a 
securitizing move depends on the support it receives among the audience. 
Whereas CS usually concentrates on successfully securitized cases, there 
are other authors who study the success or failure of securitization moves.5 
Securitization only takes place when the securitizing move is accepted by 
the audience (Léonard & Kaunert 2011: 58). However, in order to be suc-
cessful, “securitization does not require the consent (formal or informal) of 
the entire audience, it only requires the consent of enough of the audience – 
the ‘critical mass’ that O’Reilly (2008) explains as a combination of vol-
ume and quality” (Vultee 2011: 83). Its success is therefore dependent on 
helping a securitizing actor to “rightly perceive the feelings and needs of 
the audience […]”, and enables him to use a, “[…] language that will reso-
nate well with the audience” (Léonard and Kaunert 2011: 61; see also Bal-
zacq 2005: 184). For these reasons, in every empirical study on securitiza-
tion the audience has to be clearly defined.  
The audience might usually constitute the citizens in a democratic state 
or governmental elite – especially in the case of a non-democratic system 
(Vuori 2008: 72). The support given by an audience can be formal (policy-
makers such as parliamentarians) or moral (general public) (Léonard and 
Kaunert 2011: 62). However other audience settings are also possible, such 
                                                   
4  “[…] the idea of the ‘audience’ oversimplifies the fact that there can be multiple 
audiences, with different characteristics” (Léonard & Kaunert 2011: 60). 
5  Salter criticizes the lack of study into the failure of securitization (Salter 2011: 
116). But “we cannot accept a simply binary result of ‘accepted’ or ‘failed’ se-
curitizing moves […]. Rather, there are several steps in the acceptance or failure 
of a securitizing move” (Salter 2011: 119). Along with Salter, the question of 
whether a securitizing move was successful or not can be decided by answering 
these questions: “To what degree is the issue-area discussed as a part of a wider 
political debate? Is the description of the threat as existential accepted or reject-
ed? Is the solution to the threat accepted or rejected? Are new or emergency 
powers accorded to the securitizing agent?” (Salter 2011: 119f). 
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as popular, elite, technocratic and scientific settings (Léonard and Kaunert 
2011: 62). 
In this case I will refer to the whole population of a Central Asian na-
tion state as the audience of the state-actors and to the Muslim population 
of the state as the audience of the Islamist non-state actors. It is rather un-
common to speak of legitimacy in relation to authoritarian regimes and 
non-state groups accused of terrorism. Often it is assumed that only liberal 
democracies need legitimacy to implement extraordinary means because 
they depend on public opinion to a greater extent than authoritarian re-
gimes. I postulate that even authoritarian regimes depend on the popula-
tion's participation with what Vuori refers to as the “ritual of conformity” 
(Vuori 2008: 71). Compared to democracies, where legitimacy is necessary 
to win the next elections, securitization in these states conduces to maintain 
the political order, to exercise control over the population and to renew dis-
cipline (Vuori 2008: 69). It is worth pointing out, though, that securitization 
theory can also be used to analyze the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes 
although it is more often applied to an analysis of western democracies.  
The fact that the intention of terrorism per se is to awe people, as well 
as the fact that the condemnation of foreign groups and alleged terrorists in 
authoritarian regimes often have the appearance of show trials, serves to 
demonstrate that, repressive acts, including acts of terrorism are often not 
only directed at the immediate victims (see definition of terrorism in sec-
tion 1.1.2) of these acts but also at the general public. Waldmann, an expert 
on terrorism mentions the “Reaktionsangewiesenheit” of terrorists: on the 
one hand, terrorists intend to provoke a disproportionate reaction from the 
government they attack in order to trigger a circle of action and repression 
that allows the enemy to be “exposed” (2003: 88). The brutal and dispro-
portionate response of security forces should show Islamist sympathizers 
that the fight against the government is a necessity. On the other hand, the 
fact that acts of terror can be used to justify brutal police violence could ex-
plain why it is so difficult to disprove that acts of terror are not provoked by 
the government itself (for example 1999 bombings in Tashkent; see Naum-
kin). Lastly, non-state violence helps authoritarian states to strengthen their 
power. 
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10.2.4. Preconditions and Context of Securitization 
 
The securitization act takes place in a certain context: securitizing actors 
have a certain ‘dispositive’ to securitize. Furthermore, preconditions such 
as regulatory and capacity tools influence the success of a securitizing 
move (Balzacq 2011: 17ff). Regulatory tools are policy instruments such as 
written programs, laws etc. Capacity tools contain material and non-
material resources such as information, training and so on. In our case, the 
religious ministries, the Muftiate and security forces represent the state’s 
capacities. Non-state actors rely in this regard mainly on their members and 
support by foundations and allies. 
Apart from these preconditions of the security move, the context of the 
securitization is important for its analysis. Two different kinds of context 
are embraced in the analysis of securitization: proximate and distal context. 
Whereas the proximate context outlines the questions of who securitizes 
what and when (Wilkinson 2011: 107f), the distal context describes how 
and why securitization takes place (Wilkinson 2011: 108ff). According to 
Salter, the “proximate context refers to the immediate features of interac-
tion”, to the stage on which and the genre in which a securitizing move is 
made as well as to the audience and its reception of the securitizing move 
(Salter 2008: 328). I have already mentioned the importance of the mutual 
incitement of opponents, which can be included as part of the proximate 
context in the analysis (Vuori 2011: 189). Whereas Wilkinson describes the 
proximate context as the micro-environment, he refers to the distal context 
as the macro-environment of the securitization, where “social class and 
ethnicity, regional and cultural settings, and the sites of discourse” matter 
(2011: 98). The political system in which securitization takes place is also 
part of the distal context. It therefore allows us to take into account the spe-
cial circumstances of authoritarian regimes and socio-demographic precon-
ditions for conflicts. In our case, the distal context for the securitization of 
Islam is represented by the context-legitimacy (good governance and socio-
economic situation) of the Central Asian states as well and by the revival of 
Islam in the region. 
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10.3. SECURITIZATION OF ISLAM IN CENTRAL ASIA 
10.3.1. Units of Analysis in the Central Asian Context 
Securitization theory explains that the securitization of an issue takes place 
when a reference object is presented as threatened in a securitizing move. 
With regards to my research question I suppose that a vicious circle devel-
ops because a securitizing move on one side also results in the securitiza-
tion of the opposing side. This means: violence by one party justifies the 
opposing party’s perpetuation of the violence. The more repressive the state 
is against ordinary devout Muslims the easier it is for Islamists and jihadists 
to present the state as threatening the right to freedom of religion. However, 
the more acts of violence by non-state actors occur the easier it is for the 
government to justify its rigorous policies against all ‘foreign’ Islamic 
groups.  
Table 23: Securitization Theory in the Central Asian Context 
State Actor Non-State Actor 
Reference 
object 
Positive: secure governmental 
power 
Negative: freedom from sharia 
Positive: sharia, Islamic 
society/state 
Negative: freedom from 
corrupt leaders 
Securitizing 
move 
Speech act: restrictive laws, 
fatwas (issued by the Muftiate) 
Practice: repression of the free 
practice of religion 
Speech act: fatwas, other 
publications (leaflets etc),  
rel. instruction 
Practice: jihad 
Dispositive Regulatory tools: institutions 
(ministry, muftiate) 
Capacity tools: security forces, 
alliances 
Regulatory & Capacity tools: 
members 
Audience Citizens Religious ummah 
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The following causal loop diagram displays these conflict assumptions and 
the vicious-circle hypothesis graphically. 
 
10.3.2. Vicious-Circle Hypothesis as a Causal Loop Diagram 
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According to the causal loop diagram above, the following conflict assump-
tions elaborate on the hypothesis of the vicious circle of securitization of Is-
lam in Central Asia:  
 
Table 24: Conflict Assumptions for Vicious Circle Hypothesis 
Vicious-Circle Hypothesis 
Expected correlation of repression and radicalization on the macro 
level by the Vicious-Circle Hypothesis. This correlation is not directly 
analyzed – securitization theory explains how the correlation comes 
about. 
Conflict Assumptions from Securitization Theory 
State Actor 
• Goal: detention of terrorists and prevention of acts of terrorism. 
• Intended effect (securitizing move): the aim of state violence (de-
tention of alleged extremists and terrorists) is to prevent the 
spread of ‘foreign’ Islamic groups in the country. 
Non-State Actor 
• Goal: non-state violence is aimed at the physical or psychological 
weakening of security forces, the terrorization of civilians or ma-
terial damage. 
• Intended effect (securitizing move): to show the strength of the 
movement and probably gain new sympathizers as well as pro-
voke a disproportionate response from the state. 
Counter-Intended Effects (strengthening of reference object) 
State Actor: violations of human rights might aggrieve people. Al-
leged ‘extremist’ and ‘terrorist’ detainees are especially prone to mis-
treatment in prisons – this fact as well as the conditions in the specific 
prison systems can lead to the radicalization of individuals.  
Non-State Actor:6 terrorist attacks alienate the population and con-
vince them  that political Islam is not a humane alternative to the ex-
isting regimes. Furthermore, they strengthen the acceptance of restric-
tive state policies against non-official religious groups. 
                                                   
6  In the computer simulation I am interested in the counter-intended effects of sta-
te violence only. The counter-intended effect of non-state actors is not elabo-
rated on in the computer simulation in order not to make the model too complex. 
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Context-Lecitimacy 
According to theories introduced in section 1.2 diverse factors (sub-
sumed here as context-legitimacy) have had an impact on the revival 
of Islam (in Table 28 the measure of context-legitimacy is explained) 
Minor Influences 
(explained from top to bottom and left to right): 
• Human rights abuses impact state violence 
• State violence is caused by state institutions (security forces and 
religious institutions) 
• These state institutions influence the securitization of non-state 
actors 
• State violence has a direct effect on the jihadists’ capacities 
• Non-state violence has a direct effect on the state’s capacities 
• The revival of Islam has an impact on the strength of jihadists and 
on the extent to which the secular state is securitized 
 
In the next chapter I will translate these theoretical conflict assumptions as 
well as my conclusions from the case studies (see typologies in chapter 4 
and chapter 9) into a simulation model. It will be interesting to find out if 
these very simple conflict assumptions allow us to forecast some important 
conflict features. It is generally accepted that models should be as simple as 
possible and as complex as necessary to have a maximum explanatory 
power. For the moment, therefore, I do not take into account interesting 
factors such as the internal organizational structure of religious groups or 
more elaborate assumptions on the composition of groups’ demographic 
features. Instead, I concentrate on those aspects which are said to play an 
important role according to securitization theory and according to the find-
ings of my case studies. 
 
 

 
 
11. Model Description 
 
 
 
I begin by showing how securitization theory can be translated into a con-
flict model. I then give an overview of our model with the standardized 
ODD-Protocol (Railsback and Grimm 2012: 37ff). This is an important tool 
for agent-based modellers to describe their models and to make them repli-
cable – an important feature of any scientific work. In equation-based simu-
lations, the equation explains exactly what is being simulated. However, as 
the ABM technique is rather a system of procedures than of equations, the 
ODD-Protocol helps us to understand what is being simulated. However, 
the ODD-Protocol is only thoroughly understood by scientists familiar with 
ABM-studies and not very reader-friendly. Therefore, the subsequent sec-
tions describe the step-by-step implementation of the theoretical assump-
tion into the simulation model and provide some brief background infor-
mation on ABM in general. 
 
 
11.1. OVERVIEW AND ODD-PROTOCOL 
 
11.1.1. Different Interpretations of One Event 
 
As was demonstrated in the last chapter, the behaviour of state as well as 
non-state actors can be conceived of as securitization. In fact, they show 
different securitizing moves, but I concentrate here on one of the most im-
portant ones: the government arrests individuals who adhere to an unoffi-
cial interpretation of Islam while sympathizers of such groups either protest 
peacefully against or physically attack the government. I here focus on how 
the detention of Muslims is interpreted differently by governments and in-
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dividuals respectively. I define ‘arbitrary arrest’ in the simulation as fol-
lows: an individual who is not a jihadist and who has not protested is ar-
rested because he is a sympathizer of unofficial Islam. 
As we are concerned with conflict-behaviour it is important to note that 
the securitizing move by governments is assumed to be a centralized strate-
gic decision that is taken according to the ‘global’ situation, and which is 
executed by all security forces acting in the same way: they start to arrest 
sympathizers of unofficial groups arbitrarily if they fear that unofficial Is-
lam has become too widespread. The securitizing behaviour of citizens (or 
non-state actors) on the other hand is based on local information about ar-
rests: there is no strategic group-behaviour by non-state groups led by deci-
sion-makers but rather (because of the assumption that radicalization takes 
place individually rather than on a group level) the agents individually de-
cide to protest against the arbitrary arrests they have observed in their im-
mediate neighbourhood. 
Table 25: Securitization in the Simulation 
Government/ State Actor Citizens/ Non-State Actor 
Reference 
object 
Freedom from terrorist acts Freedom from religiously 
motivated arrests 
Securitizing 
move 
• Outlawing of groups
• Arrests of group members
• Protest against arrests
• Attacks against security
Dispositive • Number of security forces
• Reach of security forces
• For protests: sympathizers
of unofficial Islam 
• For attacks: jihadists
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11.1.2. ODD-Protocol 
 
I rely here on the concept of the ODD-Protocol described in Railsback and 
Grimm (2012). 
 
Table 26: ODD-Protocol 
1. Purpose 
The model represents how a vicious circle of the securitization of Islam by state 
and non-state agents develops. From this I want learn how state repression and Is-
lamic radicalization reinforce each other. In particular, I hope to demonstrate how 
arrests of alleged terrorists can be interpreted in two different ways: on the one 
hand they help to maintain national security and state power but on the other they 
threaten human security and human rights because arbitrary arrests occur and de-
vout sympathizers of unofficial Islamic groups are arrested as alleged ‘terrorists’. 
Goals of the Model: 
It is the goal of this study to find out how the reinforcement of mutual securitiza-
tion works in theory and whether it brings about a vicious circle of conflict. 
Furthermore, I want to ascertain whether the securitization of Islam by Central 
Asian governments explains the radicalization of Islamists in Kazakhstan, Kyr-
gyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 
2. Entities, state variables, and scales 
2. Entities, state variables, and scales 
Entities 
Two types of agents: 
State agents: 
• Security forces 
Non-state agents/ citizens 
• Non-Muslims 
• Adherents of official Islam (ethnic Muslims and traditionalists) 
• Adherents of unofficial Islam (undesirable and banned groups such as Sufis, 
modernists (corresponds to Nurcilar), fundamentalists (corresponds to 
Tablighi Jama’at), Islamists (corresponds to IRPT, HT), jihadists (corresponds 
to IMU and IJU) 
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Behavioural Strategies: 
• Security forces aim to eliminate jihadists by means of justified arrests;
furthermore they want to deter other citizens from becoming sympathizers of
unofficial Islam by arresting them arbitrarily.
• Jihadists: aim to eliminate security forces by attacking them directly; further-
more they try to provoke a disproportionate response from the security forces
by attacking citizens (in order to galvanize their co-citizens)
• Objective of all citizens: Maximum religious freedom (absence of religiously
motivated arrests) and maximum physical security (absence of attacks)
Attributes 
State agents own: 
• Range (of security forces) (estimation; value: radius of 1. 2 grid cells)
• Context-legitimacy (describes the legitimacy a state derives from contextual
factors such as its good governance and socio-economic situation) (based on
empirical data; range: 0 – 10, lower means less legitimacy)
• Political Terror Scale (PTS); describes the extent of human rights abuses by
the state) (based on the empirical data presented in Table 19: 1 – 5, lower
means fewer human rights abuses)
Citizens’ own: 
• Neighbourhood (estimation; value: radius of one grid cell)
• Detention-time: different for detained ‘terrorists’ and for protestors) (estima-
tion; range: 40 – 180 time steps, 40 for detained protestors, 180 for detained
‘terrorists’)
• Arrested (counts how many times an agent was arrested)
• Participated-in-protest (counts how many times an agent participated in a pro-
test)
• Protest-time (describes how long an agent participates in a protest)
• Prison-term (describes how long an agent has been in prison)
• Hit (describes if an agent is hit by a terrorist attack)
• Religiosity (describes how easily the population is proselytized; range:
1/1,000 – 1/100)
Temporal and spacial scale: 
300 time steps (ticks) are simulated. I assume that one tick is one month or 12 
ticks are one year, respectively. (As it is the goal to simulate the time since the in-
dependence of the Central Asian states up until today, this means I simulate 25 
years.) 
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The model is spacially explicit (but not geo-referenced): the agents meet in a sim-
ulated world in order to exchange information and influence each other. Security 
forces have global information and local ability to act and citizens have local in-
formation as well as a local cruising radius. 
3. Process overview and scheduling 
Within each time step, the following processes are run, in the given order, by the 
agents referred to in parentheses. Agents perform their tasks in a randomized or-
der; state variables are updated immediately. 
Processes 
• Move (all agents): all agents move randomly (if they are not arrested or pro-
testing) 
• Proselytize (sympathizers of unofficial Islam): proselytize ethnic Muslims to 
become a sympathizer of their own group (the lower the context-legitimacy of 
the state, the easier it is to proselytize them) 
• Arrest and arrest-protestors (security forces): searches and arrests jihadists and 
protestors as well as arrests sympathizers of unofficial Islam (if their number 
is more than 0.1% of the total population) for prison-term 
• Protest (sympathizers of unofficial Islam): they protest if they witness the de-
tention of an agent of his own group during protest-time 
• Attack (jihadists): jihadists look for opportunities to attack security forces; if 
they are next to a member of the security personnel they have such an oppor-
tunity – all immediate neighbours are hit 
• Radicalize (sympathizers of unofficial Islam): peaceful individuals who are 
arrested arbitrarily as well as protestors who are arrested because they occa-
sionally participated in a protest are radicalized in prison and become jihadists 
when released (the more they are exposed to human rights violations in prison 
the more prone they are to radicalization (one in ten detainees would be radi-
calized if no human rights abuses occurred. The political terror scale is used as 
a multiplying factor for this assumption (the higher PTS, the more probable 
the radicalization: 0.1 – 1.0). 
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4. Design Concepts 
4a) Basic 
principles 
Concepts, Theories and Hypotheses: 
The processes in the model implement findings from our case 
studies and theoretical considerations from securitization theo-
ry. 
• Case studies: the general revival of Islam is illustrated with 
the Proselytize procedure; the Attack procedure describes 
acts of terrorism; the banning of Islamic groups and the 
persecution of their sympathizers is illustrated with the Ar-
rest procedure 
• Securitization theory: the theory explains how Proselytize 
and Arrest procedures justify the behaviour of the opponent 
and thereby fan the flames of the vicious conflict circle 
• CLD (see section 10.3.2) shows the conflict assumptions 
with the corresponding influences and feedback loops (in-
tegration of case studies and securitization theory) 
4b) Emergence Results and Outputs: 
The model is meant to represent the first step in the revival of 
Islam. Following this, the mutual escalation of securitization 
and violence by state and non-state actors should emerge. 
4c) Adaptation The model does not include adaptations. 
4d) Objectives No 
4e) Learning No 
4f) Prediction No 
4g) Sensing Citizens are fully informed  of the attributes of their neigh-
bours. Security forces have global knowledge of all other 
agents. 
4h) Interaction Interaction among neighbour agents (within the radius of one 
grid cell) is direct; they proselytize, attack or arrest each other. 
These assumptions for the simulated interaction refer to real at-
tempts at proselytization by groups who have a social utopian 
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ideology, real attempts to attack security forces, the arrest and 
detainment of members of Islamic groups; efforts by Islamists 
to recruit among inmates in prison; the social power of dis-
missed detainees as martyrs. 
4i) Stochasticity In order not to make the model totally deterministic, one can 
mimic randomness and NetLogo has a built-in procedure for 
such pseudo-randomness.1 The distribution of the agents on the 
grid when setting up the agents during the initialization is 
pseudo-random. The direction of the movement of the agents is 
also pseudo-random (the distance they cover is one grid cell). 
The probability for the radicalization of an agent is randomized 
as well. 
4j) Collectives See agent-types in (2. Entities, state variables, and scales) 
4k) Observation Graphs depict: 
• The development of the numbers of sympathizers of Islam-
ic groups: the ratio of the number of jihadists vs. the num-
ber of adherents of unofficial Islam 
• The number of attacks and the number of arbitrary arrests 
With these graphs I will be able to find out: 
• If an escalation of arbitrary arrests (of peaceful Muslims) 
leads to an increase in attacks (or whether state repression 
leads to the radicalization of Islamists) 
Furthermore, I observe at what point in time the security forces 
start to arbitrarily arrest sympathizers of unofficial Islam 
(which means that they start to securitize their behaviour). 
 
 
 
                                                   
1  „NetLogo uses a pseudorandom number generator to output a sequence of statis-
tically random numbers which is then used to determine the order of agents cal-
led or whenever the appearance of non-determinism is needed.“ See http:// 
serendip.brynmawr.edu/exchange/parallelp (13.9.2014). 
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5. Initialization 
Two initializations for every case: 
The initial situation represents the religious situation of the Central Asian states in 
the early 1990s.  
Same conditions for every case: 
• 5,000 citizens 
Changing conditions depending on case: 
• Context-legitimacy of the government  
• Proportion of ethnic Muslims in population 
• General religiosity of the society  
• Number, range and cruelty (PTS) of security forces 
• Capacities of security forces (human and financial resources) 
Exact data for each case are presented in Appendix D. 
6. Input data 
Empirical input data from the following sources are used in the simulation (see 
section 11.2.2 and Appendix C): 
• Security forces capacities (personnel and military expenditures) (Military Ba-
lance) 
• Political Terror Scale (PTS) 
• Context-legitimacy of government (empirical index, see Table 28) 
• Percentage of ethnic Muslims (empirical data, CIA World Factbook) 
7. Submodels 
See NetLogo Code in Appendix B. 
 
 
11.2. SIMULATION SETUP 
 
I work with NetLogo (Wilensky 2013) here, a simulation program especial-
ly useful for ABMs (it can be used for System Dynamics, as well, though). 
This program is often used by social scientists, which makes this study bet-
ter replicable than if I used a less well-known program. Furthermore, the 
program is well understood because of its many users. 
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11.2.1. Agent Types 
 
I distinguish between the terms ‘agent’ and ‘actor’. When we speak of 
agent-based modelling we understand agents as “self-contained programs 
that can control their own actions based on their perceptions of their operat-
ing environment” (Gilbert & Troitzsch 2005: 172). Whereas an actor is an 
individual or a group in the real world, the term agent refers to the simulat-
ed individual or group in the computer model. As a matter of fact, there is a 
direct correspondence between agents and actors, which makes it easy to 
design the model and understand its outcome (Gilbert 2008: 14). Agents 
can represent single individuals as opposed to organizations and institutions 
or bodies such as nation-states (Gilbert 2009: 5). However, the simulated 
agents are always representations of the real-world actors and conclusions 
derived from the simulation therefore have to be carefully interpreted and 
one-to-one comparisons to the real world should either not be drawn or 
done so with caution.  
In the present study individual people are simulated as agents. They ex-
hibit features which allow them to belong to a group. The groups (security 
forces, official and unofficial Islam) are made up of the individuals sympa-
thizing with them – they support the groups’ goals and implement their tac-
tics. When running the simulation, it is possible to analyze the conflict at 
the macro-level but one can also track the development of the groups sepa-
rately at the meso-level or the behaviour of a single agent at the micro-
level. The main objective of the simulation is to understand how the secu-
ritization framing by groups influences the micro-behaviour and in doing so 
fuels the conflict at the macro-level. 
It is common that agents in ABMs have the following features at their 
disposal (Gilbert 2009: 21f): 
 
• Memory 
• Perception 
• Performance (motion, communication, action) 
• Policy (agent-rules) 
 
In our study the agents remember what they have experienced, for example 
when they were either arrested or participated in a protest: they have a 
memory. The agents have perceptions concerning their environment and 
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what happens around them. This means they behave according to their 
memory, perceptions and also according to their groups’ features. The 
agents move and interact (they proselytize, mobilize for protest, attack or 
arrest each other). The following agent-types are regarded as essential to 
simulate the revival and securitization of Islam in Central Asia. (They are 
called ‘breed’ in NetLogo language.) 
• Non-state actors: Citizens are represented as ‘ethnic Muslims’ or non-
Muslims. All of them are interested in living in a peaceful and free en-
vironment. Those who are devout and belong to a particular group (as
defined in chapter 4: Sufis, modernists, quietist salafis or political
salafis) are grouped together as sympathizers of unofficial Islam (there
is no ‘membership’ and no such ‘group’). They proselytize their co-
citizens and have a special interest in the maintaining the freedom of re-
ligion. The term ‘sympathizers of official Islam’ summarizes individu-
als who are not religious but ‘ethnic Muslims’ and desirable devout
Muslims who follow the official-traditional interpretation of Islam (here
called ‘traditionalists’). Furthermore, there are jihadists who fight
against the government because they want to establish a caliphate with
violent means; whereas the main goal of devout Muslims is to proselyt-
ize and to show their solidarity with detained sympathizers of unofficial
Islam, the main task of jihadists is to attack security forces.
• State actor: The government (state actor) is represented in the simula-
tion by the security forces and their specific capacities. Their task is to
maintain law and order which they can do more successfully if they
have sufficient resources.
11.2.2. Initial Values and Data for Validation 
I base my simulation model on empirical data as well as on estimated initial 
values and parameters and validate the simulation results with additional 
empirical data. I thereby rely on the following data:  
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Table 27: Application of Data for Simulation Model 
 State Violence Non-State Violence 
Empirical input 
data used for 
the simulation 
• Security forces capacities 
(personnel and military 
expenditures) (Military 
Balance) 
• Political Terror Scale 
(PTS) 
• Context-legitimacy of 
government (empirical 
index, see section 11.3.2) 
• Percentage of ethnic  
Muslims (empirical data, 
CIA World Factbook) 
Simulation pa-
rameters de-
termined by the 
author 
• ‘Reach’ of security forces 
(estimation, same for all 
cases) 
• Average arrest-time for 
alleged terrorists and  
protestors (estimation, 
same for all cases) 
• Religiosity of the society 
(estimation based on 
ARDA reports) 
Simulation re-
sults 
• Arbitrary arrests • Number of attacks 
• Number of former 
peaceful protestors who 
become jihadists 
Empirical data 
used for the 
validation of 
the simulation 
results 
• Religious persecution in-
dex (ARDA) 
• Estimation of detainees 
on religious grounds 
(interview with  
Ponomarev, Memorial) 
• Suicide attacks (GTD) 
 
The context-legitimacy-parameter is used for simulating the promptness of 
the revival of Islam in the specific cases. I have developed a context-
legitimacy-parameter which is composed of Gini-Index, HDI, Democracy 
Index, as well as of a ranking concerning freedom of the press (for more in-
formation on these measures see chapter 6). This empirically based parame-
ter is composed of the following rankings and indices which were streched 
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and/or rounded to a scale ranging from 0 to 10, where lower means less le-
gitimacy: 
 
Table 28: Calculation of Context-Legitimacy 
 Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
GINI Family 
income (index) 
7 7 7 6 
HDI (index) 7 6 6 7 
political rights und 
civil liberties (index) 
2 3 1 0 
Freedom of the 
press (ranking) 
1 4 3 1 
Subtotal 17 20 17 14 
Context-legitimacy  4.25 5.00 4.25 3.5 
 
In the next table the initial values (calculated for a total population of 
5,000) for the simulation of the four cases are presented. For an overview 
of all initial values and parameters used for the representation of all cases 
see Appendix C. 
 
Table 29: Initial Values for Simulation 
 Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
Security forces 22.5 17 10 15 
Non-Muslims 1,500 1,250 300 350 
Ethnic-Muslims 3,500 3,750 4,700 4,650 
Religiosity of society 1/1,000 1/1,000 1/100 1/100 
Jihadists 1 1 1 1 
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11.2.3. Interactions 
 
When agents interact, they can communicate and subsequently act on the 
basis of what they learn from these messages (Gilbert 2009: 5). Messages 
can represent spoken dialogue, pure information flow or the monitoring of 
other agents. Information “is collected and processed at the agent level and 
transmitted through interaction structures that are endogenous” (Epstein 
2006: 17). In the present study, the information agents receive through in-
teractions with other agents and by monitoring other agents influences their 
attitude. Depending on the messages they get from others, and on their pre-
sent condition, they begin (or cease) their participation in the conflict. 
 
Table 30: Interactions of Agents 
Icon in 
simulation 
Acting Agent Adaptive Agent/ 
Condition 
Procedure Name 
-  
sympathizers of 
unofficial Islam 
ethnic Muslims proselytize 
 -  
sympathizers of 
unofficial Islam 
arrest of other 
sympathizers of 
unofficial Islam in 
neighbourhood 
protest 
-   
jihadists security forces attack 
 - /  
security forces jihadists, protes-
tors 
arrest 
arrest-protestors 
 -  
security forces sympathizers of 
unofficial Islam, 
if > than 0.1 % of 
total population 
arrest  
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11.2.4. Space and Movement 
As in the social world, agents come into contact with their fellow citizens. 
Therefore, all agents (independently of their ‘breed’) move in a random 
way on the grid (which contains 71x71 ‘patches’ and ‘wraps’ horizontally 
and vertically). This holds true except for those who have been detained or 
are protesting – they stand still.  
The simulated environment is a very abstract representation of the actu-
al physical or ideological landscape of a state. Agents are randomly set up 
in this graphic world, and they meet randomly. Although it would be not be 
difficult to let agents of one group stay closer together than to other groups 
I consider it important in our specific case to let them mix because none of 
these groups are totally isolated from one another. Those groups who do 
not have a social utopian ideology consist of ethnic Muslims and tradition-
alists while those with this ideology aim at proselytizing the others – for 
these reasons they do not seal themselves off to a high degree either. 
11.2.5. Time 
Computer simulations are categorized according to how they deal with 
time. In system dynamics, time is represented continuously because the 
models are based on differential equations. The trajectories of the outcome 
can be calculated on the basis of the equations. At each time step a change 
in the model is realized and implemented numerically. 
In event based models, on the other hand, changes in the model state are 
initiated by events, not by regular time steps. Agent based simulations are a 
special case of discrete time models because they are not based on underly-
ing equations. Instead, the model is represented directly and has an internal 
state produced by agent rules. I use discrete time steps for running the 
simulation. At each time step, the agents recalculate their states. Therefore 
one assumes that the agents’ states are updated discretely at every time 
step, and therefore are synchronous. This, however, is often not the case, 
because a personal computer has a very limited computing power. Instead, 
the agents can be activated either randomly or in a sequential order (agent 
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A, agent B, agent C etc).2 In our simulation the agents are selected random-
ly and the simulation works quasi-continuously.  
11.3. SIMULATION RESULTS: REVIVAL OF ISLAM 
11.3.1. Unofficial Groups Proselytize 
A general trend in the religious development of the Central Asian countries 
is that their populations are becoming more devout. In our opinion, the 
phenomenon of the ‘securitization of Islam’ can only be understood against 
this background. I assume here that devout sympathizers of official and un-
official Islam compete with each other to convert their fellow citizens. 
Figure 13: Different Religious Groups Compete for Influence 
Comment: all groups of devout Muslims proselytize ethnic-Muslims (dis-
played in yellow in the picture above). As a result, these groups grow at the 
expense of the number of ethnic Muslims. In Figure 13 the revival of Islam 
is depicted as a competition between diverse (official and unofficial) devout 
groups to proselytize ethnic Muslims. However, I have learnt that for the 
sake of simplicity it is better to group together all unofficial groups under 
the umbrella term ‘unofficial Islam’ as the simulation would otherwise be-
come too complex and its explanatory power would be diminished. 
2  Another possibility is to simulate a synchronous execution by selecting them 
randomly, but executing their new state only in the next time step (Gilbert 2009: 
28ff). 
272 | SECURITIZATION OF ISLAM IN CENTRAL ASIA
As a consequence, I work with the very simple assumption that unofficial 
Islam is gaining more and more members (due to the proselytizing efforts 
of the diverse groups summarized under this term), as is exemplified in the 
following graph: 
Figure 14: Unofficial Islam Supercedes Official Islam 
I interpret this to mean that official Islam (numbers of ethnic Muslims and 
traditionalists) is losing sympathizers to the unofficial proselytizing groups. 
11.3.2. Influence of Context-Legitimacy on Revival of Islam 
It is easier for devout Muslims to proselytize their co-citizens if the overall 
legitimacy of the state is low. As we have seen in section1.2, and as has 
been shown by many scientists, a poor economic-situation, the lack of op-
portunities for political participation combined with high levels of inequali-
ty have helped foster the dissemination of radical Islamic thought. The pa-
rameter for context-legitimacy presented in the next table ( and introduced 
in Table 28) has an effect on the speed of the revival of Islam. 
Table 31: Context-Legitimacy (Simulation Parameter) 
Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
Context-
legitimacy 
4.25 5.00 4.25 3.5 
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11.4. THREATENED REFERENCE OBJECTS 
 
As has already been demonstrated, state and non-state actors refer to differ-
ent objects in the conflict. The primary implication for the simulation is that 
proselytizing and the arrest of alleged terrorists are interpreted differently. 
We now present how state and non-state actors regard their reference object 
as threatened – a prerequisite to start their securitizting behaviour. 
 
11.4.1. Maintaining Law and Order: Arrests 
 
The government fears not only the danger of terrorist attacks toppling the 
regime but also the prospect of political Islam gaining a critical majority. It 
is therefore the main task of the security forces to maintain ‘law and order’ 
in each respective country. Jihadists who want to establish an Islamic cali-
phate by attacking security forces as well as individuals solidarizing with 
(or protesting for) them are arrested (the latter for abetment). A terrorist at-
tack in the simulation represents a suicide attack. Solidarity with arrested 
agents is represented as ‘peaceful protest’. 
The capacity of each state’s respective security force to arrest citizens 
depends on their resources (personnel and financial resources). In the simu-
lation the security forces’ capacities are assessed by multiplying the number 
of military and police personnel by the per capita military expenditure of 
the state. As we see, the countries’ security capacities are very diverse: The 
relevant parameters for simulation are presented in the next table. 
 
Table 32: Capacities of Security Forces (Simulation Parameter) 
 Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
Capacities of 
Security forces3 
35 11 4 19 
 
                                                   
3  Corresponds to the number of security personnel (Military Balance 2012) per 
5,000 population, multiplied by the per capita military spending (Military Ba-
lance 2012) and divided by 100. 
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11.4.2. Protecting Freedom of Religion: 
Peaceful Protests Against Arrests 
 
Devout Muslims have the human right to worship. Agents identify with 
similar agents in their direct neighbourhood and share information with 
them. Because their reference object (freedom of religion) is threatened, if 
individuals of the unofficial Islamic groups discover that one of their col-
leagues has been arrested, he or she expresses solidarity with the arrested 
individual and shows this by ‘protesting’ against the arrest.  
 
Behaviour-assumption: 
 
• Sympathizers of unofficial Islam disagree with the detention of all ‘al-
leged terrorists’ and show their solidarity with arrested co-citizens in 
their immediate neighbourhood 
 
 
I interpret this to mean that the state loses legitimacy when an arbitrary ar-
rest occurs resulting in a peaceful protest. The more devout Muslims are ar-
rested, the more of them feel threatened by the state and protest against it. 
Figure 15: Arbitrary Arrests Lead to Protest 
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Figure 16: Clouds of Protestors Gather 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend: 
 
 protestor 
 jihadist 
 sympathizers of unofficial Islam 
 sympathizer of official Islam 
 security forces 
 
We can see in the figure above that around arrested individuals ‘clouds’ of 
protestors develop. This is the case because if any detained member of un-
official Islam is in the vicinity of another member of unofficial Islam, the 
latter will protest against the detention of the former. For this reason, the 
number of protestors rises disproportionately to the number of arbitrary de-
tentions. We can furthermore observe how ‘political Islam’ (total number 
of individuals who have taken part in a protest on at least one occasion) 
comes to represent a substantial proportion of unofficial Islam. 
 
Figure 17: Political Islam's Share of Unofficial Islam 
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11.5. SECURITIZING MOVES 
 
11.5.1. Detention of Sympathizers of Banned Groups 
 
If the security forces observe many representatives of unofficial Islam, they 
regard them additionally to jihadists as a threat and therefore ban and arrest 
them. 
 
Behaviour assumptions: 
 
• Security agents observe Muslims who are sympathizers of unofficial 
groups (globally) 
• If their number is more than 0.1% (assumption) they start to securitize 
and arrest them 
 
11.5.2. Radicalization in Prison 
 
If sympathizers of unofficial Islam are detained arbitrarily or because they 
participated in a protest, they might be radicalized in prison. If they are rad-
icalized, they become jihadists – they securitize the protest and attack secu-
rity forces when they are set free. In the following graph we see how ji-
hadists are gaining sympathizers. 
 
Figure 18: Radicalized Detainees Released asJjihadists 
 
 
I assume that the harsher the security forces’ treatment of alleged terrorists, 
the greater the probability that they will be radicalized in prison. One in ten 
detainees would be radicalized if no human rights abuses occurred. The po-
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litical terror scale is used as a multiplying factor for this assumption (the 
higher PTS, the more probable the radicalization). 
 
Table 33: PTS (Simulation Parameter) 
 Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
PTS 4 2.40 2.38 2.75 2.83 
 
                                                   
4  1 – 5 (lower means fewer human rights abuses). 

 
 
12. Model Verification and Validation 
 
 
12.1. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 
As the graphs above have already demonstrated, the revival of Islam, un-
derstood as the increasing influence of unofficial Islamic groups, could be 
simulated without difficulty.  
In contrast to the gradual shift in religiosity, terrorist attacks were much 
more difficult to depict because they happen only occasionally. The main 
difficulty regarding the attacks was that the reach of the security forces is 
not supposed to exceed the reach of the terrorist attacks because otherwise 
no terrorist attacks would ever occur since the terrorists would be arrested 
‘preventively’. Therefore, I handpicked these parameters using probable 
empirical values. To arrive close to these, I chose the impact of terrorist at-
tacks slightly greater than the reach of security forces. 
The arrest of undesirable agents by security forces was easy to imple-
ment and quite similar to Epstein’s civil violence model. As with Epstein, I 
too use a virtual prison-term for both detained terrorists (180 ticks) and de-
tained protestors (40 ticks). This refers to around three to fifteen years in 
prison in the real world. The parameter is the same for all cases although in 
reality the sentences are not the same length in all countries. Nevertheless, 
since it is difficult to obtain reliable estimations of the average arrest-time, 
and also since the parameter does not have a great impact on the outcome, 
these differences were ignored. 
The parameter protest-time was chosen for a short time only (5 time-
steps) because if it is too long the protestors do not stop protesting if their 
neighbours are detained for a long time (however, this is gradually the case 
and therefore no problem with regards to sensitivity – the system should not 
be discarded because of this. 
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Representing the probability of radicalization of arrested Muslims by the 
PTS-value of the respective countries was constructive. If I enhance the 
radicalization rate with a higher PTS the system reacts as it is supposed to: 
subsequently more terrorist attacks occur. The decision to include PTS as 
an empirical factor for further radicalization was a good one, as we will see 
in the next section. 
I conclude that on the whole the model is robust, but draw special atten-
tion to the ratio of the reach of the security forces versus the reach of terror-
ist attacks. Diverse context-legitimacy values do not have a fundamental 
impact on the simulated ‘revival of Islam’; rather the tendency is, as in-
tended, either accelerated or decelerated. 
 
 
12.2. VERIFICATION: MUTUAL REINFORCEMENT 
OF SECURITIZATION 
 
The model successfully represents the intended theoretical assumptions. 
Moreover, it describes the development of an escalating vicious circle of 
repression against devout Muslims and the radicalization of protestors and 
arbitrarily arrested individuals. In the eyes of the security forces, the deten-
tion of devout Muslims is well justified. Therefore they believe that citi-
zens’ protests against these detetions are illegitimate and undermine the au-
thority of the state. As a result, security forces take action against the pro-
testors and round them up. As we can see in the following example, no ter-
rorist attacks or protests will take place unless the government starts to se-
curitize: 
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Figure 19: No Detentions and No Protests 
 
As soon as there are 50 sympathizers of unofficial Islam, however, the se-
curity forces start to arrest them arbitrarily, protest breaks out and the vi-
cious circle gains momentum: the protestors themselves are then arrested 
which leads more individuals to protest:  
 
Figure 20: Detentions and Protests 
 
Here we see that initially the majority of devout Muslims are arrested arbi-
trarily – but they only act as a trigger. After some time (when the protestors 
become more numerous), the number of those who protest rises dispropor-
tionately to the number of arbitrary arrests: the conflict escalates. As a con-
sequence, the number of protestors arrested and the number of those who 
are radicalized in prison and subsequently become jihadists increases. This 
then leads to more terrorist attacks: 
282 | SECURITIZATION OF ISLAM IN CENTRAL ASIA 
Figure 21: Protestors, Jihadists and Casualties 
 
 
 
12.3. VALIDATION: SIMULATION RESULTS AND 
EMPIRICAL DATA 
 
The model represents not only the theoretical assumptions derived from the 
case studies and from securitization theory, but also has important similari-
ties to the real world, as I will show in this section. The graphs presented 
here are the outcomes of ten runs for each case only (which is actually in-
sufficient for deriving stochastically representative statements). Although 
the explanatory power of the simulation would be enhanced with the 
presentation of statistical analyses from the simulation outputs, to do so 
here would go beyond the scope of this study.1 
I present here the correspondence of the simulation results with empiri-
cal data for the main reference values of the study:  
 
• Terrorist attacks 
• Securitization by state actor 
• Violation of human rights by state actor (operationalized as arbitrary ar-
rests of sympathizers of unofficial Islam) 
 
                                                   
1  For example, it would be possible to combine NetLogo mit R or Mathematica 
for this purpose. 
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12.3.1. Terrorist Attacks 
 
The actual number of suicide attacks is highest in Uzbekistan in contrast to 
Kyrgyzstan, which has recorded no attacks up until today. As terrorist at-
tacks are very rare events, it is very difficult to obtain proper simulation re-
sults for them with my model. It was necessary to simulate a cross section 
of only 5,000 citizens from the total population because the program would 
not run correctly if the number were any higher. Due to the fact that signifi-
cantly fewer than one out of 5,000 persons would commit such an attack, it 
was necessary to constrain ourselves with possible sympathizers of suicide 
attacks instead of with the terrorists themselves. For these reasons, the sim-
ulated terrorist attacks were much too frequent in our model (when extrapo-
lated to the total population) and therefore would be better understood as 
potential terrorist attacks (because of the encounters between sympathizers 
of suicide attacks and security forces). However, if I divided my results by 
10,000 (assuming that only one out of 10,000 possible attacks would really 
be executed), the result is very good: Uzbekistan displays the greatest po-
tential for suicide attacks, followed by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajiki-
stan respectively. The table below shows the empirical and the simulated 
data for terrorist attacks. 
 
Table 34: Validation of Terrorist Attacks 
 Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
Empirical Data 
Number of Suicide 
Attacks (Incidents) 
(GTD) 
2 0 1 7 
Simulation Results 
Extrapolated to the 
whole Population 2 
5.0 0.4 0.3 8.1 
 
                                                   
2  Extrapolated for the total population and divided by 10,000. 
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The comparison of the simulated data with suicide attacks does not take the 
Tajik civil war into account because many ‘conventional’ terrorist attacks 
were reported there during this period which could not be represented in the 
simulation. 
 
12.3.2. Introduction of Securitization by State Actors 
 
In the real world, securitization by state actors means the introduction of re-
strictive religious laws. In the simulation here I compare the time span 
(years) since independence until these laws were introduced with the time-
span (ticks) when securitizing behaviour by security forces began. 
 
Table 35: Validation of Timing of Securitizaton by State Actors 
 Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
Empirical Data 
Name of Law Law on Reli-
gious Activity 
and Religious 
Associations 
N 483-IV 
3PK  
On Freedom 
of Conscience 
and Religious 
Organizations  
No 489. Law 
on Freedom 
of Conscinece 
and Religious 
Associations 
On Freedom 
of Conscience 
and Religious 
Organizations  
In force since 2011 (2009) 
Amendments 
2012  
2009 1998 
Simulation Results 
Simulated ti-
me-steps until 
securitizing 
move by state 
actor starts 
46.6 59.3 1.1 1.0 
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As in the real world, so too in the simulation were those two states with the 
most significant religious populations the first to begin the securitization of 
unofficial Islam. The comparison of the order in which securitization com-
menced is therefore represented correctly. However, the simulated differ-
ence in time between them could be more accurate – Tajikistan is actually 
closer to Kazakhstan although it was the second government to introduce 
securitizing religious policies. An important fact in this regard is that the 
fatwas of the Tajik Muftiate started to be very restrictive in the early 2000s 
already. (I consider here only the 2012 law in Kyrgyzstan because it is 
much more restrictive than the 2009 law.) Tajikistan is a special case any-
way as it witnessed a civil war between secular forces and an opposition 
with Islamist participation in the early 1990s.  
 
12.3.3. Arbitrary Arrests, Religious Persecution and  
Banned Groups 
 
Although Kazakhstan was the second last government to begin the securiti-
zation of Islam, in reality it catches up to Tajikistan in terms of the number 
of people detained on religious grounds. As the simulation displays, albeit 
in a slightly exaggerated form, this is also the case in the real world. This 
exaggerated effect does not pose a problem because it may even come clos-
er to reality if I measure state repression against unofficial Islam not only 
by calculating the number of arbitrary arrests in the real world but also by 
using the ARDA religious persecution index. Kazakhstan receives a three 
point grade by this index after Uzbekistan (six points) with Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan, which are much less restrictive, receiving only one point. (I as-
sume here that restrictions on religion have a direct impact on the number 
of arrests on religious grounds as the main restriction in these countries is 
the banning of religious groups whose sympathizers are subsequently im-
prisoned for being sympathizers of an illegal organization.) If we compare 
the ARDA index to my simulation results of arbitrary arrests (as an indica-
tor of the actual state repression of religious groups), we see that it corre-
sponds to it perfectly. However, the data in the table below are the simula-
tion outputs divided by 1,000. Here too the same problem we encountered 
with the attacks persists: the very low numbers cannot be represented cor-
rectly in a simulation of only 5,000 citizens.  
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Table 36: Validation of Constraints on Religious Freedom 
 Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
Empirical Data 
Religious persecution 
Index  (ARDA) 3 
3 1 1 6 
Estimations of current 
detentions on religious 
grounds 
350 50 350 7,000 
Simulation Results 
arbitrary arrests, extra-
polated for the whole 
population (total) 
374 41 50 719 
 
These results furthermore are in agreement with my findings which show 
that Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are more open to non-traditional or political 
Islamic groups than the other two countries, although Kazakhstan is still 
less restrictive than Uzbekistan in this regard as well. The replication of the 
approximations of religiously motivated arrests provided by Memorial 
member of staff Vitaly Ponomarev is not totally correct. Whereas these es-
timations for the real world refer to the number of current detainees on reli-
gious grounds, my simulated data refer to the total number of arrests since 
the beginning of the simulated process (as the detention time for alleged 
terrorists is very long, this does not disturb the comparison too much, 
though). Although the ‘ranking’ of the countries is once again correct, the 
measure for Tajikistan is too low and should be closer to Kazakhstan not 
Kyrgyzstan. Furthermore, the exceptionally high figures for Uzbekistan 
cannot be adequately accounted for. Despite this, a representation of state 
restrictions on religion using the simulated data on arbitrary arrests can be 
said to be quite successful overall. 
 
                                                   
3  Lower means less persecution. 
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Some concluding remarks on the validity of my model: 
 
• A clear representation in the simulation of restrictions on religious free-
dom by means of arbitrary arrests. 
• In a comparison of the four cases, terrorist attacks are correctly repre-
sented in the model although too frequently for a population of 5,000. 
• The introduction of the securitizing move by governments is clearly ex-
plained by a minimum-number of sympathizers of unofficial Islam. Ta-
jikistan is the least well represented case in this regard but this depends 
on the interpretation: if we take the civil war – with the antecedent 
criminalisation of the IRPT – into account, the result might even be cor-
rect in this case. 
 

 
 
13. Conclusions 
 
 
13.1. CONCLUSIONS FROM COMPUTER SIMULATION 
 
A simulation is a simplified picture of the world. The results presented 
above show that my simulation cannot explain the whole ongoing conflict 
between Central Asian governments and non-traditional Muslims. Howev-
er, it does show that some mutual reinforcement – as assumed by securiti-
zation theory – occurs and drives the opponents into a vicious circle of re-
pression and radicalization. 
In concluding that securitization is an important catalyst for the conflict, 
it is important to observe that contrary to government fears that unofficial 
Islam would give rise to political Islam, extremism and terrorism, this has 
not so far been the case: the total number of sympathizers of unofficial 
groups does not necessarily correspond to the number of attacks that occur 
– instead, the number of arbitrary arrests of sympathizers of peaceful unof-
ficial Islamic groups seems to be the crucial factor in determining how 
many terrorist attacks will be carried out. 
 
Figure 22: Simulation Results 
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Securitization theory explains how repressive governmental measures lead 
to the radicalization of Islamists and vice versa: thus a mutually antagonis-
tic vicious circle develops. As we can see from the graph above, in those 
cases where repression is higher, more terrorist attacks occur. Therefore, 
the vicious-circle hypothesis cannot be falsified with my simulation model.  
 
I therefore conclude: 
 
A vicious circle between repressive counter-terrorism measures and the 
radicalization of Muslims persists in Central Asia.  
 
More concretely, the simulation results show: 
 
• The more sympathizers of unofficial groups there are the more the state 
feels threatened by them and the more of them are arrested by security 
forces. 
• There is no correlation between the number of sympathizers of unoffi-
cial groups and the number of terrorist attacks. 
• The higher the number of arbitrary arrests of sympathizers of unofficial 
groups the more terrorist attacks are carried out. 
 
It is important to note, however, that the fears of both parties in the conflict 
are not imaginary but rather tend to provoke disproportionate responses 
from the opposing side. This leads to an escalation. My model does not in-
clude possible deterrence through extremely disproportionate repression. 
Although this would be interesting to elaborate on, since this too is certain-
ly a reality, to stress the radicalizing effect of repression too much might be 
short-sighted. 
 
 
13.2. GENERAL CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Both Central Asian governments and radical Islamic groups depend on be-
ing perceived as legitimate by the broader public. My hypothesis states that 
– contrary to the intended effect – legitimacy shifts from the state to the (Is-
lamic) opposition forces if citizens suffer undifferentiated repression at the 
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hands of government bodies. As my hypothesis cannot be falsified, I as-
sume that in this way a vicious circle between radical Islam and Central 
Asian states developed. Initiated by the general revival of Islam, the Central 
Asian governments came to fear non-traditional Islam as a social and polit-
ical opposition challenge to their power, which in turn led to the introduc-
tion of repressive religious policies. This led to governmental repression, 
not only of members of political and extremist movements but also of ordi-
nary people practising Islam in a strict way – or dressing accordingly. This 
is particularly the case in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan but more recently also 
to an increasing degree in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.  
I have evidence that restrictive religious policies which outlaw moder-
ate fundamentalists successfully diminish the influence of these groups. 
However, the price for this is high if at the same time the few Salafis who 
are not directly affected are radicalized to such an extent that they see all 
means of opposing such repression as justified. I would like to exemplify 
this again with the two extreme examples used in the introduction to this 
study: Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. As I have shown in chapter 9, the reli-
gious policies of the Central Asian states have had a huge impact on the 
practice of religion and on the attendance of religious services. In Kyrgyz-
stan, where only political Salafism is prohibited and apolitical forms of Is-
lam are legal, scripturalist interpretations of Islam and religious worship are 
on the increase. Nevertheless, this country, which has a high percentage of 
people who sympathize with Islamist terrorism, has experienced no terrorist 
attacks up to this day. Conversely, in Uzbekistan, a country where devout 
religious practices are decreasing, all Salafi groups without exception are 
strongly persecuted and yet the country has sustained the highest number of 
terrorist acts of all Central Asian countries and the highest loss of life – 
both through state repression and Islamist attacks. 
Even if I recommend being tolerant towards non-violent Islamists, con-
cerns of secular Central Asians who fear that political Salafis want to intro-
duce conservative sharia laws have to be taken very seriously. From my 
point of view, however, only the rule of law can prevent possibly inhuman 
political demands of such groups. Despite this, it is important to note that 
the legalization of political Islam does entail that it may gain more mem-
bers. 
To conclude, I would like to challenge the efficacy of state repression 
against unofficial Islam with the following normative question: is the re-
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striction of an individual’s human rights legitimate in order to protect the 
abstract concept of an authoritarian regime’s national security? It is possi-
ble that the answer to this question is a very simple one. Or, in the words of 
Fetullah Gülen, a leader who is regarded either as an initiator of religious 
dialogue or a possible terrorist, depending on which side of the conflict you 
are on: 
 
“The Quran says that the killing of a human being is equal to the killing of all hu-
mankind” (Gülen 2012, translated by the author). 
 
If we take a narrow view of a specific situation, limited through situative 
perceptions, arguments and interests, the instrumentalization of the individ-
ual in order to achieve a ‘higher’ goal might seem legitimate. From a more 
global perspective, however, the life or integrity of an individual cannot be 
sacrificed to ensure the security of a whole population since the only means 
of measuring that very security is the violation or integrity of the individu-
al.  
My study shows that the militarily relatively strong countries, if meas-
ured against the number of attacks which actually occurred, do not provide 
better national security than the weaker countries. Instead, they fare worse 
not only with regards to national security but also with regards to human 
security and the protection of human rights. A possible explanation for this 
is that the countries with higher capacities are more capable of implement-
ing their securitizing policies and therefore have to suffer more under its ef-
fects. This is an important finding that adds a clearly elucidated argument 
to the theoretical security discourse on how to define security. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
The following official documents and websites were used for analysing the 
Central Asian governments’ position towards religion: 
 
Parliamentary Websites of the Central Asian countries: 
 
• Kazakhstan: http://www.parlam.kz/en  
• Kyrgyzstan: http://www.kenesh.kg/  
• Tajikistan: http://www.parlament.tj/  
• Uzbekistan: http://parliament.gov.uz/en/, Senate: http://www.senat. 
gov.uz/en/index.html  
 
Constitutions of the Central Asian countries: 
 
• Kazakhstan: http://www.din.gov.kz/eng/pravovaja_baza/ ; http://www. 
constcouncil.kz/eng/norpb/constrk/#note8anc  
• Kyrgyzstan: http://www.legislationline.org/download/action/download/ 
id/3116/file/Kyrgyz%20Constitution%20-%20adopted%20by%20 
referendum%2027%20Jun2010_f_EN.pdf  
• Tajikistan: http://legislationline.org/download/action/download/id/1649/ 
file/5f95858dea5e2a62de84f0c7f650.pdf  
• Uzbekistan: http://legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/15850/ 
preview  
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Religious laws of the Central Asian countries: (24.9.2013) 
 
• Kazakhstan: http://www.legislationline.org/download/action/download/ 
id/4091/file/Kazakhstan_Law_religious_freedoms_organisations_2011_
en.pdf  
• Kyrgyzstan: http://www.atc.kg/doc/zkr/3/ 
• Tajikistan: http://woltj.my1.ru/Doc/ZakPro.pdf  
• Uzbekistan: http://religions.uz/rus/normativnaya_baza/zakoni/  
 
Websites of the Religious Committees of Central Asian countries: 
 
• Kazakhstan: http://www.din.gov.kz/eng/index.php (English), http:// 
www.din.gov.kz/  (Kazakh) 
• Kyrgyzstan: not available 
• Tajikistan: not available 
• Uzbekistan: http://religions.uz/rus  
 
Websites of the Muftiates of Central Asian countries: 
 
• Kazakhstan: http://muftyat.kz/  
• Kyrgyzstan: http://muftiyat.kg/  
• Tajikistan: not available 
• Uzbekistan: http://muslim.uz/  
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APPENDIX B 
 
globals [arbitrary-arrests] 
breed [non-muslims non-muslim] 
breed [muslims muslim] 
breed [unofficial-muslims unofficial-muslim] 
breed [securities security] 
turtles-own [violent-means 
             protest-time 
             participated-in-protest 
             prison-term 
             arrested 
             hit 
             radicalized] 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; SETUP;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
to setup 
clear-all 
setup-patches 
setup-non-muslims 
setup-muslims 
setup-securities 
reset-ticks 
end 
to setup-patches 
ask patches [set pcolor 9.9] 
end 
to setup-non-muslims 
create-non-muslims 1250 
ask non-muslims [setxy random-xcor random-ycor]  
ask non-muslims [set color yellow] 
end 
to setup-muslims  
create-muslims 3250 
ask muslims [setxy random-xcor random-ycor]    
ask muslims [set color 66] 
ask n-of (count muslims / 1000) muslims [set color 74 set breed unofficial-
muslims ] 
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ask one-of unofficial-muslims [set color red set violent-means 1 set size 
1.5] 
end 
to setup-securities 
create-securities capacity-securities 
ask securities [setxy random-xcor random-ycor]    
ask securities [set color 105 set size 1.5] 
end 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; GO;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
to go 
move-turtles 
proselytize 
protest 
arrest 
arrest-protestors 
attack 
radicalize 
ask turtles [if hit > 0 [set hit hit - 1]]  
ask turtles [if prison-term > 0 [set prison-term prison-term - 1]] 
ask turtles [if protest-time > 0 [set protest-time protest-time - 1]] 
tick 
end 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; MOVE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
to move-turtles  
ask turtles with [prison-term = 0] with [protest-time = 0] [left random 360 
forward 1 
end 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;PROSELYTIZE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
to proselytize 
ask n-of ((count unofficial-muslims with  [prison-term = 0] / (100  * con-
text-legitimacy) )+ 1) unofficial-muslims with [prison-term = 0] 
[if any? muslims in-radius 1 [ ask one-of muslims in-radius 1 [set color 74 
set breed unofficial-muslims]]] 
end 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; ARREST;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
to arrest 
ask securities [ifelse (count unofficial-muslims > 10 * context-legitimacy) 
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[ask unofficial-muslims in-radius 1 [ set prison-term 180 ]  
ask unofficial-muslims with [violent-means = 1] in-radius 1 [ set prison-
term 180 ]] 
[ask unofficial-muslims with [violent-means = 1] in-radius 1 [ set prison-
term 180 ]] ] 
ask unofficial-muslims with [color = 74] [if prison-term = 180 [set arbi-
trary-arrests arbitrary-arrests + 1]] 
end  
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; ARREST PROTESTORS;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
to arrest-protestors 
ask securities [ask turtles with [color = black] in-radius 1 [set prison-term 
40]] 
ask turtles with [prison-term = 1]  [set arrested arrested + 1] 
end   
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;PROTEST & SPROUT JIHADISTS;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
to protest 
ask unofficial-muslims [if any? unofficial-muslims with [prison-term > 0] 
in-radius 1  
[set protest-time 5 set color black set participated-in-protest participated-in-
protest + 1]] 
ask unofficial-muslims with [protest-time = 0] with [prison-term = 0] [set 
color 74]  
end 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;ATTACK;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
to attack 
ask unofficial-muslims with [violent-means = 1]  with [prison-term = 0] [if 
any? securities in-radius 1.2 [ask turtles in-radius 1.2 [set hit 2] set pcolor 
black ] ] 
end 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;RADICALIZE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
to radicalize 
ask turtles with [prison-term = 1] [set radicalized random 10 * pts]  
ask turtles with [prison-term = 0] [if (radicalized >= 9) [set breed unoffi-
cial-muslims set violent-means 1 set color red]] 
end  
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APPENDIX C 
 
Table 37: Initial Values and Parameters for Simulation 
 Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
Initial Values 
Security forces 22.5 17 10 15 
Non-Muslims 1,500 1,250 300 350 
Ethnic-Muslims 3,500 3,750 4,700 4,650 
Religiosity of the 
society 
1/1,000 1/1,000 1/100 1/100 
Jihadists 1 1 1 1 
Parameters 
Context-
legitimacy 
4.25 5.00 4.25 3.5 
Capacities of 
Security forces 
35 11 4 19 
PTS 2.40 2.38 2.75 2.83 
 
